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AT THE INTERSECTION OF MIGRATION AND POPULIST POLITICS

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This working paper is the result of panel presentations and discussions at the 23rd International Summer University (Europe in the Vortex of Change), held in Kőszeg in June and July 2018, and sponsored by the Institute for Social and European Studies (ISES), the Institute of Advanced Studies-Kőszeg (iASK), and the University of Pannonia Kőszeg Campus. An additional paper related to migration is presented in Chapter 3, presented by a young researcher at iASK. The papers presented here reflect scientific research on the topic of migration by experts, and also very personal experiences from practitioners working on the ground with migrants and refugees.

This is a working paper of the Polányi Centre at the Institute of Advanced Studies Kőszeg. The series editor is Jody Jensen, the director of the Centre. She is assistant professor at the University of Pannonia and director of the International Studies MA Programme at the University of Pannonia Kőszeg Campus. She is a Jean Monnet Chair for European Solidarity and Social Cohesion (ESSCO). She is a founder of the Institute of Social and European Studies (a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence). Her areas of research at the iASK are prefigurative and subterranean politics about new social and political movements, particularly in East and Central Europe and the Balkans; looking at the conjunction of the social and natural sciences in the study of complexity as it translates to social phenomenon and change; she is also very interested in the transformation of education and the social sciences in response to global challenges.

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COMPLEXITY, CONNECTIONS AND PROSPECTS OF RECENT MIGRATION FLOWS IN THE ADRIATIC-IONIAN AND DANUBE REGIONS

Marco Zoppi

I. Introduction

Since the mass migration registered in 2015 along the so-called Balkan Route, the debate about migration in Europe has quickly polarized between the proponents of unconditional humanitarian solidarity towards asylum seekers and supporters of different degrees of securitization (Braghiroli and Makarychev 2017; Castelli Gattinara and Morales 2017). While the arguments of the former draw on principles of humanitarianism and international law, the latter have especially presented asylum seekers and economic migrants as threats to Europe's national identities, social security and welfare systems. Transcending the specific types of argumentation put forward by each party, the narratives surrounding migration dynamics often seem dominated by an understanding of migration that is strictly associated with the idea of lacking resources and space, both physically and figuratively, to host newcomers. Within this general understanding, the debate has developed in terms of how the reception and integration of asylum seekers can fit into existing communities without generating social tensions, often neglecting the discussion of the territorial needs to which newcomers may contribute through their skills.

In fact, as the research presented here attempts to reveal, many territories across Europe suffer from severe depopulation as well as lack of human labor and capital for sustainable development. According to projections, rural areas especially will be in continuous decline for the next decades, furthering economic disparities with more well-to-do areas (Espon 2017). This is particularly true for EU and non-EU territories in the Adriatic-Ionian and Danube regions which have been exposed for decades and continue to experience remarkable emigration of their populations to seek job opportunities in central and northern Europe (see Vermeulen, Baldwin-Edwards and van Boeschoten 2015; and Map 1 here). Take Bulgaria, a country that in 2050 will have lost almost 30% of its population, if trends are not countered with innovative policies[1]; or again, the forecasted reduction by one fifth of the Albanian population by 2060, to mention the most emblematic cases (Instat 2014). Hence, it appears that in many ways the notion of migration also needs to be reconnected to issues that are overlooked like depopulation and economic decline, and conceptually to the ideas of scarcity and "lack". This missing link has to be stressed further, as it will play a crucial role for defining the future of the EU.

The research project entitled "Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migration and Refugee Flows" has endeavored to explore the dynamics mentioned above through quantitative data analysis and mapping, as well as through qualitative inputs collected via eight case studies. The project team was composed by UNIBO (University of Bologna, Italy, lead partner); CEI (Central European Initiative, Trieste, Italy); UET (European University of Tirana, Albania); UTH- LDSA (University of Thessaly, Greece) and IECOB (Institute for East-Central and Balkan Europe, Forlì, Italy). Project stakeholders were extremely responsive to the outcome of the project; they were led by the Region Emilia-Romagna (Managing Authority of the Interreg VB Adrion) and com-

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1   See: https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/01/11/if-hell-is-other-people-bulgaria-is-paradise

posed of other managing authorities and governing institutions across the Adriatic-Ionian and Danube macro-regions. The targeted area of the project is represented by the Adriatic-Ionian and Danube macro-regions, to which the team has added Macedonia or Rrepublic of North Macedonia and Kosovo[2]. The research project was financed by ESPON, the European Territorial Observatory Network, and run for one year (from July 2017 to July 2018). Complete findings and policy recommendations will be published on the ESPON website.

II. "Unpacking" the Notion of Migration

Map 1: Net migration plus statistical adjustment

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2   The official definition of the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region comprises 8 countries, equally split between EU members (Croatia; Greece; Italy; Slovenia) and non-EU members (Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Montenegro; Serbia). The Danube macro-region consists of fourteen countries, among which nine are EU members: Austria; Bulgaria; Croatia; Czech Republic; Germany (only the Landers Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria); Hungary; Romania; Slovenia; Slovakia, and five non-EU countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Montenegro; the Republic of Moldova; Serbia; and Ukraine (the southern-western regions along the Danube). When data was not comparable, some of the mentioned areas were excluded from the analysis.

Map 1, extracted from the Eurostat Statistical Atlas, shows the crude rate of net migration in 2017 across the macro-regional area (i.e. the difference between the total change and the natural change of the population, plus statistical adjustment). As it emerges, A

Austria and Southern Germany attracted migrants at a very high rate, while countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans largely suffered from moderate to heavy declines in population (signalled in light and dark orange).

The socio-economic consequences affecting depopulating areas include a rise in the elderly dependency ratio (i.e. the number of elderly people compared to the number of people of working age); the downsizing or withdrawal of state-provided social services; gaps in the local labor markets (e.g. agriculture, eldercare). Moreover, as can be seen in Map 1, while human presence in rural areas is becoming increasingly fragmented, cities are increasingly attracting new residents, as centripetal poles for human mobility: Athens, Bratislava, Budapest, Prague, Rome, Tirana, have all increased their resident population over the past few years[3]. This changing socio-economic picture creates governance challenges of different sorts, and it is certainly responsible for part of the social malaise diffused in these territories. Therefore, the inflows of asylum seekers and economic migrants reaching Europe through the so-called Balkan Route, are occurring beside other, overlooked mobility patterns that are concerning the continent.

Against this background, three concepts help when exploring migration in the framework of this research: *complexity*, *connections* and *prospects*. Let us deal with these one by one.

It makes sense to talk first of all about complexity, since migration in the macro-regional area does not only involve "external" flows such as those of asylum seekers and economic migrants. The research team identified at least four diverse mobility patterns:

1) internal flows within each country (e.g. those moving from the countryside to the city);

2) internal flows within the macro-regions (those moving to work, to seek employment, or re-unite with family members in another macro-regional country);

3) external flows to the macro-regions (asylum seekers and economic migrants);

4) Secondary, or onward migrations of those who have been denied protection status in a given country.

Flows in the macro-regions are thus characterized by diversity and multi-directionality.

Connections is another keyword, because macro-regional mobility cannot be understood without an analysis of the implications of persistent economic disparities between areas in the macro-regions, and of the role of diaspora networks in shaping old and new mobility patterns. Equally important is the examination of the long-term effects of the EU enlargement process, and of the financial crisis that hit Southern Europe at the end of the 2010s, which spurred unemployment and return migration. Connections cutting across the targeted area remain vital in making and re-making migration, and are ultimately responsible for maintaining a sub-regional economic system characterized by seasonal and temporary labor migration; circular migration; transborder mobility; return migration; brain drain, to mention some of the most significant mobility dynamics.

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3   This is also confirmed by the comparison of the last census data for the macro-regional countries.

Finally, it is relevant to introduce discourse on prospects in relation to migration flows and socio-demographic trends. In fact, many territories in the targeted area are bound to experience more and more depopulation and ageing issues, and such alarming demographic trends may increase regional disparities and may even threaten territorial cohesion in the near future, if not addressed properly at the policy level.

Approaching such urgent questions from the point of view of territorial socio-economic performance can be particularly effective, because it sheds lights on territories facing similar challenges across countries, underlining at the same time the need for more transnational cooperation to find common solutions that can be reproduceable in all concerned areas. Within the framework of the European Union, territorial cohesion finds a privileged space of policy action within the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Territory-based cooperation is also strengthened through the macro-regional strategies (MRS), which have been increasingly embedded in the European development and integration strategy since the 1990s: the European Commission has described a macro-region as "an area covering a number of administrative regions but with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach" (EC 2009), namely as a multistate area associated with one or more common opportunities or challenges. These *"challenges and opportunities",* as another key EU document asserts, *"are too local to be of direct interest to the whole EU, but on the other hand too broad to be efficiently dealt with at national level"* (EC 2016, original italic). The EU has identified an added value for its territorial policy that is reflected in the implementation of four EU macro-regional strategies: the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, EUSBSR (2009); the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, EUSDR (2010); the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region, EUSAIR (2014); the EU Strategy for the Alpine Region, EUSALP (2015).

III. Evidence of the Different Types of Flows

In this section, I will provide data and cartographic evidence for the types of migration flows previously identified. In most cases, 2015 represents the end year of analysis, because after that data were less reliable and usable for comparative purposes. Nevertheless, the team could expand the analysis to 2016 and 2017 when the data allowed us to do so without methodological or reliability concerns.

Information on internal migration was gathered in each country's national statistical offices, through direct contact or consultation on their websites. The team was interested in collecting statistics on the changes of residence officially reported by citizens to public authorities: these include both de-registrations from previous places and registrations into new places of residence, although the data only provided totals, without registering who exactly moved where. It is important to specify that, as the registration of residence change is in most countries a non-compulsory act, it relies eventually on the citizens' propensity to notify authorities about the change, as well as on the public administration's efficiency to register it. These are important limitations in terms of data availability, for which the team has recommended improvements on the part of institutions in charge of maintaining such registers. Based on available data for 2015, we found 10.027.328 instances of residence change in the 16 macro-regional countries for which such data are made available. When relating residence changes and total population, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary were the countries most affected by internal movements, while Montenegro, Czech Republic, Kosovo and Republic of North Macedonia were at the opposite end of the chart. We also found that in the same year, approximately one in two internal migrants in each country was between 20-39 years old. In particular, the age group of

25-29 year olds were the demographic segment most inclined to move internally (maximum share was 23.9% in Republic of North Macedonia). Also, women aged between 20-39 are more prone to migrate than men in the same age class. In some countries, the difference was not particularly noticeable (such as in Italy and Slovenia), while the gap was much more evident in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia.

For the second typology of flows, the team accessed the Eurostat dataset on "immigration by country of previous residence", which allows the tracking of the country where immigrants used to live before changing residence to a new one. The team produced several maps showing aggregated data about registered immigration instances in the period 2008-2015. Below you can see what the immigration data, according to countries of previous residence in the macro-regions, looks like in the case of Italy:

Immigration in Italy by country of previous residence

Legend
- 2008-2009
- 2010-2011
- 2012-2013
- 2014-2015

700000
600000
400000
200000

© ESPON, 2018

100 km

Territorial level: NUTS 0 (version 2013)
Source: own elaboration, 2018
Origin of data: EUROSTAT Database
University of Geneva for administrative boundaries

Map 2: Immigration to Italy, 2008-2015

The map shows immigration flows (given by the size of the pie charts), while the different colors divide the overall period 2008-2015 in 2-year segments. The map provides, in an intuitive fashion, an assessment of the intense migration flows binding together the macro-region: in total, 1.164.608 instances of residence change are reported. As many as 697.540 people previously

residing in Romania reached Italy in the eight selected years, with a peak in 2008-2009 (282.259). In 2015 alone, those who registered their residence in Italy from the represented countries were almost 78.000. On top of that, we should keep in mind that the Eurostat dataset only takes into account those who have effectively changed their residence throughout the year, and not those that for many reasons (e.g. short or seasonal stays) do not notify public authorities. In other words, we should expect real flows to be larger.

The third typology of flow concerns asylum seekers and economic migrants, the one typology that attracted the most political attention as well as controversial counter measures on the part of governments traversed by the Balkan Route. Map 3 displays a summary of information about the country of origin of asylum seekers applying in one of the EU28 countries between 2015 and 2017.


Map 3: Asylum seekers in EU28 by country of origin

What emerges is that the largest group of asylum seekers was represented by Syrians (749.853), followed by Afghanis (389.172) and Iraqis (277.816). However, it is important to highlight that the following groups in the list were those originating from Serbia and Kosovo (111.950) and Albania (109.936)[4]. In fact, Eurostat data show that in 2015 some 200.000, or 15% of the total asylum applicants in EU28, were citizens of SEE6 countries[5]. In 2016, SEE applicants declined

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4   Note that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR aggregates statistics for Serbia and Kosovo.
5   I use "SEE6" to indicate the following six countries: Albania; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Kosovo; Macedonia Montenegro; Serbia.

to a still considerable 74.000, or 6% of total asylum seekers. Applications from SEE6 countries received very high rejection rates in EU countries, as they were all included in the list of safe countries of origin by EU member states. Eurostat statistics on asylum applications in all EU28 countries show that, out of the total final decision taken on applications submitted by SEE6 citizens in 2015 (86.980), the rejection rate stood at 98%. In 2016 too, the average was very similar (97,8%). The share of rejected applications is considerably higher than the average recorded by all extra-EU28 applicants, whose rejection rates in all EU28 countries for 2015 and 2016 were 85,5% and 82,8% respectively.


Map 4: First time asylum seekers

Map 4 visualizes the migration patterns of asylum seekers, and for this purpose uses UNHCR data on countries of first time application. You can easily spot the countries that have received most applications: Germany, in light red, leads with 1.344.540; Turkey (around 300.508); Italy

(275.014); France (218.716); and Hungary (204.887). The entire SEE6 area plus Romania has received very few applications (some 16.000 altogether in the period 2015-2017, that is to say around 10% of the total). The low share of applications lodged in the mentioned countries trigger further questions about their territorial attractiveness; efficiency of asylum procedures and integration policies; governments' willingness to manage migration or interest in "passing on the people to neighbors further along the route" (EC, 2015: 2).

Even though data about the destination of secondary movements is still scarce, the team has attempted to outline at least the entity of the flow in question, elaborating on Eurostat yearly statistics on "Final decisions on applications by citizenship", from which the team extrapolated only decisions ended with rejection. One of the resulting maps included in the project report is presented here below. The "location index for rejected applications" enables the identification of the countries that display a rejection rate higher than the EU28+ average (for countries with available data). The dark purple-toned countries have the higher rejection rates.

Map 5: Location Index

IV. Comparative Remarks

In light of the given overview of migration flows in Europe, and particularly in the Adriatic-Ionian and Danube macro-regions, it is possible to offer a few comparative remarks. The results of the project suggest that besides flows of asylum seekers and economic migrants, the area is impacted by intense internal flows of EU and non-EU citizens. Take for example Slovenia, which in 2015 received 208 asylum applications; it acquired 12.585 new residents (only from countries in the two macro-regions); and registered 47.405 instances of internal residence change. Or Slovakia, which in the same year registered 329 asylum applications, 4.094 macro-regional migrants, and as many as 90.831 internal migrants. In addition, all analyzed territories are experiencing growing rates of urbanization that should attract more attention from policymakers. Some countries, however, are more affected than others: Albania, Hungary, Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovakia present the most dichotomic contexts in which only a few cities, if not only the capital, are attracting most of the internal and international immigrants while rural areas face depopulation. More than 31% of the Montenegrin population live in the capital Podgorica, and similar high rates also characterize Budapest and Tirana. The analysis of statistics on asylum seekers[6] reveals that throughout the period 2008-2015, 94% of the total applications were lodged in just five macro-regional countries: Germany, Italy, Hungary, Greece and Austria (circa 1.950.000); the remaining countries received limited applications, ranging from the slightly more than 40.000 in Bulgaria, to a few hundred in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the period 2015-2017 only, Hungary, Sweden, Austria and Germany were the countries who received most oft he first-time asylum seekers in relation to their population, while Croatia, Romania, Czech Republic and Bosnia and Herzegovina had rates below the EU28+ average.

V. Conclusion

The migration dynamics explored here reveal that even besides asylum flows, mobility is a defining feature of the European Union and its neighbors. Mobility, through the form of brain drain, has contributed and still contributes to the EU territories' economic performance. By the same token, continuing emigration is leading to widespread depopulation and ageing in Southeastern Europe, although these problems are not always acknowledged at either the national or supranational level (Vračić 2018). Coping with Europe's present and future challenges requires "place-based" knowledge of territorial dynamics at the economic as well as demographic levels, as issues of urbanization, depopulation, territorial cohesion, sustainable development and xenophobia are more closely related that what is usually thought. A proper understanding of this multifaceted mobility and its implications is therefore both necessary to manage and to turn all forms of migration intertwining Europe into an asset, thereby shedding new light on what today is often depicted in public debates as a threat to security and prosperity.

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6   The source here is the "Applied during the year" dataset provided by UNHCR.

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RUSSIA'S EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING MIGRATION FLOWS: AN EVER INCREASING TASK

Elena Alekseenkova

Discussions on the role of migration and migrants in the development of the EU countries continue in the European Union. Sharp discrepancies in refugee policy are observed both among EU countries and between public groups within specific countries. Migration issues have become key points in the programs of political parties and decisive issues of confrontation between political leaders. International organizations such as the OSCE and IOM try to formulate basic principles for the global governance of migration that highlight the problem of changing public perceptions of migration and migrants as the main task. Their efforts are aimed at helping to transform migration from a „threat" into a „resource" for the economic development of EU countries that would become host countries. For Russia this problem is also relevant since **Russia still does not have a consistent and comprehensive migration strategy that would be founded on the "migration is a resource" idea**.

The period after the collapse of the Soviet Union was very challenging for Russia from the perspective of demographics and migration. The huge loss of population after the new borders were implemented, the **unfavourable demographic trends** (the declining and ageing of the population) were compensated only partially by the flow of temporary and permanent migrants from other post-Soviet states. A visa-free regime, introduced for the former Soviet republics, has helped maintain communication among civil societies of the former soviet republics in a situation where the new borders between countries have artificially separated families, relatives and compatriots who had lived in a common country for centuries and generations. Since the 1990s and up until now, the total decrease of population in Russia has been 13 million people. This drop was almost compensated by migrants coming from the former USSR members (9,3 million). Nevertheless, the tendency of depopulation is still relevant for Russia. Some positive demographic trends in births rates in previous years (when there was a 250.000-300.000 growth in numbers) took place, but unfortunately this tendency did not prove to be permanent. According to statistics, during 2017 there were 10% less children born in Russia than in 2016. The latest research forecasts the loss of 12 million from the work force by 2030[7]. This means that in the foreseeable future Russia will face a dire need of human resources to support its economic development. Today Russia is the main destination for most of the migrants from the post-soviet space, but there are two major problems that Russia will evidently face in the near future. First, these migration flows are changing qualitatively and Russia has to adapt itself to these changes. Second, the most complicated issue is the quality of the incoming labor force and its correlation to the needs of Russia's economy. We will proceed by going into greater detail about these two challenges.

At least two thirds of migrants in Russia come from the former USSR. According to the population census of 2010, 10.5 million migrants came from the former USSR. 57% of those who came to Russia from these countries after 1991 were ethnically Russians. But if in the 1990s and the first decade of 20th century most people coming to Russia were ethnically Russians or

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7   http://www.rosbalt.ru/russia/2018/01/30/1678447.html

from mixed families, *today* **the characteristics of migration flows to Russia have changed a lot**. The flow of ethnic Russians or so-called "compatriots" is nearly exhausted. Those Russians who still live in former post-soviet countries are highly unlikely to come to Russia because they are already well-integrated into those communities. Launched in 2007, the state program of resettlement of compatriots helped to bring back just 656.300 people[8]. According to IOM statistics, there is the potential return of about 5-10 million compatriots, but the probability of their return is very low.

Total amount of foreign citizens in Russia, 1 February 2017[9]

Country	Amount (pers.)
Azerbaijan	530.131
Armenia	451.554
Belarus	697.797
Kazakhstan	570.393
Moldova	479.487
Tajikistan	866.679
Uzbekistan	1.513.694
Ukraine	2.409.074
Kyrgyzstan	593.760
CIS total	8.112.569

8   http://www.aif.ru/dontknows/actual/skolko_sootechestvennikov_vernulos_v_rossiyu_ po_programme_pere-seleniya
9   https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2017/03/17/58ca55a39a794772eb8b702e

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
(persons)

	1997	2000	2005	2010	2013	2014	2015	2016
Immigrated to the Russian Federation - total of which írom:	**597651**	**359330**	**177230**	**191656**	**482241**	**590824**	**598617**	**575158**
CIS countries	547386	326561	163101	171940	422738	529448	536157	511773
Azerbaijan	29878	14906	4600	14500	23453	26367	24326	24109
Armenia	19123	15951	7581	19890	42361	46568	45670	43929
Belarus	17575	10274	6797	4894	15748	17931	17741	14590
Kazakhstan	235903	124903	51945	27862	51958	59142	65750	69356
Kyrgyzstan	13752	15536	15592	20901	30388	28543	26045	28202
Republic of Moldova	13750	11652	6569	11814	28666	32107	34026	32418
Tajikistan	23053	11043	4717	18188	51011	54658	47638	52676
Turkmenistan	16501	6738	4104	2283	5986	6038	6539	7242
Uzbekistan	39620	40810	30436	24100	118130	131275	74242	60977
Ukraine	138231	74748	30760	27508	55037	126819	194180	178274

Russia in figures. Official publication. Federal State statistic service. 2017.[10]

Another recent change is that the numbers of those coming from the western part of the post-soviet space are constantly decreasing, while the number of those coming from Central Asia is rising. This situation reflects the demographic trends of countries of origin: in Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldova the same processes of an ageing population take place as in Russia and, in addition, these countries have recently implemented visa-free regimes with the EU. So the significant part of migrants from these countries is expected to be redirected towards the EU. In contrast, the Central Asian countries, first of all Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have very high birth rates and young populations. For example, more then 1/3rd of the Kyrgyz population are children and adolescents; 60% of the population are of working age and only 7% over the working age[11]. Additionally, the latest research in Russia demonstrates a rise in the number of migrants coming from rural areas. They are less educated and may not even speak Russian. Only 20% of migrants coming to Russia have higher education, about 40% have secondary education, only 30% have professional education. 40% of migrants come to Russia without any work experience at home. More than 65% of those coming receive their first jobs in Russia that do not correlate with their education. More than 60% of migrants, working in Russia, according to the polls, are not interested in improving their qualifications. 60% of those who worked in their countries of origin have less qualified jobs and positions in Russia than in their home countries.

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10 Russia in figures. Official publication. Federal State statistic service. 2017.
11 https://knews.kg/2016/04/11/naselenie-kyrgyzstana-molodeet/

All these figures lead to the conclusion that Russia can not expect Russian-speaking, well-educated, qualified and culturally close migrants any more. The quality of migrant flows to Russia has changed drastically and this will have inevitable consequences for the Russian society and economy. Leaving the economy for the second part of this article, let's first look at the problems that migration places on Russian society.

The main problem of Russia's migration policy today is that it **lacks conceptual clarity** and clear guidelines for the future. **This considerably disorients the host society.** Russia has never managed to arrive at a conclusion based on the adequate assessment of how many migrants it needs, and what their role in the future development of the country should be. This has resulted in inconsistent administrative decisions, disoriented Russian society and reduced Russia's attractiveness to migrants. The institutional changes of recent years reflected this inconsistency: in 2004 the separate state body – the Federal Migration Service – was created to manage migration in Russia. In 2016 it was eliminated and all its functions were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, which actually means the "securitisation of migration" and almost no attention to the issues of integration and adaptation of migrants. One of the most important failures of Russia's migration policy has been **the neglect of the need to help migrants to adapt and integrate into the new society.** Russian officials highlight the migrant's need to integration or even assimilation, but they put the total responsibility for integration on the migrants themselves who are solely responsible for their own integration. But the fact is that today a new generation of migrants is coming to Russia that is less educated, with little or no knowledge of Russian and no cultural so-called "post-soviet legacy" – so there is a dire need for special programs for their integration and adaptation, starting with language courses and ending with the possibility to receive a technical education.

Anti-migrant sentiments in Russian society are decreasing at the moment, as recent research show (from 81% in 2013 to 54% in 2017), but they are still rather high. Society is polarized, with politicians and the public having different views as to whether Russia should attract migrants in order to resolve its demographic and economic problems or to ban the number of incoming migrants. Opinion polls indicate that a growing proportion of the Russian population supports a strict line on migration. Against this backdrop, following a migration policy aimed at increasing Russia's attractiveness to migrants appears to be a difficult task.

The so-called **"securitization of migration"** is a tendency in Russia as well as in Europe. Russia's media has showed natives of Central Asia as involved in every underground terrorist cell, every terrorist attack staged or prevented in the country over the past few years. In many cases, these people had entered Russia as labour migrants. According to Alexander Bastrykin, who heads the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, "recruiters deliberately exploit the immigrant community to radicalize CIS citizens who have failed to adapt in Russia; they aim to set up so-called sleeper cells that could be used in terrorist attacks [...]" It appears, however, that the policy of "stricter control over migration flows" promoted by the Investigative Committee is unlikely to solve the problem on its own.

Besides strict security control, **the state has a broad range of social integration methods in its toolbox that could help to prevent the radicalization of migrants**: the education system, the regulated labour market, legal protection mechanisms, the cultural environment and the everyday practices of social integration. If used wisely, these instruments might help rectify the situation. The system of education, including religious instruction, needs to be adjusted to the new reality: research indicates that recruiters most often succeed in indoctrinating young people who have a rather vague idea about Islamic traditions and the key canons of Islam. Such

young people are offered vague knowledge of religion, frequently those promoted by theologians in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. As for the labour market, it would be advisable to replicate some of the practices used in EU countries that test every newly arrived immigrant to assess their level of education and professional competencies, run career enhancement programs, and offer free language courses. Italy for example is achieving good results with its own system: it involves immigrants in such activities as restoring furniture and buildings, provides them with employment opportunities, including as tour guides for compatriot tourists, etc. The OECD is working to improve this program: the organization reports that 27% of highly qualified migrants are still unemployed, and 26% of those employed are overqualified for their positions. What is important here is that the EU makes a point of analyzing each immigrant's education level and competencies. This approach makes it possible to kill two birds with one stone: the immigrants get an opportunity to find their niche, and the host countries use additional personnel resources to develop their economies.

We have come closer to the issue of the labour market and migration as a possible economic resource to compensate demographic losses in Russia. This is a strategic challenge for Russian migration policy today. The main tasks are as follows:

1) Compensation for the natural population decline by stimulating migration from abroad and stabilizing the size of the country's permanent population;

2) Fulfillment of the labour market's demand for additional workers against the backdrop of a reduction in national labour resources by attracting temporary international labour migrants.

The state **migration policy** that was adopted in 2012, while officially stressing "positive potential inherent in the migration processes," has failed to support the internal logic of the practical measures and institutional decisions being taken to manage migration processes. There are still no answers to important questions to the desired scale, structure and vectors of migration processes, and to turning migration from a "threat" factor in the public consciousness into a factor that would facilitate its progressive development.

The most important problem for Russia now is the lack of understanding of the real scale and structure of migration inflows, and of the role that migrants play in the country's economy. There is still no adequate methodology to assess the country's demand for a professional and qualified workforce. There are no methodologies to assess the qualifications and skills of people coming. As a result, despite the significant numbers of incoming migrants, the unmet demand for workers remains steadily high, and the current **migrant qualification potential** often remains under exploited. Russia's economy cannot yet exploit the potential labour force and that is why migration for Russia is still not viewed as a resource. The migration policy fails to reflect the general situation in the Russian labour market. Additionally, taking into account the declining quality of migrant flows (in terms of their qualifications and language skills), Russia has to acknowledge that it needs to invest a lot into the incoming human capital before it will become a **real resource** for the developing economy. Russia should invest in the education of migrants, their professional training, language knowledge and in labour market infrastructure. Today the **official labour migration infrastructure**, i.e. the complex of consultancy and information services intended both for Russian employers wishing to attract foreign labour and for foreign citizens seeking employment in Russia, remains underdeveloped. As a result, the hiring of foreign workers by Russian employers remains disorganized, largely spontaneous, with the involvement of shadow ethnic groups playing the role of efficient employment mediators for migrants and e12ntrepreneurs.

The **common labour market** model created within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015 implemented the freedom of travel and employment for citizens of the EAEU member states. This was an important incentive for the countries of origin of migrants that gave their citizens a possibility to work in Russia in better institutional and juridical conditions than migrants from the countries outside the EAEU. Some facilitation measures for labour force movement inside the Eurasian Economic Union were also introduced such as access to emergency medical services inside the countries of the EEU, the acknowledgement of diplomas, etc. But there is still a lack of infrastructure, i.e., services and information that could facilitate the process of hiring and getting jobs.

The problem of qualifications, education and skills of migrants is also not decided yet in the EAEU. Despite the formal acknowledgement of diplomas, the difference in educational standards in Russia and other EAEU countries does not allow Russian entrepreneurs to rely on formal diplomas. There is a dire need for common higher educational and professional education standards inside the EAEU as well as for common approaches to the estimation of labour market demand and supply. The initiative of an electronic labor exchange is promised to be implemented in the Eurasian Economic Union to facilitate the search for employers and employees.

Besides the EAEU, there are some attempts to regulate migration flows from Central Asia. One of them is the introduction of a system of organized migrant employment in the frames of special bilateral agreements with countries of origin, Uzbekistan for example. This year the agreement with Uzbekistan should be implemented. There are also negotiations between Russia and Tajikistan to sign an agreement on organized employment.

Another aspect of the Russian migration policy is the introduction of a separate migration channel for **highly qualified specialists**. The goal is to increase Russia's attractivity to highly qualified foreign professionals who could contribute new knowledge to the creation of modern production facilities in Russia for it to reach the status of a developed economy. But the results of this program until now are rather moderate: during the 2011-2016, only 150.000 work permits were issued for highly qualified specialists. The reason for this seems to be the poor attractivity of Russian living conditions and the high level of bureaucratic work required to receive the necessary permissions to work in Russia.

The scale of illegal migration and unregistered migrant employment is declining today, but it is still rather high[12]. According to official data, there were about 2.6 million illegal migrants in Russia in 2017. There are two basic reasons for illegal migration in Russia. First is the existing economic system in Russia with its significant informal economy ("grey zone"), where migrants work without contracts or legal status. The second is the administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to the acquisition of work permits by foreign citizens in Russia, forcing them to seek employment illegally or even staying in the country illegally. Illegal migration and the unregistered employment of foreign citizens leads to the deterioration of the labour market, erosion of fair competition in the labour market and discrimination against national workers.

Today Russia faces a lot of challenges in terms of managing migration flows and trying to benefit from migration as a resource. Among these challenges there are the qualitative changes of migrant flows into Russia, the lack of consistent and coherent policy towards migration, the lack of methodologies that could help to assess the economic needs for a foreign labour force and assessment of the the quality of the incoming labor force and its correlation with the needs of the Russian economy. The permanent exchange of experience between the EU and Russia could help to improve migration management policy in every country.

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12 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/59e9baea9a7947705a3506dd

UNILATERAL DECISIONS ON MIGRATION AND THEIR EFFECTS:
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL STATUS QUO ON REFUGEES, HARM AND RESPONSIBILITY

Felix Bender

Introduction

Throughout the year 2018, a number of EU countries adopted harsh immigration policies. This is not only the case for countries at the EU periphery, but also for core EU states such as Denmark, Sweden and Germany. Contrary to the often voiced plans to develop an EU-wide action plan with regards to refugee admission, most countries have acted unilaterally. Yet, as this paper attempts to show, such unilateral actions are interwoven. Unilateral decisions on harsher immigration policies, this paper argues, cause ripple effects that are felt far beyond the borders of each particular state. Such decisions have resulted in other countries adopting similar measures and have impacted the conditions faced by refugees in a number of detrimental ways, far beyond the borders of the EU. The paper will first explore some of the decisions on harsher immigration policies made throughout 2018. It will then draw on past decisions on various ways of restricting access to claiming asylum and show that unilateral decisions have structurally determined the creation of an international scheme of harsher immigration policies. Such international status quo has resulted in additional barriers to refugees seeking international protection. For refugees, they present additional sources of threats to serious harm, even if the magnitude of combined unilateral decisions were not planned as such by each individual state. Past experience, the article concludes, may provide us with ample information about what we ought to expect from unilateral decisions on harsher immigration policies in 2018.

Unilateral Decisions on Harsher Immigration Policies – 2018

In July 2018, the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) pushed for additional restrictions of access for asylum seekers attempting to enter Germany. Their plans foresaw additional border controls on its southern border between Bavaria and Austria and the creation of extrajudicial zones in which asylum seekers may be held pending a fast decision on their claims.[13] In most cases, so the argument by the CSU, refugees would then be deported to the country of first entry into the EU – a measure that sought to reinstate the rules of the Dublin regulation, which has mostly broken down since 2015. Such plans were, of course, not original. They attempted to emulate the policies of the Hungarian government that has erected a border fence along its entire border to Serbia in 2016 and has established border zones that function as holding centers featuring fast track asylum decisions for arriving refugees. Yet, before returning to this subject, it seems prudent to consider the consequences of the announcement of such plans.

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13 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/world/europe/germany-merkel-migrants-bavaria-seehofer.html

In just 24 hours, the Austrian government reacted to the plans issued by the German conservatives. Chancellor Sebastian Kurz announced the following day that if Germany were to control its borders, Austria will follow suit. Plans to control the Brenner pass to Italy circulated, aiming at rejecting and sending back refugees coming from Italy.[14] In a speech before the European Parliament he subsequently argued for a "paradigm shift in migration", that would allow for a Europe without internal borders only in the long term.[15] The message by the German and Austrian governments was heard by other European leaders in countries further south. Italy had already begun adopting harsher policies towards refugees with calling back its rescue missions, obstructing rescue operations by civil society actors and denying other rescue ships access to its harbors. In June 2018, Italy refused the MS Aquarius to dock at its ports. The rescue ship carried 629 refugees that were saved from drowning in the Mediterranean a few days before.[16] Following Italy's refusal to allow the refugees off board, the ship was stranded in the Mediterranean for several days without adequate water, food and medical supplies. The captain of the ship requested permission to land in several other ports of EU countries but was denied by all. It took several days until the Spanish government declared itself willing to let the boat dock in one of its harbors. The harsh stance that northern European states took with regards to refugees, denying them entry into their countries and threatening deportation back to the country of first entry into the EU caused the countries at the EU periphery to tighten their policies towards refugees themselves. Knowing that international refugee law does not allow for refoulement of refugees once they have set foot on their territory, the only way to keep from adhering to international law was therefore to keep refugees away from their borders. In the Mediterranean this has taken the shape of cancelling back their rescue operation (notably the relatively successful "Mare Nostrum" operation by the Italian government)[17], denying access to ports to rescue ships,[18] seizing the ships of humanitarian volunteers who have sought to take up the work these governments refrained from doing and financing the coast guards of states such as Libya to keep refugees from entering their waters.[19] Italy is not alone with implementing such practices. States such as Malta have adopted similar measures. On July 4, it has seized the "Moonbird", an aircraft operated by the Swiss Humanitarian Pilots Initiative (HPI) that has participated in saving over 20,000 people in the Mediterranean in 2017 alone.[20] The decisions taken by core EU countries, such as Germany, reverberated throughout the entire EU and, as we shall see further below, also had significant effects on refugees' lives beyond the borders of the EU. Those decisions, designed to bypass the responsibilities of states under international refugee law, have caused much more than the individual resignation of a few states from acknowledging responsibilities towards refugees. In fact, they have led to the creation of a structured international scheme of imposing barriers and harm on refugees. They have led to a – perhaps unwanted – uncoordinated international status quo that subjects refugees to additional harm.

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14 https://www.politico.eu/article/sebastian-kurz-austria-to-impose-brenner-controls-if-germany-turns-back-refugees/

15 See the keynote address of Chancellor Kurz to the European Parliament on July 4th, 2018: https://www.eu2018.at/latest-news/news/07-04-Grundsatzrede-vor-dem-Europ-ischen-Parlament---Priorit-ten-des--sterreichischen-EU-Ratsvorsitzes-pr-sentiert.html

16 See: The Guardian on 11th of June 2018: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/11/un-calls-for-migrant-ship-to-be-allowed-to-dock-in-italian-port

17 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk

18 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44668062

19 https://euobserver.com/migration/140067

20 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/malta-blocks-moonbird-plane-mediterranean-refugee-crisis-ngo-sea-watch-italy-libya-eu-a8430756.html

Learning from Experience – The Effects of Unilateral Decisions on Harsh Immigration Policies

We may draw on ample experience in determining the effects of unilateral decisions on harsh immigration policies. In 2015, the Hungarian government decided to seal its borders by erecting a razor wire fence stretching along its entire border to Serbia. Not unlike the plans of the German conservatives that would attempt to emulate this decision 3 years later, the Hungarian government aimed at keeping refugees from launching asylum claims. On September 15th 2015, a law passed by the Hungarian government came into effect. It disallowed refugees from crossing the border at any point other than at the newly created "transit zones".[21] These zones, which sought to concentrate refugees throughout the country, consist of two heavily guarded container camps surrounded by razor wire at the Hungarian-Serbian border. According to this law, refugees would need to ask for permission to enter the transit zone, where their asylum claims would be determined. Since the implementation of this law, the number of refugees allowed to enter and lodge an asylum claim was systematically lowered from 30 a day to 2 a day. This meant that only one refugee could enter one of the two transit zones per day, leaving families and thousands of other refugees stranded beyond the borders. The decision to seal its borders coincided with the declaration by the Hungarian government that Serbia ought to be viewed as a "safe third country", which meant that refugees that could not demonstrate why they are unsafe in Serbia, did not possess a valid claim to asylum in Hungary.[22] The same law also foresaw heavy penalties on crossing the borders elsewhere. Crossing the border alone could result in a one-year prison sentence. Damaging the border fence (which was a necessity for crossing the border) foresaw a prison sentence of up to three years. This was accompanied by additional police forces and the army being deployed at the Hungarian borders. The government also condoned private vigilante groups chasing down refugees, apprehending and mistreating refugees at the border. Refugees that were apprehended by either the police, the army, private vigilante groups, or the newly established police force officially named "border hunters" were often subjected to cruel treatments amounting to serious human rights violations. This was much less sporadic than it was a programmatic treatment of refugees crossing the border into Hungary. After being apprehended by one of these groups operating at the border to Serbia, refugees were subjected to beatings and other forms of inhumane treatment. In an account that reflect other cases of refugees being apprehended at the Hungarian border, "Abdullah" describes the treatment he suffered after being apprehended in Hungarian territory after crossing the border on May 23rd, 2016:

> "We were tired but if we lagged behind they would beat us with their batons to keep us going. They took us back to where we crossed the border and made us stop about 100 meters from the fence. About 30 police were gathered…They wore dark blue uniforms, there was also one in grey. They told us to sit and put our heads in our hands and not lift our heads to look around. But I managed to see that they brought two big spray canisters from the cars. They started beating us with batons while we sat and stared at the ground. Then they told us to stand up and run up to the fence and they kept beating us as we were running. We came about 10 meters from the fence and saw a small hole, full of razor-wire and sharp edges in three layers.
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> They brought plastic cuffs and tied our hands in front of our bodies. I was the first in line and all of a sudden a police officer came and sprayed my face. I couldn't see as he made

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21 See: Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2017): Pushed Back at the Door: Denial of Access to Asylum in Eastern EU Member States. Available under: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/pushed_back.pdf, p. 12.

22 See: https://www.asylumineurope.org/news/30-03-2017/hungary-adopts-list-safe-countries-origin-and-safe-third-countries

me crawl through the razor-wire, so I cut my leg and hands badly. After that, I was inside the layers of the fence when he started kicking the fence to make the razor injure me. He then kept kicking my butt to make me crawl faster through the fence. My eyes were full of tears and my hands cuffed in front of me. They swore and laughed at me during the whole time."[23]

Such treatment of refugees continues, largely unobserved internationally, until today. In 2017 alone, approximately 10000 refugees were apprehended.[24] The unilateral decision of the Hungarian border can be described as policy of deterrence, detainment and deportation. It is designed to deter refugees from entering Hungarian territory. If they do so legally, they are detained in transit zones. As a consequence of the safe third country rule they are then often "deported" to Serbia. If they cross the border elsewhere, they are pushed back to Serbia, needing to fear severe violations of their human rights.

The unilateral decision to seal its borders combined with a policy of deterring refugees from entering Hungarian territory and lodging asylum claims had significant effects beyond the Hungarian borders. These decisions had immediate effects on the treatment of refugees not only in Hungary but all throughout the so called "Balkan Route". Seeing border fences going up and the Balkan Route's bottleneck being closed, other countries copied the Hungarian solution: none wanted to host those refugees that could no longer go on to seek protection in the country of their destination. The unilateral decision of the Hungarian government had, at the time, created a ripple effect of border controls and abuses of refugee rights that reached far back into Turkey. Slovenia and Croatia soon began adopting similar measures. In March 2016, both these countries effectively sealed their borders to refugees after Sweden had begun controlling the borders to Denmark, Denmark to Germany, Germany to Austria and Austria to Slovenia.[25] Macedonia followed suit shortly after by erecting barbed wire fences and deploying army troops at their borders themselves.[26] Those unfortunate refugees that were violently pushed back from Hungary to Serbia subsequently ran the risk of being caught up in a chain of push backs: from Serbia to Macedonia and from Macedonia back to Greece, often suffering beatings, humiliation and theft of their belongings by private vigilante groups or police forces along the way.

Not unlike other policies of "non-arrival", such as visa requirements or carrier sanctions for airline companies carrying persons without valid immigration documents[27], such harsh immigra-

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23 Human Rights Watch (2016): Hungary: Migrants Abused at the Border: Ensure Asylum Access; Investigate Cruel, Violent Pushbacks. Available under: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/13/hungary-migrants-abused-border

24 See: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/HHC-Hungary-asylum-figures-1-December-2017.pdf

25 See also: Kallius, Annastiina (2017): The East-South Axis: Legitimizing the "Hungarian Solution to Migration". In: Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales. Vol. 33. No. 2 & 3, 133-155.

26 See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-macedonia/macedonia-closes-border-to-illegal-migrants-police-official-idUSKCN0WB0Z0

27 Visa restrictions and carrier sanctions were early versions of "non-arrival" policies, designed to keep refugees from reaching their point of destination and from lodging asylum claims. The legal and moral implications of these have been discussed widely in the literature. See as examples: Gibney, Matthew (2006): 'A Thousand Little Guantanamos': Western States and Measures to Prevent the Arrival of Refugees. In: Tunstall, Kate E. (ed.) (2006): Displacement, Asylum, Migration: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2004. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 139-169.; Feller, Erika (1989): Carrier Sanctions and International Law. In: International Journal of Refugee Law. Vol. 1. No. 1. 48-66.; Rodenhäuser, Tilman (2014): Another Brick in the Wall: Carrier Sanctions and the Privatization of Immigration Control. In: International Journal of Refugee Law. Vol. 26, No. 2. 223-247.

tion policies have caused a ripple effect. Unilateral decisions have evolved to form an international status quo that allows states to shun their obligations under international refugee law at the price of subjecting refugees to additional harm other than the threats of harm they have fled from. Barred from moving on, refugees are either stuck in orbit or in squalid refugee camps. Not able to move either on nor back, those stuck are confined to a life without much hope for betterment. The ripple effect of harsh immigration policies has caused an international status quo in which they are barred from applying for international protection, yet do not receive the minimal benefits of living in a refugee camp. Often, these refugees live in makeshift camps lacking adequate food, shelter and medical supplies as happened along the Balkan route. Those refugees waiting for being admitted in the Hungarian transit zones camped in a strip of land in front of the Hungarian border fence, yet on Hungarian territory. Refugees stranded in Serbia and Macedonia suffered from similarly detrimental conditions. The ripple effect of border closures was even felt in Greece, where refugees are confined to a life in squalid refugee camps for an unforeseen amount of time. Yet, the ripple effect is not confined to Europe alone. The ripples spread far beyond the borders of the EU, impacting the ability of refugees to leave northern African countries and a life in the makeshift camps they are forced to live in.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: What are We to Expect and Is There a Way Out?

The ripple effect of harsh immigration policies that emanated from Hungary's unilateral decision to close down its borders provides us with ample information on the effects of unilateral decisions on harsh immigration policies. Such policies do not only concern those refugees directly affected. The effects spread like ripples from one country to the next. Border controls in countries such as Germany are likely to affect immigration policies in Austria. These, in turn, affect decisions on "non-arrival" policies in EU periphery countries such as Italy, Spain, Malta and Greece. The practice of avoiding to take on moral and legal responsibilities towards refugees cause effects on the lives of refugees far beyond the borders of the European Union. It has also started to affect countries south of the Mediterranean such as Algeria. With an eye to harsher immigration policies being enforced by EU states, these countries seem equally unwilling to be the state that loses out, having to host those refugees that EU states reject. Algeria has already begun with the push backs of refugees, packing them into trucks and abandoning them in the Saharan Desert. Last year alone approximately 13,000 refugees were abandoned in the Saharan Desert to wander off by foot into the direction of Niger and towards likely death in temperatures reaching 48°C.[28]

Unilateral decisions on harsh immigration policies have created an international status quo that allows each state to bypass their obligations under international refugee law, creating detrimental conditions for refugees. While the ripple effect of harsh immigration policies is easily triggered through unilateral decisions, it proves much harder to undo its effects: an uncoordinated system of additional barriers and harms imposed on refugees. To undo these effects requires more than unilateral action. It requires a coordinated international response to a problem that has evolved gradually through individual decisions. The high threshold for political agreement and willingness across the EU and beyond will prove this to be a difficult endeavor. Yet, shifting attention from the harm that cause refugees to flee their countries of origin to the

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28 See: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/walk-die-algeria-abandons-13000-refugees-sahara-180625 064043040.html

harm that is generated through the ripple effects of harsh immigration policies in the EU may lead us in such directions. When tackling the desperate plight of refugees, we must not only ask what harms they experience at the hands of authoritarian leaders and dictators, but also what harms they suffer at the hands of our immigration policies. We must, in other words, reconsider our role with regards to refugees. We must ask not only to what extent liberal democracies pose as countries of asylum, but to what extent they bare a responsibility towards the conditions that refugees must endure.

MIGRATION REALITIES IN TURKEY

Tara Hopkins

I became directly involved in refugee work for several reasons. I have been living in the town of Ayvalik, on the Aegean Coast in Northwest Turkey, for 10 years. A good friend on the Greek island of Lesvos was one of the founders of the wonderful people's camp of solidarity, Pikpa. After several phone calls from her early one morning, requesting assistance geting corpses back to Syria – bodies of people who did not make the journey across the sea alive – I decided I would make an effort to work to give people reasons not to get on those damn dinghies. Even though all may not be perfect and wonderful here in Turkey, there is much that is good, and better chances can be given to people so that they do not die.

There are a few facts from the Turkish reality that are important to get a grasp of the refugee situation: Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkey accepts/acknowledges refugees only coming from Europe. Additionally, between 1923-1997, 1.6 million people immigrated to Turkey, mostly from Balkan countries, with preference to those who know the Turkish language and have an affiliation with 'Turkishness'.

Currently, in July 2018, there are nearly 5 million 'refugees' in Turkey: the majority are from Syria, followed by many from Iraq, Afghanistan, and then from Iran, Pakistan and sub-Saharan Africa as well as others from as far away as The Dominican Republic. The road to Europe can be a long one indeed!

As the numbers are so high, and because the State does not acknowledge refugee status to those who were coming across the borders in such great numbers, in April 2013, Turkey adopted the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, granting temporary protection status to Syrians and Stateless Palestinians from Syria.

At the same time, the State established the Directorate General of Migration Management, which works closely with the UNHCR.

(A few asides: Turkey has been under a State of Emergency since July 2016 – 5 days after the most recent coup attempt – the state of OHAL has been extended 7 times since then; the topic of IDPs within the country is rarely discussed.)

The photograph of three-year old Alayn Kurdi, whose little body washed up on one of the beaches on Turkey's coast on September 2, 2015, was the catalyst for international action in Turkey and on the Greek islands. In the month of October alone, 221.000 people made the crossing from Turkey to Greece. By the end of 2015, 1 million refugees had arrived on European shores - and nearly 4.000 died trying to get there. By the end of October 2015, Frontex, NATO, the Turkish and Greek coastguards stepped up efforts to stop boats from entering Greek waters.

In March 2016, Prime Minister Davutoglu and EU leaders signed what has become known as the Turkey-EU agreement, exchanging some refugees on some of the Greek islands for some vetted refugees on mainland Turkey. This is the 6 Billion Euro deal to stop the influx of refugees from stepping on European soil. Half that money has been paid to date, as both sides negotiate and re-negotiate and the political climate shifts more towards nationalism and away from humanity.

Article 14 of the UDHR states that:

1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries.

2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Legally, as soon as a person sets foot on European soil, they are entitled to apply for asylum – this does not mean asylum is automatically granted, but that they have the right to apply.

Some current facts in Turkey

- there are over 3.5 million refugees from Syria alone

- there are over 1 million refugees from other countries

- less than 10% of the refugees live in camps

- Turkey has spent over 12.5 billion Euros in humanitarian aid since 2011 from state budgets

- Turkey has built a 781 km wall along its border with Syria with financial support from the EU

- Rules and regulations from the State have been modified often enough that it has been difficult to keep up with the changes, making implementation sometimes challenging

- less than .1% of Syrians have been granted work permits in Turkey (about 21.000 people)

- about half the refugee children are in school; less than 20% continue to high school

- there are roughly 2 million child laborers in Turkey, 40% of them refugee children

There are many excellent initiatives to address the 'Syrian crisis!' besides, of course, ending the war – from Syrian, Turkish, and International Civil Society Organizations, from the Turkish State together with UNHCR. There are projects carried out in cooperation with Kizilay - the Turkish equivalent of the Red Cross, UNHCR, and the EU. UNICEF is working together with the Ministry of Education to keep children in school with cash incentives. UNHCR has established the very comprehensive 3RP (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan) program for refugees in the region impacted by the war in Syria, for Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.

I would like to briefly introduce some of the fine initiatives from various aspects of Civil Society:

- YUVA - the Community Center in Kirikhan, near the Syrian border

- GIZ - projects in Gaziantep and Sanliurfa

- Education Support for Refugees - working around the country

- MeWeSyria - operating in cities near the Syrian border (in Lebanon and Jordan too)

- and the Camp for Solidarity, Pikpa on the island of Lesvos

Yuva, in Kirikhan, works together with local authorities, perhaps one of their most defining characteristics. The Community Center brings in women and children from the local community for educational activities and classes as well as projects to raise self-esteem. The director makes sure the Center cooperates and works well with international agencies, like GIZ, Goethe Institute, as well as Turkish CSOs.

GIZ, in their project for Youth Development and Social Cohesion, oversees a 3-year program in Gaziantep and Sanliurfa (modified slightly from the original program according to Turkish political realities). Through this program, they work to promote activities that strengthen social cohesion, mostly through sports, working in cooperation with the German Olympic Sports Confederation and its comprehensive training program for volunteers and multipliers.

Education Support for Refugee Children, a grassroots initiative organized by Ingrid Aysu, focusses on getting vulnerable refugee children into schools and keeping them there. Children are identified by State agencies, local CSOs or local contacts/referrals. There are estimated 700.000 refugee children out of school, so selection criteria is imperative. The initiative supports from 14-20 children per year, depending on financial support received, mostly from abroad, much from Australia. The program includes thorough follow-up, including visits to each school to meet with teachers, making monthly-contact with each family and child, and ensuring the child regularly attends school. It tries to cover related needs, like transportation, books, uniforms, and visits the family yearly in person.

MeWeSyria is led by Mohsin Mohi Ud Din, who is part of the Ashoka Youth Venture program, and is based in the US. This initiative focusses on battling displacement with social media storytelling. The program lets refugees change the crisis narrative by using interpersonal communication with teams in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan.

Pikpa, the Camp of Solidarity, is on the Greek island of Lesvos. The camp began operations in 2012, built on principles of solidarity, dignity and belief in hope. It is known for its focus on the most vulnerable refugees – all who arrive in overcrowded plastic dinghies via smugglers. The community focus is on compassion, rights, while addressing real needs within an atmosphere of hope and dignity. Efi Latsoudi, one of the founding members, was awarded the Nansen Refugee Award by the UNHCR recognizing her work with refugees in Lesvos. The prize money was used to establish Mosaic, a Community Center for ALL refugees on the island.

No one puts their child in a boat unless the alternative is worse. Those of us who, by accidents of birth, are not faced with the realities that those who are fleeing face, have a responsibility to impart and ensure their most basic rights to hope and dignity.

Your hopes, dedication and perseverance will contribute to a much-needed focus on humanity!

RECENT EU MIGRATION IN THE FRAME OF POPULIST POLICY AND REPORTING:
THE CASE OF THE SLOVENE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION CAMPAIGN 2018

Goran Gumze

Migration, the ongoing phenomenon in all societies, periodically reaches epidemic dimensions due to sudden changes in the natural environment, the economy or in the social order and policies. The so-called migration waves are consequently causing turbulence and crisis in both hosting and migrating societies. Reactions to receiving migrating individuals and groups vary in space and time. At the frontline of modern political propaganda and mass communication, however, the modern mass media and populist propaganda of political campaigns are employing sensationalistic reporting.

Populist approaches to campaigns prevail in many political approaches, all with the aim to win the votes. Yet populism can be harmful and misleading in the construction of lay public discourse and influences political decisions on national or local levels. Namely, all messages passed through the media, by opinion leaders and politicians, create and re-create public opinion and social reality. The subjective truths constructed through populist policies and sensationalist reporting, influence and shape the social reality and public discourse.

During the recent parliamentary election campaign in Slovenia, political populism was the most common propaganda tool exploited by most left- and right-wing Slovenian political parties. The left options appealed to humanity and compassion for migrants, stating that the borders should be even more open and that the defensive fence, built in 2015, should be removed. The right-wing emphasized the security issues and urged for strengthened control at Schengen borders, in this case the Slovene-Croatian border.

However, the rhetoric was split not only between right-wing and left-wing, but also between governmental and non-governmental actors. Governmental parties emphasized the efficiency of the Slovene state and institutions in controlling the Schengen borders and cooperating with Brussels. Non-governmental groups focused on the lack of available budget and human resources for defense. They claimed that Slovenia was not investing enough in police and army forces and that they should double the numbers of police and soldiers to maintain effective control of all Slovene borders. Namely, the media reported about huge numbers of migrants entering Slovenia by swimming across the Sotla and Kolpa rivers during the night. Some of the right-wing and non-governmental groups' leaders even stated that the Schengen border should be moved from Croatian national borders. In that case, the role of Slovene police would be helping the Croatian border police to control the national borders between Croatia and Bosnia & Hercegovina.

One of the parties used migration issues on their propaganda banners. They showed the map of Slovenia and below were written the costs per migrant per month in big bold letters. It showed that the state spends 1.930 euro (brutto) per month per migrant while aid for the unemployed is 380 euro (netto) per month. With such ambiguous messaging (costs in brutto in one case, and netto in the other), the propaganda raised resistance towards migrants among

the Slovene population. The most common comment on the migration crisis was that our government wants to spend our money for the migrants, but Slovenes are living in poverty.

The same party leader provided information that at least 50.000 migrants were waiting in Velika Kladuša to cross the border between Croatia and Bosnia & Hercegovina, and that they would all migrate through Slovenia. Yet, several months have passed and there are still no migrating masses to be seen in Slovenia. Some interviews with migrants even showed that those who are coming have no intention of staying in Slovenia since the country is perceived as a poor one. Everybody wants to go to Germany or Sweden.

But even if some of the politicians were trying to represent the situation in the country as critical, the mainstream media supported the idea of left-wing parties and "fake" humanity, claiming that Slovenia should be open to everyone in need, which was also rather naive propaganda.

According to some research (MATES project, ISF-Police), there was a serious violation of EU laws and Schengen procedures during the migrant crisis in 2015 when the Balkan route was "open". People were entering the EU without any documents, some were arrested, violently resisting to identify themselves at the border. More than 40 were arrested and brought to the prison in Maribor, but later returned to their countries of origin. These were mostly German citizens, returning from the battlefields in Syria. Similar information on returning ISIS fighters was also gathered during the filed research in Bosnia & Hercegovina, where I performed three in-depth interviews with Salafists. One of them spent some time on the battlefield in Syria, recruiting fighters directly on the spot, using YouTube and social media. He claimed already in 2017 that ISIS would fall apart and that foreign fighters would return to their homes in Europe. He claimed that they might represent a real danger for European society, since many of them had lost their families in Syria and wanted revenge.

The interviews with Slovene police officers, prison officers and secret service agents have shown that the migration flows are easily usurped by criminal organizations, like human traffikers, drug and organ dealers, terrorist groups. Such organizations and individuals are exploiting the migrants on their way, so in addition to populist or sensationalistic reporting, migration can raise other subjective truths for public debate.

In the Slovene case, there was a lack of deep information and reporting on migrants which rather emphasized pro- or contra- discourses regarding migration and migrants, which was the result of a coalition established between political parties and the media. The mainstream was and still is supporting the position of the powerholders: the opposition used the smaller and local media to spread their messages widely, emphasizing the threats that migration and migrants represent for Slovenia.

Recent events in Slovenia showed how effective populist propaganda can be and how harmful false and manipulative messages by the media and politicians can be; namely, one of the extreme right party leaders has established the regional guard, called Varda, that has trained in the forests to prepare themselves for border control and defense in the case of migrant invasion. The leader was arrested on the 7th of September 2018, under the suspicion that he organized the troops for the purposes of political overthrow. The politician and his 300 men, armed with axes and paintball guns, surely don't represent a serious threat to the government and constitution, but they gained a lot of media space and attention, much more than the leading politician did during the campaign. The political goal was achieved, but also the damage was done through the sensationalist reporting of that episode. If the mass communication prin-

ciple – there is no event, without event – were followed, such hostile actions would stay as part of a silent history, and not contribute to the general discourse and social reality.

Both nationalist or religious extremism result from populism and ignorant sensationalisation by the media based on colonial exploitation and migrations as the consequence. In this context, I have to mention that the coalition between the mainstream media and leading politicians in Slovenia was established to maintain full control and power over the national budget. Even if they were in favor of accepting migrants, through controlled migration, that position was not due their feelings for humanity, but rather opportunism. As can be seen in the case of Slovenia, this has not resulted in constructive policies regarding migration but has, on the contrary, increased extremism.

On the other hand, smaller private media reporting in Slovenia is completely different from the mainstream media. At the frontline of reporting are the illegal migrants and their connected threats. Mostly they report about returning ISIS fighters that are using the opportunity that mass migration offers for illegally returning to Europe. They report on every incident involving migrants, presenting them as rapists and criminals. The latest knife attack was immediately ascribed to terrorism, which remains connected with migration. In addition, most interviews with experts in some smaller media outlets present migrants as a burden that must be financed from our budget and which brings chaos to Europe. Let me focus on one such incident in connection with the 17th memorial of the attack on the Twin Towers in New York. Links between Islam and terrorism were immediately made, claiming that Europe should declare itself as Catholic and set clear rules for incoming migrants, namely that they should accept our culture, and not that we Europeans should be forced to adapt to their culture, if conflict is to be prevented.

To conclude, do we really want one religion in power, to prevent others from prevailing? Maybe we should search for other solutions to cultural pluralism and respect. For sure ghettoization is not an appropriate solution as we can see what kind of problems this created in France and Belgium. We must find better ways for the integration of migrants and planned urbanization. Everything can be solved with openness, acceptance and respect.

MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

Gabriele Matzner

Migration: as old as humanity …

Migration, emigration and immigration, are as old as humanity. Human beings have always moved about, more or less intensively or frequently, for varying reasons, motivated by the hope for a better life or by fear. Such movements can be fast or slow, over short or long distances, temporary or permanent, individually or in groups or even masses, voluntary or forced, peaceful or less so. Entire countries and continents in their present demographic/ethnic composition are based on migration. Our species, allegedly created to spread about and dominate the world, indeed succeeded in this endeavour.

and usually not without some problems … but also with great benefits …

Migration has often, at least temporarily, been characterized by stress, uncertainty, friction, fear, animosity etc., and effected both those who move and those who stay and/or "receive" immigrants. Migration has also, naturally, in many if not most cases, occurred to enhance individual safety, to improve chances for survival, promoting fruitful exchanges, economic, political and cultural progress.

European migration is no exception

Nobody in his or her right mind would have, in retrospect, criminalized the mass migration of Europeans in the past and even present, on their continent and beyond, to North and South America, Australia and so forth. Most of these migrations happened for personal so-called "economic" motives, but could also have been done to save one's life. Why are such motivations that partly underlie the current migratory movements now viewed negatively by some?

Even in recent decades, literally millions of Europeans, mostly from the less fortunate Southern and Eastern peripheries, and mostly young men, moved to wealthier and more prosperous EU-member countries. These mass movements, problematic as they can be, are hardly a topic. Most media (and politicians) instead focus on "hordes" of allegedly alien and dangerous young men "invading" Europe, threatening physical and cultural annihilation. If this tableau were not so dangerous, it would be simply ridiculous.

Are we not (almost) all here migrants?

Most, probably all of us here present, have at least one ancestor, or relative, who came from another country or continent, if that is not the case even for ourselves. Some of our ancestors, e.g., in Hungary, are reported to have originally come from Central Asia. Certainly, parts of our (European) culture, including agriculture, is based on influences from neighbouring continents. Christianity itself was imported from the Middle East.

During the centuries of the Habsburg Empire, millions of people migrated within this area, mostly from the poorer to the richer, more promising parts. And towards the end of multi-ethnic-national-religious Central Europe many millions emigrated to, mostly, America. As a matter of fact, the largest agglomeration of "Burgenländer", the traditionally economically less favored inhabitants of the Austrian province bordering Hungary and once part of it, is not Eisenstadt but Chicago.

Vienna profitted and still profits from migration

Major cities like Vienna (Budapest or Prague) owe their political, economic and cultural rise, particularly around the famous "Fin de Siècle" period, to the influx of ambitious individuals from all ends of this Empire. At first isolated or isolating themselves, and viewed with anxiety and xenophobia, these "foreign" workers are the ancestors of many, if not most, Austrians and especially of the Viennese.

This fact is, unfortunately, however, hardly known or acknowledged. Many immigrants changed their names to make them sound "German," probably to escape xenophobic discrimination, but many "foreign"-sounding, especially Slavic names, are still found in the Vienna telefone directory.

Following many decades of stagnation, Vienna and Austria are again growing, demographically and economically thanks to immigration, naturally. This fact is also hardly acknowledged.

There is a need for migration …

Without foreigners from near and far many basic services would nowadays not function as well or at all: medical and care services, tourism and gastronomy, education and science, etc. Moreover, without immigration Austria's population would have shrunk considerably like in a number of neighbouring countries. These facts appear to be little known or appreciated.

Ignorance and rejection, nourished for political purposes …

The degree of suspicion, resentment and rejection of foreigners seems to vary depending on the distance of their places of origin, the colour of the skin and the wealth of those having come and their willingness to come. The rich and famous, sheiks, opera singers, football stars, "investors", encounter no or few problems when they come and stay. Others, from countries further away and especially Muslims, and even more especially asylum seekers, are met with suspicion and resentment that is usually based simply on rumours, nourished and abused by the media and politicians for decades. Most native Austrians have had no personal encounters or relations with asylum seekers or refugees, and no knowledge of Islam.

Most migrants never reach Europe

Of course, Europe cannot receive "all" refugees! No reasonable person would expect that. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of refugees globally (currently at least 70 millions) flee to places inside their own countries or to neighboring ones. They are thus mostly found in some of the very poorest countries in Africa and Asia. Only a relatively small number ever make it to Europe where such relatively miniscule numbers could be easily absorbed.

Blaming the victims … and the poorest

It has become customary to blame asylum seekers and refugees for coming and for the situations they are fleeing from. They should have, one hears, simply overthrown dictatorships or settled civil wars in their countries of origin. Such regimes and wars are, by the way, often nourished, for political and/or business interests, by Western/European countries, a fact hardly ever mentioned. Migrants/refugees are also blamed for "intruding" into "our" social system to which they have sofar not contributed. But this is also true for a large number of native Austrians who are welfare recipients, being children or otherwise not gainfully employed.

There is, internationally, no proof of claims that migrants "choose" countries on the basis of hoped-for (modern state) social benefits. More important "pull factors" are: the presence of relatives, friends, a "community" to rely on in may ways: for safety and security, and for educational, training, and employment opportunities.

What caused the "wave" in 2015?

Migration by refugees, across the Mediterrean to Europe has been going on for many years, largely ignored until the "wave" hit in 2015. This surge in numbers and attention was caused by the failure of mostly Western countries, major donors to international organizations, to fulfil their promises to, e.g., provide for Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries in the area (like e.g., Lebanon). It is this fact, and not an alleged "invitation" by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which triggered this "wave". The majority were already on their way and in Europe when she said "Wir schaffen das" [We can cope].

Fortress Europe

Often denied, Europe has long evolved into a fortress trying to keep out others, namely those that are poorer. It has been, now and for many years, close to impossible for ordinary non-Europeans to even visit Europe, let alone study or work here. There has been a lot of talk about the need to create the legal means for orderly immigration so people would not feel compelled to resort to asking for asylum. Labelling human beings as "illegal" is nevertheless disgusting.

Tackling root causes

There has also been a lot of talk about the need to actually provide sufficient funding for refugee camps on other continents, assisting concerned countries and societies to provide a better, more secure life so people will not feel compelled to move away, and so on. Fairer terms of trade and measures against climate change effecting poorer countries disproportionally are also discussed. Little has been done in these respects, and Austria is particularly reluctant to contribute to what its government propagates as "Hilfe vor Ort" [help at the source]. A common (European) denominator rather seems to be ever tougher, legally questionable and inhumane measures, within European countries and at the borders, to prevent people from ever reaching Europe, including "centres" in failed states such as Libya.

At the same time everybody in his or her right mind knows that this is no lasting "solution" (neither is the disputed fairer distribution of refugees across Europe, though it would help).

Some conclusions

While it is natural to be wary of "others", the *degree* of alleged fear and resentment nowadays extended towards immigrants (criminalized as "illegal") is a political decision that has been made. It is, for a number of media and (more and more important) political parties, a convenient distraction from other, real uncertainties and problems which most people face and to which they are unable to offer remedies. Most discomforting developments have, in reality, absolutely nothing to do with refugees, but are part and parcel of so-called globalisation, which is a manmade homunculus of global capitalism unleashed for the benefit of the few.

My personal experiences and motives ...

I did and do have personal encounters with asylum seekers and refugees as I teach German and help some of them also in other ways (such as providing shelter or advice). I am, fortunately, not the only one. There are many individuals and organisations active in this field. But one does

feel today a perverse need to justify why one is doing something for other people. People assisting others are ridiculed as "Gutmenschen", misguided, at best naive. I, an agnostic, sometimes wonder where Christianity has gone, as well as some other allegedly European "values".

My parents, doctors, planned to emigrate to Syria after WW II to look for better opportunities. That did not happen, but I could have grown up in Syria and married a Syrian. The young Syrians from Aleppo whom I lodged for some months, and am still accompanying in their steps of integration in Vienna, could have been my grandchildren.

The forced emigration of so many Hungarians in 1956 was probably my first political experience, and, in 1968, the crack-down of the Prague Spring provided a similar experience. Encounters in Moscow, my first assigment as a diplomat in the 1970s, also opened my eyes to the need to escape unbearable circumstances. At the embassy I signed transit visas for Jews wishing or forced to emigrate to Israel and other countries.

Like most Austrians of my post-war generation, I was extremely lucky to be able to develop under excellent conditions, compared to most other countries, including the neighbouring ones which had the misfortune of falling under communist rule. Without such conditions, my efforts and the efforts of countless others, would have been in vain. From this I deduct a certain modesty and understanding of life's vagaries. Only a minority can offer lodging, but most could offer something equally if not more valuable, namely understanding, respect, curiosity, interest, and if none of the above at least compassion or tolerance.

All my adult life as a diplomat I was fortunate to meet locals who helped me to understand their country and culture, what to do and not to do. I remain forever grateful to these people, like the woman who cooked for me in Tunis. It makes a lot of difference to experience this hospitality and respect, and I feel fortunate to be able to do the same for a few newcomers to my own country now.

Learning from others

Last but not least, meeting people from different countries or different cultures was always instructive and enriching, intellectually and emotionally. It is, and could be, I believe for everybody. Not least because some of the so-called "values", i.e., ways of life based on ideological/religious convictions, differ … not totally, but in some ways. We Westerners tend to deem our "values" far superior, as do probably all others about their respective values. Considering *other* values can provide food for thought. How justified is it, for example, to pamper our pets or to separate the elderly and feeble into special institutions, to abuse nature, to put profit above all else? Trying to put oneself mentally into the situation of the "other" becomes a natural habit for someone in the diplomatic circuit.

Is integration the aim?

Adjustments, linguistic, cultural, economic, social etc. by immigrants, sooner or later, have been the rule, as have been the more subtle effects of immigration on the hosting population.

In recent decades, however, almost nobody in Austria has paid any attention to the need to integrate/assimilate newcomers. This applied particularly, to "Yugoslavs" and Turks who had been recruited in large numbers as (presumably temporary) "Fremdarbeiter" [guest workers] in the 1960s. Most of them stayed on and "integration" was a non-issue for decades. Even (or especially?) Social Democrats ruling "Red Vienna", disregarded potential problems with massive im-

migration, especially multi-linguistic scenarios in schools (with up to 40% and more kids whose mother tongue is not German).

"Integration" has only recently become a topic and demand. And why not? But this demand is predominantly directed at the immigrants only, while the naturally required reciprocal will on the side of the natives is questionable and adequate assistance by the authorities (e.g., sufficient training and/or employment support) is often lacking.

Refugees/immigrants are publicly denounced (and treated) as unable or unwilling to integrate, due to their alleged different character/culture (namely Islam). Studies upon so-called "studies", commissioned (and twisted) by right-wing politicians, seem to prove that newcomers, especially from Muslim countries, are uneducated, primitive, socially backward, politically immature, ideologially potentially dangerous and, last but not least, sexually menacing. Imagine if you were under such suspicion and prejudice! This happens to people who were born and raised in Austria.

The obstacles put in the way of immigrants wishing to integrate are enormous, whether through malice or incompetence, I cannot judge. But so it is, in my experience, to the detriment of both sides. Only racists and parties which nurture them profit from this situation. The general public is completely unaware of what is actually happening, and of the fact that they are actually being manipulated.

Some conclusions

Integration is, and should rightfully be, a mutually demanding aim. Like any change, it is achievable. Societies are and have been constantly changing, and migration is just one important ingredient in these processes. Talk of "globalisation" or global "values" should be enriched in substance, i.e., encompassing topics that get to the root causes and effects of migrations.