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**DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN TAIWAN
AND IN HUNGARY**

Regional Developments of Democratization and
Civil Society: Transition, Consolidation,
Hybridization, Globalization

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Democratic Transition in Taiwan and in Hungary¹

Regional Developments of Democratization and Civil Society: Transition, Consolidation, Hybridization, Globalization

Máté Szabó

Abstract

Different starting points, similar processes and differentiated outcomes need to be identified when comparing East Central Europe and East and South Asia. They share similar global challenges and regional patterns of democratization and crises. East Central Europe was economically marginalized during the Communist period in the world economy, whereas some parts of Asia were well integrated in the global economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization, and a favourable external environment helped former Communist countries oriented towards Western-type rule of law and democracy. Other external factors helped Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan, led by American and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to develop their human rights culture and democracy while facing their totalitarian counterparts such as China and North Korea. The very different positions Taiwan and Hungary have in their respective regions are based upon different capacities to transform management since 1988-89. Taiwan could preserve its leading role and stable democracy despite threats to its sovereignty from China. Hungary never had such an influential conflict partner and received security and welfare partnership from the EU which Taiwan did not have. Taiwan's security conditions were less, yet economic and social conditions were more favourable for democratization than in Hungary. Hungary had a leading position in the democratization processes during the post-communist transition which was lost during the crisis and conflicts of the last decade since 2006 and especially since 2010. It can be stated that Western global concepts of democratization help to identify similarities and differences, comparing stronger and weaker factors of democratic transitions in Asia and Europe under Third Wave democracies.

About the Author

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1 This paper was prepared in the Institute of Advanced Studies Kőszeg, 2017 April –June, during my New Central Europe fellowship there at the Karl Polányi Centre. The Taiwan field research was carried out at Taipei R.O.C. at the Soochow University, as guest professor of Chang-Fo- Chuan Centre for the Study of Human Rights, teaching at the Human Rights MA Program 2015 February-June, and carrying out research 2016 June-September with the fellowship of the Hungarian National Bank Pageo Foundation in Soochow University Taipei at the same Centre.

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Introduction

Carothers (2002) seminal work on the farewell to the transition paradigm started a new era of studies on the multiple alternatives of the third wave transitions. Literature on illiberal tendencies, hybridization and new authoritarianism resulted in a much-debated new approach. A few analysts, such as Ekiert (2011), Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014), Krasztev-Til (2015), Whitehead (2016), tried to make conclusions on the challenges of the crisis for post-authoritarian and post-communist civil societies. However, Dahrendorf (1990) made clear that the new civil society and its political culture maturity would emerge after a long and conflict-ridden period with the establishment of new constitutionalism, a political system and market economy. Linz and Stepan (1996) reflected that civil society was the prerequisite of democratic consolidation embedded in the framework of democracy, the market economy, and the new rule of law. An embedded complex of democracy and relations to civil society was the precondition for the democratic stabilization and consolidation defined by Wolfgang Merkel (1994). The literature shows that after the global civil society enthusiasm of the 2nd millennium, a more self-critical and self-reflexive approach appeared focusing on the effects of the economic and political crises on civic development (Berg-Schlosser 2015, Shin and Kim 2016) which will be reflected in this paper.

Transition literature based upon Southern European and South American tendencies is elite-centered. Later, the analysis of East Asian and Eastern European transitions, mainly the latter, focused on civil society (della Porta 2016). When discussing democratic progress, it is important to differentiate between the concepts of “liberalization”, “democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation.” For Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), the first indicates a non-democratic state with a mix of policy and social changes, such as less media censorship and the toleration of opposition; the second indicates free competitive elections; and the last indicates that democracy has behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally become “the only game in town.” They proposed five necessary arenas for working definitions of consolidated democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, usable bureaucracy, and economic society (Linz and Stepan 1996:1-11). Consequently, we will adopt the abovementioned criteria for discussion for two reasons: 1) for its comprehensive theoretical coherence; 2) for the possibility to dynamically and strictly assess the progress and regression of consolidation. For Linz and Stepan, civil society refers to the polity where self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations, and advance their interests. Thus, in this arena, they reckoned that the primary organizing principle would be “freedom of association and communication”; furthermore, “the rule of law” which might establish legal guarantees would be one of necessary supports from other arenas (Linz & Stepan 1996:7, 14).

As analysis of civil society development in former communist countries has shown, a differentiated social map of new civil societies emerged (Ekiert and Kubik 2014, Bába 2016, Ekiert and Foa 2011, 2017). Eastern and Central Europe were close to European models; post-Soviet Russia and Central Asian regions closer to new authoritarianism. In the process of EU accession, the East Central European and the Baltic regions made progress in following European and global models. The risks of the democratization processes were stressed in the transition literature against the evolution-progress-based strict stage models (Schmitter and Schneider 2014). Issues of hybridization were discussed, especially related to the multiplicity of forms of political participation and of political conflict-solving (Morlino 2009, Levitsky and Way 2010). For a long time, East Central Europe was seen as a success story compared to

other regions (Merkel 2010.). However, problems of consolidation, and recent economic and political crises produced counter-tendencies to democratic consolidation in Hungary and elsewhere (Ekiert 2011). Hybridization, illiberal tendencies endanger pluralism and tolerance, core values of old and new civil societies, weakening of the rule of law with governmental intervention against the autonomy of civil society (Bozóki and Hegedűs 2017).

Eastern and Central Europe: A Transition towards European Civil Society?

In Poland, the mass movement *Solidarity*, in Czechoslovakia the small intellectual network *Charta 77*, and in Hungary different networks of critical intellectuals articulated the demands of civil society (Bába 2016). National autonomy and independence opened for civil society within the policy of the individual communist countries but was limited by Soviet intervention in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and the Soviet-supported Polish military takeover in Poland 1981, and Russia/SU maintained the forced integration in of the former 'socialist' countries.

The crisis of the planned economy, centralized one-party rule, and international, East-West conflicts opened more possibilities for autonomous "national" policies within the Eastern bloc in the 1970s and 1980s. The general trend in East Central Europe was the using of the political space by the communist elite to gain popular support by formulating autonomous foreign and domestic policies. There were some experimental openings towards civil society in Hungary and Poland (Arato 1992, Frenzel-Zagórska 1990), but authoritarian patterns were reinforced and civil society survived in a catacomb existence. The liberalization processes in Poland and Hungary opened up political spaces for the development of civil society and political opposition (Falk 2003).

The legacy of the past, of pre-communist and anti-communist civil society played a role from the beginning. Social solidarity, Christian and Catholic social and moral values, national traditions and democratic aspirations could establish strong civil society as a mobilizing force in Poland through the 1980s (Ekiert and Kubik 2014). Their organizational and symbolic unity in *Solidarity* (Ekiert 1996) was not, however, preserved in the framework of pluralist democracy after 1989. Strong organizational unity even hindered the development and differentiation of a multi-party system. Compared with Poland, since 1956 there was considerable political stability in Hungary (Tórkés 1996). Kádárist policy opened up possibilities for the second economy, and formation of civil society. A much less politicized civil society emerged this way in Hungary than in Poland (Michta 1997, Míszlivetz 1999, Renwick 2014). Fragmentation and differentiation of intellectual opposition groups and circles developed already before the system transformation, and their possibilities for political bargaining with reformers of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party were much greater than in Poland. No huge waves of repressions like "marshal law" in Poland were imposed in Hungary since 1956 revolution and its aftermath. Thus, no "umbrella organization" representing national solidarity could be established, only the temporary unity of opposition groups for bargaining with communists at a "Round Table" as only transitory cooperation existed (Tórkés 1996).

Protest movements and civic organizations emerged as leading forces of the democratic breakthrough from 1988-1990. The resurrection of civil society development, self-organizing, "bottom up" approaches, new groups of elites and their competition, new organizational forms gave a fast shape to the civic sphere, emerged from the former "catacomb" networks of nation-wide mass mobilizations that reshaped the state and society (Arato 1992). united civil society will be fragmented by movements and counter-movements mobilized.

During the phases of system transformation, the change of the social-political subjects occurred. Social movements mobilized by crisis and protest set up transitory coalitions with temporary organizational consequences. The emergence of party systems is important for

institutionalization (Dawisha and Parrot 1997). With the free elections, the distribution of power and formulation of national policy concluded in the setup of new institutional structures that represented “national” interest within pluralistic, conflict-based modern society. Civil society with its networks was established on the basis of the new economy, constitutionalism, rule of law, regional and global networking. Associations, foundations, and different types of NGO’s networks were established. Civic activism progressively developed in the respective countries when not hindered by war, ethnic conflict or authoritarianism.

The processes of system transformation in East Central Europe had similar dynamics, but also considerable differences. There are some common elements based on common historical and cultural heritage and geography, economic and social ties to Western Europe in this region, if we compare this dynamic with the post-communist development in the Balkans and former Soviet Union. Some of the important distinctive features in East Central Europe was the absence of violent ethnic and territorial conflicts, which followed the dissolution of multi-ethnic federal states, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that territorial- based ethnic minorities do exist, they do not provoke violent mobilization of majorities, or do not serve as starting points for such kind of mobilizations. Ethnic violence seems to be under control in this region, where new political institutions, constitutional framework and political parties are used as accepted channels for the distribution of power. The Europeanisation process, the dynamics of European integration and its effects produced a largely supportive trend for the development of East and Central European civil society.

The international, as well global and regional dimension of democratization were obvious within the revitalization of civil society. International organizations and foreign governments became main supporters – the new capitalists were less involved in philanthropy in a new market system. While government support was rare during transformation to a market economy, NGOs did not particularly seek government support anyway. So the scarcity of internal resources is one reason why foreign, especially international and Western aid, was and is so important for the new NGO sector in the new EU member countries (Jensen and Mislivetz 2006).

Transition, Consolidation and Civil Society in East Asia

A general starting point of discussion is if the democratic transitions in Asia could at all be interpreted with the same theoretical concepts as democratic transitions all over the world and especially in Eastern and Central Europe (Cotton 1997, Shin-Kim 2016). Already in the 1990s, the research on democratic consolidation seriously questioned East Asian Third Wave democracies, with differentiated arguments that remain relevant today. Against homogenizing approaches, a regional analysis of limits and achievements of democratization was proposed, which is still in elaboration. The Western-style pluralist “opposition” as an important agent and actor against the authoritarian regime was apparently a less marked phenomena than in Southern and Eastern Europe. The blooming economy under benevolent authoritarian rule (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) established more openness to the authoritarian past than in Eastern Europe or South America.

However, there are many aspects which validate the comparison of post-authoritarian Asian countries and the East Central European, and wider post-communist EU member states, based on the following shared problems:

- Struggling with the past
- Lack and weaknesses of a human rights culture
- Instability of constitutionalism and human rights regimes after transition
- Tendencies of economic and financial crisis
- External factors, such as authoritarian or civic neighbourhood, local conflicts and tensions, waves of migration

This research paper tries to explore the alternative ways of civic engagement and partisanship, development of civil society and the sustainability of the achievements of civic development (Schack-Hudson 2003, Alagappa 2004, Broadbent and Brockman 2011). The two regions are distinct from each other, in geography and in cultural traditions, but they are bound by global networks. In this sense, they are both divided and integrated by the effects of globalization. In both regions, a wide range of literature has established some focal points as characteristic for each region. In East and Central Europe, there is the tradition of planned economy, the need to rebuild the market economy after Communism, the chances of European networking, extended welfare services, traditions of interwar developments (Dawisha and Parrot 1997). In Asia, there is the integration into the global economy, the success of economic development under authoritarian rule, the challenges of the un-reflected authoritarian past, civil-military relations, relations of ancient Asian culture and religion to Western-based global human rights values and concepts (Diamond and Plattner 1998, Mc Allister 2016, Croissant 2017).

D.C. Shin (2008) and F. Fukuyama (2012) and others set a network of analytical aspects for the interpretation of problems and achievements of new democracies of East and South East Asia related to the third wave and follow up consolidation:

- East Asia is a region where the Third Wave of democratization could not reach sustainable results, and different tendencies to illiberal democracies are documented.

- Some of the important authoritarian regimes are located there especially China, North Korea, Vietnam (and Russia nearby).
- China is traditionally the core state of reference of Asian civilizations.
- Authoritarian-capitalist states as China, Vietnam and especially Singapore maintain an alternative to democracy with high opportunity costs and support authoritarian nostalgia to former developmental authoritarian regimes.
- There is no regional organization for implementing human rights and democratic values as efficient as the EU; ASEAN has no or a much weaker profile and character.
- Benevolent authoritarian dictatorships have a long tradition in the region from ancient to modern times.
- Economic success, well-being, and development are associated with the contemporary realm of some authoritarian regimes (“China-factor”, Singapore as a success story).
- Traditional value systems, “Asian values” of Confucianism, have a contemporary influence which has a differentiated character related to Western-type human rights and democracy concepts.
- Civil society is much less developed and later developed than the authoritarian-bureaucratic developmental state.
- Political culture has a “hybrid” character within the region involving authoritarian, anti-liberal as well as democratic and liberal elements.
- There is no general, regional consent on the “rules of the game” of the polity as in the EU.
- The persistence of the idea of benevolent authoritarian rulers, and a need for “strong men” as top leaders.
- Less sensibility than in pluralist US-Europe-based systems towards media control.
- The weak-rootedness of party systems that would need longer experience of periodic elections.
- Weak civil society, but new types of political mobilizations in the new civic culture; living together with deeply rooted traditional forms of legitimacy.
- The narrow, Schumpeterian concept of electoral democracy spread out and stabilized as a starting point to further democratization.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are countries where liberal democracy is preserved for the long run, but with the help of majoritarian electoral systems, hegemonic or two-party systems, and strong pictures of enemies among the authoritarian states of China and North Korea. Here the development of the middle classes, mobilization of civil society and value changes towards the rule of law and democracy helped to consolidate democratic regimes, however not without serious problems. In other cases, cycles of crises annulled or hybridized democratic regimes, as in the case of the Philippines or Thailand (Croissant 2017).

All these trends and patterns are not very far from the ones from Eastern Europe of the 1990s. The rejection of the “ancient regime”, Communist regime was more radical, as well as the discontinuation of the Communist planned economy and system of scarcity which was left behind with transition in Eastern Europe. Meanwhile urbanization, modernization, even globalization of fast growing and innovative economies characterised the authoritarian developmental dictatorships of Taiwan, South Korea or Singapore. In Southern Europe this aspect is more similar to East Asia, meaning that no radical change of property and economic

relations occurred with democratization, at least not so deep as in the former Communist countries².

There was more optimistic forecasting for the region of East and Central Europe at the time that was based very much on the external framework, the perspective of EU-accession and Western aid, as well as the hopes for the newly emerging market economies. The EU-accession and the process of Europeanization helped to find consent among the groups of the political elite, and Europeanization seemed to have a great perspective which influenced the new democracies and market economies of Eastern Europe, despite the conflicts that emerged from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

On the contrary, the common denominator for East and South East Asian new democracies was less transparent, and the development of ASEAN never provided a similar dynamic to the Europeanization process. On the global level, China was an emerging actor, and the US supported democratization and consolidation processes in the region but not with the same intensity and engagement in every country but according to the regional interests of US foreign policy. The consolidation of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, who are evaluated as stable free and liberal democracies, is partly due to the American presence and support based upon the security problems and conflicts concentrated in these countries with powerful enemies on the “other side” (Larry Diamond 1997, Shin-Kim 2016, Mc Allister 2016, Croissant 2017).

The Third wave produced a “muddling through” of unconsolidated systems, and an articulation of a “reverse wave” against democratization can be documented and observed in the region. According to Larry Diamond (1997, 1998, 2014), the role and importance of external factors and their conducive interplay with internal factors is the key to the consolidation of Taiwan and South Korea. Their role within the global economy, internal economic and technology development and its effect on the social structure, produce a unique “Westernization”, as well as their role in Asian security and general policy of the US, e.g., their “geopolitical” situation.³

Consolidation discussions emphasized the wide range of “democracy promotion” (Carothers 2015) in the form of differentiated resources, what Eastern Europe enjoyed was targeted

2 The prospects for the consolidation were rather moderate as stated here:

“In short, where democratic consolidation has been proceeding, it has not always established the conditions that are fundamental for the reproduction for a Western-style democracy. Finally, the present era (end of the 90’s-SzM) may not be as favourable to democratization as the latter part of the 1980’s was. In particular, the imperatives of globalization may reduce the attractiveness of democracy” (Cotton, 116).

3 *“With the reunification of Germany, these two democracies (Taiwan and South Korea) are now unique in their status as divided countries, facing threats to their very existence from communist regimes of the same nationality that claim sovereignty over them. ... The resulting threats to the national security of the two democracies have slowed efforts to democratize civil-military relations and to dismantle the vestiges of authoritarian national – security laws and structures. At the same time, the quest for international legitimacy and Western (especially U.S.) support have driven forward the processes of democratization in many other respects... The dilemma is particularly acute for Taiwan, given mainland China’s economic dynamism and substantially greater size and power. Yet precisely because Taiwan is so threatened – and by one of the world’s most authoritarian states – democracy has become a resource and a legitimating symbol in its quest for an accepted place in world affairs (Diamond XXXIV-XXXV)“...The export dependence of Korea and Taiwan has pushed political development in a democratic direction. Closer economic and political integration with the advanced industrial democracies“... “will become virtually impossible if these two countries cannot implement and maintain democratic systems. At the same time, however, middle classes aware of the need for socioeconomic stability to maintain international competitiveness have not been sympathetic to militant mobilization by labour and other organized groups. Thus the high degree of involvement in the world economy also generates a bias for stability and moderation that tends to limit the potential for polarizing conflict over socioeconomic issues...”(XXXV) (Larry Diamond 1997).*

by developed democracies from Western Europe and elsewhere. This kind of help reached the East and South Asian countries rather in form of established or long established cultural and educational exchange, mainly from the US, Canada and Australia, and less from Western Europe. Strengthening party systems, civil societies, public media discourse, the inclusion of passive subjects into political mobilization, were similar challenges as in East and Central Europe, but the different structures of pre-democratic authoritarian regimes demanded different strategies and concepts. Moreover, global structures (like global human rights regime of the UN made similar challenges to the rule of law, legal culture and institutional reform established or re-established after the Cold War) in the two regions. The introduction of new institutions and the growing of a new culture of human rights presupposes civic activism by human rights initiatives which were developing after transition in both regions. However, civic activism has a differentiated profile in both regions. The Asian values of collectivism, public good orientation, acceptance of authority, and “communitarianism” are missing in East and Central Europe, where the pseudo-collectivism of Communism opened space for individualism, a lack of trust in institutions and communities and neglect of the public good (Hankiss 1990).

Philippe C. Schmitter (1997) made a clear and systematic differentiation of civil society in the East and the West. He stressed that diffusion of Western civil society to Asia, by way of colonialization, cultural globalization and economic ties as well as migration (Chinese, Korean, Taiwanese etc. communities in the US, Australia, Europe). He mentioned the possible initiating and implementing role of civic associations in the building up of the rule of law, legal and administrative reforms after transition (such as bar associations, alumni associations) after having experience in the West. Based on his own earlier approach of neo-corporatism, Schmitter characterised the Asian values-based civic associations as intermediaries between state and society at the level of local, regional, professional organization and self-regulation. In his view, in Asia, the “Hegelian-German-European” polarization and contradiction between state and civil society is less developed, and already Hegel in his “Philosophy of Law” put corporate associations as mediators between state and society. Schmitter argues, that the authoritarian regimes of Asia, built up in the liberalization phase with strong connections between state and society may survive during latter phases of democratic consolidation.

This organized, embedded transformation, like in the case of Taiwan, enables non-violent and less conflictual regime transformation, however, the inherited informal mechanisms of the previous regime may prove hindrances and obstacles to legal change in the direction of a Western-type human rights regime in the long run. This point is taken up later in the Taiwan-Hungary comparison where reform-oriented elite groups played important role in both transitions, but with remarkable differences.

The unique case of Taiwan (Chu 1998, Mc Allister 2016), where the state was based upon the *Kuomintang* (KMT) army and administration from mainland China after the defeat by the Communists, produced in Taiwan a militarized Leninist-type regime, that copied/reproduced certain characteristics of the Russian and Chinese party-state (Cheng-Haggard 1992). Instead of a conflict between state and civil society, the state and civil society were organised from the top down by the military and political networks of the mainland Chinese elite. This elite penetrated civil, military, state and society and suppressed the local Taiwanese elites for a long time, e.g., forced them to build up a counter-elite against the state and the military. The strong interconnectedness of the state-Kuomintang party-army produced the conflict between civil society and the military regime. This occurred in other post-war Asian authoritarian/developmental regimes too, but in the case of Taiwan it was strengthened by the conflict of the KMT with mainland China as well as to local Taiwanese groups (Wu and Wen 1992). This division was established during the liberalization and democratization processes as the

main axis and conflict, e.g. cleavage of party system, the mainland-based Kuomintang party versus the Taiwan-based and independence-oriented Democratic Progressive Party, which was since 1986 and still is the main bulk of party competition. On both poles, new political parties emerged, but the two “camps” – the Blue (KMT coming from China and having in mind some type of reintegration with the mainland) and the Green (DPP, local Taiwanese cultural and political independence party recruiting from the Taiwan-based population) – are still the main divides in the political and social systems (Cao-Langyin-Sun, 2014). Such strong cleavage going back to the political and social realm of the former authoritarian system as in case of East and Central Europe – belonging to the former nomenklatura vs. non-elite groups, and the religiosity vs. secularization as basic features dividing Left and Right, as in case of Hungary (Körösényi et.al.2009). This was not bound, however, to (sub)ethnic, linguistic and local identities as in the case of Taiwan.

Civil and political society development in Taiwan has to dismiss the pre-democratic pattern to unite a “nation”, for a real macro-political community identity instead of a “separatist” identity of an island (McAllister 2016). However, the strong external challenge from the People’s Republic China, among other factors, formed the dual party system of Taiwan based upon the issue of separation/integration. After democratic transition, the Kuomintang became the party of understanding and dialogue with China, and the DPP (Lu 1992) set barriers, demanding guarantees to avoid a too strong and fast integration with the mainland that might endanger the results of the democratic transition and consolidation, as well as Taiwanese independence (Bush, 2014). Both parties “frame” differently the “China-factor” and analyse and observe, according to their own views, the experience of the Chinese principle “one country-two systems” in Hong-Kong and Macau (Ortmann 2010, 2015, Ngok 2008, Kwong 2014).

According Linz and Stepan, “statehood” as one of the important “five realms” of democratic consolidation is not fully developed in the case of Taiwan in the case of sovereignty. State power in the sense of monopoly of control over the territory exists but sovereignty is contested by China and it is not acknowledged by the great majority of countries and international organizations. China is implementing the “one China principle” in bilateral and multilateral relations related to its growing economic, military and international power position in a very consequent way. The sovereignty of Taiwan is only accepted in a small circle of diplomatic allies (Chu and Moon 1997). The great majority of states and international organizations, including the UN, do not accept Taiwanese statehood, but with the consent and support of China, it is “Chinese Taipei”.

Aurel Croissant (2004) and McAllister (2016) estimate that in Asia, Taiwan is the best pupil of democracy, together with South Korea (and Mongolia) from the third wave transition countries. In this view, new democracies in South East Asian are under very high pressure from crisis and internal problems that are not conducive to democratic consolidation. They also recognize the state problems with freedom of expression, the rule of law and horizontal accountability, and serious corruption even in well performing political systems (Garner 2011).

Another recent analysis by Larry Diamond and coauthors (2014) stresses that in Taiwan and Korea we are dealing with “maturing” democracies that are comparable with established new democracies in Europe and South America. They have, however, a narrow path to walk between the challenges to their statehood/sovereignty and nation-building, and policies towards China and North Korea. They are also vulnerable to political crises by their internal defects of constitutionalism, rule of law and polarized party system. Recent political crisis in 2016/2017 in South Korea with the presidency, informal influence, corruption networks and parallel challenge by the aggressive military policy of North Korea underlined this problem,

and made the internal and external problems of Korean democracy very visible (Diamond 2014). The success of anti-president demonstrations and rallies in South Korea resulted in the decision of the parliament and constitutional court against the corrupt president, and a criminal process against former President Pak started as a proof of the strength of civil society and the constitutional order against anti-democratic tendencies in a post authoritarian society.

In summary, there are similar global challenges, regional patterns of democratization and crises developing. East Central Europe was economically marginalized during the communist period in the global economy; while some parts of Asia could be well integrated in the global world economy under authoritarian rule. Europeanization, a favourable external environment, helped former Communist countries to be oriented towards the Western type of rule of law and democracy. External factors helped Third Wave democracies in Asia, especially South Korea and Taiwan with American and other global economic, military and cultural partnerships to develop a human rights culture and democracy when facing their totalitarian counterparts in China and North Korea (Pei 1998). The conflicts provided the reason for military strength and security power in these countries, but the external threat also strengthened the need to make a clear difference between them and their enemies. This helped the establishment of strong human rights and democratic engagement combined with a developmental state that supports global market integration. The development of these two countries is based on the external challenge of autocratic regimes and political-military support of democratic regimes like the US. These developments helped to establish the polarized party systems and political cultures internally based upon the division of the Chinese and Korean nation and state externally.

Tendencies of hybridization among new democracies are globally present and consolidation after transition is endangered by the strengthening of populism, nationalism and new authoritarianism. Concepts of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky-Way 2010) and of hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002, Morlino 2009) help to analyse the differentiated outcomes of the democratic transitions. The challenges of hybridization are present in both East Asia and East Central Europe. Hungary and Taiwan will be compared as diverging, but in many respect similar, cases of authoritarian tradition, democratic transition with different waves of consolidation and de-consolidation as examples of East European and East Asian Third wave democracies.

Taiwan and Hungary in Comparative Perspective

This section will focus on the changing role of social movements, protest and networks of civil society before, during and after democratic transition in Taiwan and in Hungary. Despite very big differences in social, cultural and political opportunities of protest and social movement cultures, a general comparison is made that may contribute to further discussions. Of course, it is neither possible and nor reasonable to give a comprehensive overview of the two social movement and protest cultures here with case studies of protest events or NGO case analysis that have in both cases a wide and developing scholarship in native and English languages⁴. We rather give an overview of general common and distinguishing characteristics in the changing political opportunity structures based on the transition to democracy and the civil society literature.

The post-communist transition of Hungary occurred on a peaceful and non-violent way, as well as the transition to democracy in Taiwan. The conflict between “softliners” and “hardliners” of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party in 1989-1990 was similar to the opening up of the KMT opening in 1986-1990. A former monopolistic party smoothly opened up new political opportunities from the top down, allowing emergent incumbents to participate in policy-making (pluralistic party system) and redefined the rules of the game (constitution making). In *the struggle with the past*, the issues on the rehabilitation of former anti-authoritarian protesters (against KMT and the Communists in the 1947 incident in Taiwan, and in Hungary the revolts 1956) played a crucial role, proving the tolerance of the two former authoritarian-totalitarian parties by showing how far they meant to go by opening toward their authoritarian past in 1986-1990. In the case of Hungary, this process was earlier and somewhat deeper, than in Taiwan, despite of wide criticism of it. Based on the monolithic character of the former authoritarian regimes, the state apparatus and administration followed the political will of the top leaders, and at certain points (1988-1999), the civil forces, social movements from the bottom up supported the transition in different ways, from bargaining to protest in both countries.

Despite mass mobilization (The “*Wild Lilies*” in 1988-1989 in Taiwan and the *citizens’ movements* in Hungary) both cases of transformation were channelled in an institutionalized way. There were no *coup d’état*; there was no terrorism, or civil war perpetrated by “hardliners”, the “old guard” and the security organs. There were no martyrs of the protests and no executions of the former leaders. The civic forces established political parties (1986 in Taiwan; 1988 in Hungary), autonomous trade unions, interest representation organs, citizens’ initiatives and NGO’s. The law and constitution making and revision produced and developed the institutional framework for demonstrations (1988 Parade Act Taiwan, 1989 Law of Association and Assembly, Hungary), strikes, and other protest forms as well as rules for the establishment of organizations (from the constitution to police rules), and an overall institutionalization occurred of the former informal, “grey” areas.

4 In the case of Taiwan, Ming-sho Ho (NTU) and Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao (Academia Sinica) made seminal contributions to social movement research in Taiwan. East Central European civil society researchers on Taiwan include Kákai, Meseznikov. András Bozóki, Ervin Csizmadia, Ágnes Gagyí, Jody Jensen, Ferenc Miszlivetz, Andrea Szabó, Dániel Mikecz, László Kákai, Máté Szabó prepared PHD and a wide range of Hungarian and English publication on protest and movements of civil society in Hungary. On research in Hungary: Buzogány 2016. Actual state of civil society in Taiwan and Hungary: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2016.see in Appendix.

In summary, the basics differences and similarities between Taiwan and Hungary are the following:

| TAIWAN | HUNGARY |
|---|---|
| KMT nationalist white terror | Communist dictatorship |
| Cold War division within China | Cold War division within Europe |
| East and South East Asian geopolitics and culture | Central European geopolitics and culture |
| Subethnic conflict, China-factor and natives | Homogeneous small nation in Europe |
| Isolated by the People's Republic | Sovereignty and International/European boundaries |
| US and Western-bound elites | Moscow-based rule, eastern Bloc |
| Militarized character | De-militarized by Moscow dominance |
| Economic growth, modernization, welfare | Communist modernization and industrialization, scarcity of resources, economic crisis |
| Bound to ancient and national tradition | Internationalism, Europeanisation, suppressed national traditions |
| East Asian boundaries-Chinese diaspora | Central European Boundaries, Hungarian diaspora in Western countries |

Recent Protest Waves in Taiwan (2014) and in Hungary (2010-17)

Former opposition movements gained momentum as parties and NGO's after democratization, but new waves of civil society may challenge them. The DPP in Taiwan, and Fidesz in Hungary are big parties and important political actors; each emerging from the anti-authoritarian, former opposition movements. They have been changed and challenged by new and different civic protest movements (such as *Sunflower*, *Wild Strawberries*, *White Shirts* in Taiwan), as well as by students, environmentalists, or right-wing radicals in Hungary. Here we will focus on the anti-government protests since 2010 in Budapest, and the occupation of the parliament in 2014 Taipei and the outcomes of these protests.

The general election of 2010, on the one hand, resulted in a two-thirds majority for Fidesz, as well as seeing the parliamentary entry of the radical right party "Jobbik", and the Green party LMP. The Socialist Left lost dramatically its political significance, as it fragmented into three parties, two new ones led by former Prime Ministers (Ferenc Gyurcsány, and Gordon Bajnai), and the remains of Socialist Party (est. 1990). In the new hegemonic party system, there is no system alternative to the Fidesz party as a real political centre. The Orbán regime can be described as a majoritarian democracy within a hegemonic party system with strongly centralized finances and economy (Csillag and Szelényi 2015, Bozóki 2015). There is strong dominance of the ruling party and the right-wing parties which means that human rights are pushed back by a government policy of "law and order"; European values, human rights and civic culture are secondary for this authoritarian-conservative governance (Disrespect 2010).

A de-mobilization of the protests by the extreme right began with the resignation of the much-debated Socialist Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2009, whose person triggered the riots in Budapest from September 2006. The energetic performance by the Fidesz government after 2010 has reduced the mobilization potential of the radical right on the protest scene. Parliamentary seats promoted the more moderate development of the "Jobbik" party. "Jobbik" will further preserve its identity and profile as a parliamentary protest party, but the truly radical protest is carried out, after its presence in parliament, by other organizations or right-wing groups and their leaders.

As a result of the hegemonic party system and divided opposition parties, new extra-parliamentary democratic movements emerged. These new movements tried to mobilize the participation of active citizens who worked to build a new political landscape from the bottom up, from the civil society. Their mobilization was directed primarily against the policies of the hegemonic party Fidesz, and the right-wing opposition party Jobbik. These new democratic movements were members of and supported by international and especially European civic and human rights networks, they were highly Europeanised and globally connected. There is civic, political and media pluralism in Hungary, however restricted; as in many other recent competitive-authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Levitsky-Way 2010, Whitehead 2016). Peaceful forms of protest can be exercised within the frame of the demonstration law of 1989, and there are even political and media "spaces" for civil disobedience. Not only the ruling majority and its affiliated organizations have a "voice" in public, but also the old and new protesters. There exists a limited, selective pluralism for the protest movements (Jensen 2015).

Left- and right-wing political movements can be commonly characterized by a readiness to protest activity against the Fidesz-led government. The radical right and the right-wing

populists are, however, different from the Left, as the riots of 2006 and their aftermath demonstrated. Right-wing activists use different forms of political violence as a strategy of political mobilization. The Left /alternative citizens' movements and activists are non-violent and bound to the culture of the civil disobedience in Hungary. Surveys have shown that the Left-wing citizens' movements want to accept globalization and Europeanization in principle and manifest these values in the protests against the Fidesz government, while the Right-wing populists stand against globalization and Europeanization (Krasztev-Till 2013, Active Citizen's 2013). Minorities and immigrants are massively rejected by the right-wing populists, while the leftist protest generation behaves with tolerance towards these groups. The protest potential of the new Right and Left citizens' movements is thus profiled distinctively differently, both types of protest belong to Hungarian protest culture, but they have different characters.

The Orbán government is also supported by a variety of citizens' groups, who stand behind the policy of the Fidesz government. The largest pro-government demonstrations "Peace March" (*Békemenet*), was supported by a pro-government "umbrella organization" of "Civilian Solidarity" (*Civil Összefogás, CÖF*) financed by "oligarchs" near to the Fidesz government and this way indirectly by the state budget. They organized marches of tens of thousands of people in order to show that the government, in fact, enjoys the support of the majority of the population (Metz 2015, Kende and Krekó et al 2017).

At the level of civil society-state relations, reflected in recent developments (e.g., the government's attempt to control the civil society program of the Norway Grant in 2014-15 and the campaign against Soros funded organizations in 2016-17), we must state that party and government political influence on civil society has escalated. Grants and support mechanisms managed by the government prefer those NGOs and CSOs where the leadership is loyal to the government (Antall 2016: 105-162, 266-283). Critical analysts call this trend the "domestication of NGOs" by centralizing resources and decisions through different institutional methods (Magyar 2016: 139-143.) The hybrid regime's loyal GONGOs and their alliances may be hegemonic, dominant, or strong in the domestic arena, but have few or minimal regional and global allies. The autonomous civic groups and their alliances may be weakened by the loyalists of the hybrid regime which rules in the domestic area, but the real NGOs receive considerable support from regional and global networks (Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Open Society Fund etc.) and organizations (UN, EU, CoE etc.) or from nation states and their alliances (US, Switzerland, Norway, democracy development projects etc.). This is the reason why international resource mobilization is a main target of the regime against autonomous civil society actors with external support. In 2017, the Hungarian government put forward propositions to enforce the immediate and public identification of considerable foreign support in NGOs budgets. The government considered to qualify active human rights NGOs as lobby organizations with some political and social engagement, and differentiate their regulations from 'normal'(sic) NGOs. Harsh international and internal criticism followed this proposition, that was looked upon as an attempt to discriminate against NGOs that receive foreign support to NGOs with domestic, especially government support. This way all relevant forms of international resource mobilization is marked and identified publicly. There were campaigns against the NGOs supported by the Norwegian Fund and later by those supported by the Open Society Institute, as well as the Central European University founded by George Soros that was looked upon as a liberal think-tank. A change in the Hungarian Higher Education law tried to disrupt the 20 years of CEU activities in Hungary and provoked a wide range of solidarity protests as well as international publicity and support for the CEU and against the Orbán government in the Spring of 2017.

In summary, the effects of democratic transition on civil society and NGO development are the target of a recent roll back (2014-2017) in Hungary:

- Parts of the legalized NGO sector are outlawed, or subject to discrimination.
- Foreign aid is viewed as a “stigma” which is defined by the new legislation – discrimination against “foreign-funded” NGOs.
- Networking in regional and global networks will be sanctioned by the discrimination of foreign aid.
- The new legislation opens a deep gap between legality and legitimacy; this is shown by the strong protest wave against the preparation and implementation of legislation on foreign aided CSOs and especially the Central European University in Budapest in the Spring of 2017.
- Pro- and anti-EU international/regional cleavage and liberal/illiberal internal cleavages and conflicts overlap mobilization for different protest waves, e.g., between national/illiberal (2002-2010), and pro-EU/liberal (2010-2017) protest waves.

The “Sunflower Student Movement of 2014” against the KMT Rule and the Change of Government

Since the system change in Taiwan the two main political alternatives are the former Chang-Kai-shek party, Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from the opposition movements that was established in 1986. Elections and important government actions, decisions by the DPP presidency elected in 2000 and 2004, were followed by intra – and extra-parliamentary protests by the KMT. The mobilization of supporters against the democratically elected president and parliament were included in the political culture of the new democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, the KMT built strong ties with China and the Chinese Communist Party, and in this way their protest received a pro-unification, pro-China character. This is an important issue in Taiwan, where the Republic of China is seen by the mainland Chinese elite, and also a great bulk of citizens, as an illegal separation from the ancient Chinese statehood.

The DPP stands for Taiwanese independence, and after losing presidential and governmental power in 2008 they supported pro-independence civic movements against the newly re-established KMT regime. Debated issues of constitution were in the forefront of protest as well as corruption and the misuse of governmental power and the neglect of citizens’ rights by the DPP. Under the challenge of the KMT, mobilization, criticism, and serious economic and policy issues, the DPP lost the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections, and the KMT gained the majority in 2008 and 2012. The DPP in opposition renewed its networks of civil society which started protest campaigns against the policy failures of the KMT government and president.

The KMT government and presidency (2008-2016) introduced a series of agreements and legislation on China-Taiwan economic, social and administrative relations. The main foreign policy orientation against the former DPP period (2000-2008) was built upon strengthening the cooperation of Taipei and Beijing in many respects. After a trade agreement, a new agreement on the mutual liberalization of the service trade was discussed. Many professional and business organisations and independence-oriented political and social organizations demanded guarantees against the growing Chinese influence on Taiwan in telecommunications, internet and other services. DPP and other independence oriented parties tried to implement a high threshold for discussing the new treaty, but the KMT fraction of the Legislative Yuan tried to dramatically shorten the internal bargaining procedure. On March 17, 2014 a KMT legislator Chang Ching-chung, the convener of Internal Administration Committee of Legislative Yuan, spent only 30 seconds to announce that the review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) between the KMT and Beijing government was completed by the examination committee (Wright 2014). Afterwards, he dispersed the meeting. Since CSSTA was highly controversial, a number of citizens felt doubtful and anxious about the other party of agreement, China, who might utilize its economic dominance to exert political influence on the cross-strait deadlock. (Ho 2015).

The issue was based upon structural conflicts such as China-Taiwan relations, youth unemployment, growing Chinese influence on Taiwan, de-legitimation of the political regime led by Kuomintang, the former ruling party of authoritarian regime. The trigger for the protest

on 17-18.03.2014 in Taipei was that the KMT president, government and parliamentary fraction pushed for the ratification of a treaty with China, manipulating political decision making in the Legislative Yuan for the full acceptance of the Cross Strait Service and Trade Agreement(CSSTA). The opposition Democratic Progress Party and the independence oriented radical Taiwan Solidarity Union perceived the threat of exclusion of parliamentary opposition from the decision making. NGOs, student organizations, and different forces of civil society felt they were excluded from the discourse and criticized the “black box” of political decision making. This “injustice frame” mobilized NGOs and student movements for democracy and transparency against the ratification of CSSTA. Students, their supporters and allies started the occupation of the Executive Yuan building in Taipei from 18.03. until the 10. 04.2014. Reactions of authorities could be described as selective and repressive tolerance, i.e., tolerating the occupation of the building of the Legislative Yuan, but not tolerating the occupation of the building of the Executive Yuan, the Prime Minister’s office. There was police intervention with force, followed by the discussion on police brutality and violence resulting in the criticism of the NGOs. Political opportunities expanded for the protest by the internal division of the KMT between “hardliners” and “softliners”, and between the political elite in the governing and opposition parties (Jones and Su 2015). The occupation of the parliament, and in the following legal procedures, the concept of civil disobedience was used by the protesters (as in the “Umbrella Movement” in Hong-Kong, Ortmann 2015). Their discourse used the “human rights” frames against the “law and order” orientation of the authorities. The protest opened a new policy window: first rejection, later acceptance by the KMT of the basic demand, not to pass the CSSTA law on the fast track. Elites were more and more divided by the wide civil support for the protest movement which was supported by a wide coalition of media and professional intellectuals as well as solidarity campaigns and series of protests, marches, rallies, demonstrations mainly in Taipei, but also in some larger cities of Taiwan. The operation called “black box”, terminating the examination procedure in the parliament, generated “Sunflower Movement.”

The short-term results of the protest campaign are as follows: The CSSTA was not accepted by the parliament on a fast track; there was a widespread de-legitimation of the governing party was shown in the results of the 2014 local and 2016 national elections; there were protest waves in Hong-Kong and Macau against China-based authoritarian tendencies; there was international media coverage and support by civil society in Taiwan. The *Sunflower Movement* challenged the structures of Taiwanese politics and put different and serious issues on the public agenda:

- Does Taiwan need a democratic revival with new political actors and agents?
- Do relations with China need to be rethought?
- Does Taiwan need a wider constitutional reform?

These are open questions for the future development of Taiwan, made conscious in wider circles by the intensive protest campaign against CSSTA in 2014 in Taipei. Thus, these scholarly, democratic and grassroots organizations displayed a novel composition and mobilization. In addition, the multidimensional characteristics, including a democratic deliberation forum commonly established by several NGOs and academic institutions, showed the vitality and momentum of an empowered “civil society”. Civil society in Taiwan was also strengthened by the recent protest waves against KMT government, and a wide range of human rights watchdog initiatives developed (Meseznikov 2013).

The KMT government lost its support partly because of the protest mobilization and critical discourse of illiberal tendencies within civil and political society. The “China-factor”, the specific relation between KMT and CCP, constructed the “shadow of China” on the liberal democracy of Taiwan. The electorate at the 2015 municipal/local elections and the 2016 presidential/parliamentary elections voted with two-thirds majority for the DPP, and demanded a clear transition to more independence and autonomy for Taiwan, as well as for the restoration of human rights culture. Besides the DPP’s victory, the party of the *Sunflower Movement* the “New People Party” also gained some mandates in the 2016 parliament. They tried to bring into the public discourse the radical demands of social movements and civic groups. The DPP government and president aim to be agents of larger and lasting deadlocks, as inquiries are made about, for example, the violence of the authoritarian regime before 1989, reaching consent with colonized aboriginal tribes, reforming the penal court system and strengthening human rights defence and rule of law.

The very clear lack of sovereignty or statehood forces Taiwan, with its economic and social development, to become a unique experiment based on the idea of “civic diplomacy” with a dominant role for civil society in international, as well as regional and global relations. Participation in international organizations, and conferences is mainly conducted at the level of NGOs (like Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, in Meseznikov 2013) instead of at the level of formal, international, or foreign affairs organizations. Civil society in Taiwan is moved by necessity in a very post-modern, globalised direction. The growing role of NGOs in international relations is a general trend in the 21th century, but mainly in the shadow of classical foreign-international affairs. In the case of Taiwan, many functions which cannot be provided through formal foreign policy are performed by participation within global and regional NGO networks (Kákai 2015, Ming-sho Ho 2015). Civil society and human rights are “in” in Taiwan because this is their “brand” against China with its still authoritarian regime. The new DPP government and presidency in Taiwan tends to broaden the participation in international affairs and in the work of specialised UN bodies through the channels of human rights NGOs. There have been inquiries, however, into NGOs funded by the KMT Party and government to find out whether they used public money for their own goals without government control.

The policy and legislation towards civil society and NGOs by the DPP government in Taiwan (2016-17) is developing the democratic transition further:

- By overlapping issues of “international” pro- and anti-China cleavages and of liberal/illiberal internal cleavages that mobilize protest waves (from 2008-2016) and independence/liberal and pro-China/illiberal ones (after the 2016 elections).
- China-Taiwan relations, on the level of the civil society, are controlled and hindered by China because of their “one China principle”, but Taiwan tries to initiate more networking and communication.

Conclusions

The party systems in Taiwan and in Hungary are concentrated and built upon main conflicts – in Hungary, between nationalist-illiberal parties of the right and a Europe-oriented and liberally minded left; in Taiwan between the pro-China-Nationalist KMT (“green”) versus the independence oriented liberal DPP (“blue”) and their allies. Very strong central conflicts mobilized protest movements in both countries, in 2006 in Hungary and 2014 in Taiwan. Both protest cycles contributed to the two-third majority victory at the next elections of the protesting parties, Fidesz in Hungary and DPP in Taiwan. However, the two former protest parties moved the political regime in different directions. In Hungary, Fidesz changed the constitution quickly and radically which resulted in many liberal and Europe-minded criticism and protest. In Taiwan, it is almost impossible to change the constitution because of a very high threshold needed for a referendum, which is a requirement for constitutional changes. Fidesz in Hungary changed the electoral system to its own favour as a dominant and unified big party. The DPP in Taiwan try to marginalize the second biggest party, the KMT, investigating its “ill- gotten party property” from the 1945 conquest of the Taiwan island by Chang-Kai-shek. Both parties try to use their present dominant position to guarantee their own political future within the dual competition, accusing the former government party with corruption and the abuse of power. The political conflicts in the two countries may produce elements of competitive authoritarianism for the Socialists in Hungary and the KMT in Taiwan. Hybridization is very clear and seems to be long term in Hungary, and a present danger in the case of Taiwan. Both parties, Fidesz and the DPP, understand their political success (two-thirds majority) as legitimation for completing unfinished democratization in their own way, securing their further and persistent dominance, and oppressing former authoritarian ruling parties.

In Hungary, the Fidesz government built their own political path, distancing themselves from EU standards in the refugee issue and some other human rights issues (e.g., lifelong imprisonment, restrictions on NGOs who receive foreign support etc.). In the case of Taiwan, distancing from the Chinese model involves the strengthening of the diffusion and acceptance of the Western human rights culture, and strong support for NGOs and civil society. In Hungary on the contrary, balancing foreign policy between partners like China and Russia and the EU, as well as internal political developments, present the dangers of illiberal democracy and a hybrid regime in an EU member state. Under the DPP government and presidency, Taiwan seems to develop out of the illiberal tendencies of the KMT-past, although fighting the KMT over its democratic failures and authoritarian past may marginalize a great deal of the electorate.

The two countries share the origin of democracy in the third wave of democratization. Comparing their paths of development before, during and after democratization, we can emphasize many similarities based on the relative benevolence of authoritarian rule at its latter phase, in the “pacted” transition, in the reform-oriented direction of the old elite and the role of civil society in the transition. In East Central Europe, the consolidation of democracy was coupled with a strong trend to Europeanization. Among the Asian democracies of the third wave, Taiwan and South Korea became the avant-garde in consolidation and maturation of new democracies without a regional democratic development network and institutionalization such as the EU provided in case of Hungary. Taiwan also struggles with the open issue of sovereignty and statehood, as well as with serious external security threats.

The thesis of Aurel Croissant (2004) implied for the majority of new democracies in Asia that after transition hybridization and defective development would endanger consolidation. This

trend is also apparent in case of East Central Europe, and has been debated since 2010 in the cases of Poland (Ekiert 2011) and Hungary. Hungarian democracy since 2010 is at the forefront of debates on the anti-democratic tendencies of populism and hybridization, for EU-criticism and scepticism of the ruling party Fidesz (Bozóki 2015, Hegedűs and Bozóki 2017). Civil society networks and mobilizations in Hungary need to take into consideration the expectations of the critical public that expect political solutions. Civic activism is under pressure to contribute to political transformation which overburdens new civic groups with the responsibility to cross the barrier of the civil to political society as their predecessor did in 1989-1990. A new type of “dissent” emerged against the “Orbán-regime”, with high political hopes, and can be characterized as non-political, single issue civic activism (e.g., mobilizations against the internet tax in 2014, or against the Olympic games in Budapest 2017). External actors, like European institutions, are involved in the conflicts between political and social groups and the Hungarian government.

The democratic deficits in case of Korea and Taiwan are combined with external challenges by China and North Korea. They present dangers, especially regarding great internal problems in South Korea and the external challenges of China, against the independence oriented DPP government in Taiwan. The DPP government tries to initiate far-reaching democratic reforms to solve problems like the rule of law and accountability, as well as tries to face the remains of the KMT’s authoritarian past. The KMT and people who feel provoked by the reforms protest against them, and sharp conflicts exist.

In both Taiwan and Hungary, civic movements made considerable contributions to the political changes, and they proved to be constructive forces as new types of “coloured revolutions” (Forbig and Demes 2007) against the hybridization tendencies of corrupt and manipulating political elites in 2016-2017. Movements to “democratize democracy” and fight the “democratic deficit” are badly needed in both countries. However, a consensus over the “rules of the game” must be conserved despite sharpening conflicts on the policies and economic decisions of the respective governments. In South Korea, for example, the huge protest wave remained peaceful. Issues of the legality of anti-government protests are discussed in Taiwan and Hungary, and hopefully the balance between legality and legitimacy will be kept in both cases, and peaceful parliamentary governance will not be endangered by active anti-government protest waves.

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