



POLÁNYI CENTRE PUBLICATIONS

Juozas Kasputis

SCHOLAR ENTANGLED: NEW IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL INQUIRY

**THE NECESSITY FOR PEACE AND PAX IMPERII:
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

II.2019/WP02

**iASK WORKING PAPERS
2019**

Table of Contents

<i>About the Author</i>	5
<i>Abstract</i>	7
1. Introduction	9
2.1. On the troubled verge of times	10
2.2. For the benefit of the service	12
2.3. Modelling (moulding?) the social	13
2.4. The insufficiency of detachment	15
2.5. The modern preoccupation with linearity	20
2.6. New scope of participant	22
3. Conclusion	25
<i>References</i>	26

About the Author

Juozas Kasputis is a research fellow at iASK. He holds a BA in Business Administration from Kaunas Technology University (Lithuania, 1998) and an MA in Practical Philosophy from Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania, 2011). Juozas Kasputis carries out philosophical inquiry on methodological challenges in the social sciences. His focus includes philosophy of science and language, semiotics, sociology of knowledge, economics. Juozas Kasputis was a young research fellow at ISES under National Excellence program (Hungary) in 2014 - 2015. His research interests at iASK are the application of scientific method within social sciences from philosophical perspective; the impact of recent developments in natural sciences for social sciences (especially the implications of complexity theory, quantum mechanics). He specifically scrutinizes the issues of objectivity, linearity, and rationality but is also interested in the history of utopian thought, the issues of determinism and causality.

Abstract

Social studies still have been pursued as complicated scientific endeavour. From epistemological point of view, social sciences don't converge on a predominant definition of Science, like natural sciences do. The existing differences in exposition of 'science', 'inquiry', or 'studies' end up with disputed role of intellectual, embarked on understanding social realm. Philosophy of science is engaged on the 'maturity' of social sciences in terms of objectivity and rationality. But continuing epistemological debates would be insufficient without reference to scholar as human studying other humans. Philosophical approach has been mainly concentrated on the accumulation of knowledge thus neglecting any social context. This way the role of scholar is defined in accordance to methodical procedures. However, it should be useful to have a contextual recourse to emerging thoughts about rationality and intellectual responsibility at the beginning of the 20th century – the outset of institutionalized social sciences. Then Benda's "The Treason of the Intellectuals" as Dewey's "The Quest for Certainty" introduced the issues of external influence and objectivity with far reaching implications for the rest of century. The project of scientific social sciences has been persisting in distorted compromises and reservations though in disguise of formalisms. The ideas of detached observation and deterministic causality cannot be applied to social reality in general and to participatory social inquiry particularly. Dewey has referred to quantum mechanics as possible solution for this contradiction – observation and interference can overlap. The proposal has received another chance in Weinert's "The Scientist as Philosopher" as redefined non-deterministic causality: the concept of causal story. Though it reintroduces probabilistic causality, there is enough space for interpreting non-linear processes on the behalf of scholar – participant. Which means that observation turns into deliberate participation thus extending the limits of social inquiry.

“Philosophy occupies an important place in culture only when things seem to be falling apart – when cherished beliefs are threatened. At such times, intellectuals start to prophesy a new age. They reinterpret the past by reference to an imagined future; and offer suggestions about what should be preserved and what must be discarded.”

(Rorty, 2016: p. 23)

1. Introduction

This paper has deliberately been named using such words as ‘scholar’ and ‘inquiry’. Their modern counterparts, ‘scientist’ and ‘science’ may seem more prominent in academic terms, but none the less controversial. A certain trend has come to the fore regarding the usage of these words that by and large connotes the Natural Sciences as an exemplary mode of scientific endeavour, which is a focus of this paper. Predominantly, many dictionaries define ‘scientist’ and ‘science’ with an emphasis on the Natural Sciences that leads to a model of scientific endeavour. The impressive success of Newtonian physics has set long-term standards of science that include the detachment of scientists as observers, impersonal knowledge, “value-free” objectivity, the regular pattern of reality, etc. These concepts have also been used in the so-called Social Sciences since their institutionalisation within universities at the end of the nineteenth century. Although a final elaboration of the Social Sciences did not come to fruition in the following century, the application of scientific methods remained questionable in the social realm. By revisiting a history of Western intellectual thought, a methodological debate underwent a revival.

This is a reason why the paper has invoked some notable authors published at the beginning of the twenty-first century - the aim is to present authentic reflections, which are nonetheless relevant to and explanatory of the ongoing discussion. In addition, this paper is not intended to deny the scientific status of Social Studies – rather it seeks to expand the scope of possible research methods, thus, involving more alternative approaches. The terms ‘scholar’ and ‘inquiry’ are more general but less restrictive, they are helpful in bridging the divide between Philosophy and Social Studies. The field of Social Science has become deeply associated with the concepts of engineering which also originated from industrialisation during the nineteenth century. It has led to the isolation of Philosophy from Social Studies but has never achieved the same success as that of the Natural Sciences ‘though many tried’. As a result, Social Science has constantly drifted between Philosophy and the Natural Sciences. Social reality is more complex, than its physical equivalent, and has emerged as somewhere “in-between” both realities. However, a mechanistic approach, with relevant cause-effect relations, has still been extensively applied in Social Studies that do not qualify for the comprehensive exploitation of available options. Many interesting developments have taken place in the Natural Sciences as well as in Physics. Newtonian physics is no longer the only exemplary mode of Science. The predictive capacity of Social Science is unsatisfactory due to linear thinking and false cause-effect presumptions. This paper discusses the opportunities of exploring new insights that originate from the Natural Sciences (namely Physics and Astronomy) in addition to the philosophies of Science and language for the development of social inquiry. This purpose is served best by the term ‘entanglement’, which originates from Quantum Physics. It should be noted that it would be helpful to revisit classic notions of objectivity and detached observation to supplement scientific methods. Naturally this may require the basic concepts of time and space, the

whole scientific endeavour, and the role of scholars who face both social and individual challenges to be rethought.

Scientists usually assume that scientific laws, regularities or equations must be universally valid, despite different models concerning space and time. The major problem about the social realm concerns the sheer impossibility of knowledge being entirely impartial. In other words, positivism can only cover a limited degree of peace regarding social reality even if its mode of “slicing” the object of study to retrieve quantitative data is claimed to be comprehensive. The detachment of scientists is a notion of the ideal which in many cases is not completely adhered to in the Natural Sciences either. For example, sometimes to take a measurement literally requires the observer to intervene, as in Quantum and Particle Physics. The definition of observation is not fixed so the notion of objectivity itself is rather contradictory. A scholar is not just a scientist but also an intellectual. However, this does not merely presume the implementation of the most suitable solutions to technical problems because scholars fail to fulfil certain functions that technicians do. First, a scholar must be sensitive to ethical issues and societal needs which is not as superficial a declaration as it may seem. Rational modelling as a method tends to neglect the problem with ‘values.’ It is time to understand that a denial of ethical values and other social sensitivity does not eliminate bias in the pursuit of objectivity and detachment. This understanding does not simplify matters but should enrich both social inquiry and society.

2.1. On the troubled verge of times

The statement by Rorty (2016: p. 24) that “there was no intellectual struggle comparable in scale to the warfare between science and theology” between 1600 and 1900 stimulates some troubled thoughts concerning the twentieth century and beyond. What is the significance of the twentieth century then, if any? Was this an era of glorious scientific progress and other kinds of augmented intellectual improvements? Material and technological achievements have been strongly associated with the scientific method and rationality. However, the age of two consecutive world wars did not conform to the universal aspiration of peace and conflict resolution. The quest for a universal framework was a basic precondition of the scientific project (Wallerstein, 1996: p. 3) with an ambitious promise to extract some rationality from the so-called *non-scientific cluster of values*. On the other hand, the monopolization of a centre of gravity of final authority is highly competitive. A clash of ideologies has prevented warfare between Science and Religion that makes the issue of rationality nonetheless complicated. The autonomy of Science still has been determined in relative terms, especially in the case of the Social Sciences. The political dimension has pervaded the scientific method in spite of the ideals of objectivity and detachment. This is a hallmark of the twentieth century – politics pervading Science, and vice versa. These relations have turned into a special kind of entanglement which signifies a new mode of research within the social realm both implicitly and explicitly. The transition of social scholars from civil servants (clerks) to self-conscious agents attached to the social context would not have been possible without the shifting role of intellectuality within society. In this regard, the twentieth century could have far reaching implications for the social inquiry.

The imposition of the scientific method was a prerequisite for further ‘scientification’ and ‘institutionalization’ of the Social Sciences from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. Following the first industrial revolution, a scientific capacity to predict and control

processes has been subdued to engineering power. The need for newly emerged nation-states to consolidate and manage social transformations has invoked a technical and deterministic approach within Social Studies. Even though it marks a certain point of divergence between scientific and intellectual mentalities, it is less noticeable than the preceding split between Philosophy and the Sciences, both are of equal importance. No intent to plunge into the philosophical debate regarding the distinction between reason and intellect is made in this paper. The discussion with regard to which one of them is technical/instrumental is irrelevant in terms of the concern that scientists are too submissive to the method in the absence of any critical considerations, almost like in a hostage situation. Intellectual mentality should aspire to the re-evaluation of restrictions with regard to the method, thus, leading to the resumption of a social inquiry in a broader context than required by the notion of 'discipline'. It is quite symptomatic of the rather ubiquitous nature of impressive developments, the sense of a fixated and disempowered scientific 'vicious circle' or, in other words, *stasis* is still prevalent in the ivory tower of social knowledge. This without a doubt does not resemble the stance of a winner, moreover, it does not necessarily result in outdated warfare resurfacing between Science and Religion, because the distinction between binary oppositions may be just another attempt to reduce the complexity by constructing a simplified version of reality through rationalisations.

Theology is a unique outcome of Western civilization; it has contributed to the rise of modern scientific thought. In some sense, Science can be nominated as the successor to theological tradition since it claims a monopoly on knowing a Being. On the other hand, Theology readily assumes the scientific foundations of Religion, thus, preserving a statement on faculty discipline in some Western universities (whose philosophy cannot frequently afford to do by default). From a historical perspective, a 'purification' machine of the scientific method has not proven to be reliable, at least in the social field, by sustaining a framework of rational values of its own throughout the twentieth century. The complicated relationship between Theology and Science could be a symptom of continuous challenge and controversy in terms of reviving universal structures. Tackling the unresolved issue of universal rationality, assuming it needs to be resolved, was postponed until this millennium. The example of fluctuating worldviews in the context of this dispute, which has yet to achieve any viable end, may be drawn in a comparative way from the writings of prominent intellectuals – according to philosopher Dewey (1929) and physicist Dyson (2006) – representing the first and second halves of the previous century. While Dewey (1929), in terms of the elimination of traditional metaphysics, relied on the industrial economy and experimental scientific method, Dyson (2006) at the end of the twentieth century admitted the relevance of religious values regarding the growth of scientific knowledge. However, first and foremost, these authors shared a common sentiment because their approaches were significant and interesting regarding the prevailing common concern about the role of Science and scientists themselves rather than in terms of their presumed differences. Despite this, both Dewey and Dyson reject a grand universal framework based on the privileged access to 'pure' rationality cleansed of social and moral values. Equally, it can be reaffirmed that they dismiss the perspective of the outside spectator (be it God or a 'detached' observer) and the unique authority of Science in the search for new knowledge.

The overall scientific landscape of the entire twentieth century has been immersed in Kantian benevolent neutrality between Theology and Science which previously was anticipated by Dewey (1929: p. 58). Impressive scientific applications and experiments consolidated a firm image of the Sciences and scientists. It also took into account social scientists who try to follow the latest trends with a tremendous "field work" at their fingertips - world wars and post-war

changes had produced a wide range of opportunities for social experiments (WWII *per se* can be regarded as the greatest social experiment in human history, at least for now). The full ironic nature of this is unlikely to be avoided since it is quite complicated to conduct a social experiment in a laboratory that is representative. Even though the demand for adequate policy advice is growing, the Social Sciences possess a limited set of research tools which basically rely on modelling and statistical databases. This means that social knowledge has been accumulated from experience, which also includes dead ends and mistakes, though not everybody is ready to take advantage of this. For example, the mentality of 'let bygones be bygones' is still evident in the economic mental outlook for ideological and methodological reasons (Stiglitz, 2010). The ideal of detachment has been severely obstructed in the social realm, however, that is not necessarily a methodological flaw in the social inquiry. Furthermore, social interests and ethical considerations must become an inseparable part of a research programme (or paradigm) that is liberated from misleading and reductionist 'rational agents.'

2.2. For the benefit of the service

The scientific endeavour of social scientists, which occasionally includes a mask of omniscient arrogance, is somewhat uncomfortable. A tremendous variety of cases arose during the twentieth century when social scientists as characters experienced fundamental transformations. Shortly after the Social Sciences had been established within universities at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries (Wagner, 2001), it became obvious that social complexity could not be surrendered to the engineering ambitions of the industrialisation epoch. Rapid social and economic changes required a certain degree of authority to justify a corresponding pattern of directional development. The newly emerged nation-states needed a sophisticated tool for administrative statecraft, and this had been realised long before the industrialisation of the nineteenth century. The impressive achievements of Astronomy and Mechanics have shaken the authority of Religion at least since the Renaissance. Then a basic principle of experimental Science propounded by Bacon delivered a new promise 'to tame a Nature'. The appreciated success about the predictive capacity of the Physical Sciences has stimulated the following belief of governing elites to tame a social and political order. It was supported by the outstanding force of law-abiding natural regularities which pointed to inevitability but enabled "the adjustable setting" and its potential implementation in terms of solving social issues. That shift in thinking had been premised on the expected transposition of lawful regularities from the physical to the social realm by assuming certain similarities between them and, thus, were studied by the universal scientific mentality.

Regarding the concept of controlling a process, knowledge with predictive power is presumed in terms of the expected outcome and ability to arrange the necessary conditions that would facilitate the desired consequences. Not surprisingly, the first theoreticians and practitioners of Social Studies also occupied administrative positions (Hirschman, 1997; Wallerstein, 1996). It was quite an influential trend, sometimes referred to as 'mandarinization', which survived into the era of imperial Germany. The compatible existence of scholar and administrator in one person can be traced back to Ancient China but it is unnecessary to go back so far. It is enough to keep in mind that the presence of the state as an 'intellectual container' is deeply ingrained in many fields of social research. This is a never-ending issue in Social Studies that is less visible than in the Natural Sciences where the influence of the state is more apparent and focused like in the procedures for defining the priorities of research or possible applications of

innovations. The obligation to supply 'policy advice' has led to a peculiar list of requirements for scholars who are forced, maybe even unwarily, to make contradictory methodological, professional and moral choices during inquiries. These contradictions are usually resolved by 'rationalising' hidden bias within a formal framework (Myrdal, 1944). Obviously social relations (and social inquiry as an integral part of them) are maintained by human beings with diverse interests and respectively different expectations. A "disinterested social science", according to Myrdal, "never existed, and it never will exist" (1944: p. 1064). For example, the political economy was renamed as economics to achieve 'a true' scientific status.

Many hopes of securing economic theory arose from external influences and other biases, therefore, it began to resemble 'mature' Sciences. The philosophy of Science has always struggled with the so-called immaturity of Social Sciences (Kuhn, 1996; Lakatos, 1999; Popper, 2008) which seemed to be lost somewhere in between the Humanities and Natural Sciences. The introduction of mathematical models with linear equations did not complete a scientific project of 'the social sciences' queen' within Economics. Once the professionalisation of Sciences had gained momentum, scientists sought after the reputation of the independent intellectual leading force in the wake of progress. But it has always remained an open-ended question with regard to the utilisation of the results of scientific research in terms of the common good. Natural scientists can perform as many experiments as necessary but social theorists do not have such a privilege. Due to social complexity, scholars are obliged to be emphatic and sensitive as much as possible when making responsible choices. It is not a case of building a new weapon of mass destruction, but the consequences can be just as devastating.

2.3. Modelling (moulding?) the social

The collapse of financial markets (2008 – 2009) revealed how much damage can be done by delusional misunderstanding and misappropriation of rational agent-based modelling. Models may be useful for studying and understanding social reality, but they cannot replace reality itself. Even today, the arrogant behaviour of many financial institutions like banks is beyond rational limits. Allegedly, economic processes are modelled by them in terms of objective and accurate analyses, but banks are dissatisfied with the tools available, which is quite understandable. They aspire to tame uncertainty by shaping public opinion, not only financial education programmes. A significant amount of effort is made to influence the behaviour of consumers. Furthermore, in order to share expert knowledge, bank economists frequently function as PR (public relations) specialists by propagating certain attitudes in public. Without interference from external regulatory institutions or other sources of influence (central banks are insufficient), such activities end in 'closed-loop' thinking and acting. In this case, the model is not intended to correspond to reality, but reality is "forced" to comply with the model.

Ironically, economists are famous for trying to personify 'rational agents' (Stiglitz, 2010: p. 249) which in themselves are irrational, not to mention regular efforts to convert others. It is a reminder of what may be confirmed by the practices of a religious community according to the observation of Redman (1993: p. 176) that "it has been forgotten that economics in both England and the United States grew out of religion". This refers to historical findings that many early economists were clergymen (in the UK) and former or practising ministers (in the USA). Later, the authority to rationalize social order was entrenched in the political as well as religious realms. The redemption and amelioration of the human condition are two sides of the same

coin – the postponed (or lost) ideal of final achievement yet to be actualized in the present. The abstract perfection of the model is supposed to assist scientists by sorting out divergencies from the ideal in the field of research. Every type of measurement requires an ideal point of reference or benchmark case to ensure a form of universality across different areas of research or a thorough comparison between the outcomes of various fields of research. However, a reversed set of values is introduced, mainly via the ideological dimension which is oriented towards the convergence of reality with an aspired worldview.

Political mentality consists of many peculiar modes of thinking which differ from scientific equivalents. Notwithstanding any references made or aspirations declared, some fatal similarities can also be drawn. Politicians are well-known for their ability to exploit the arbitrariness of signifier and signified that results in a shift in meaning and displacement. It transforms the idealisation of the model from a research tool into the framework of the political programme. The fact that the ideal image of reality approaches a desired condition, following arbitrarily arranged initial parameters, is nothing more than a piece of wishful political reality, which has a chance of becoming viable if the electorate “buys” it. The case of bank economists could be extended into a general pattern of disguised bias that employs the rhetoric of Science. The political field of influence covers a whole stratum of appointed and non-elected officials that dilutes accountability but not ideological preferences. This constitutes a class of people that have the capacity to disseminate a specific worldview far beyond the political realm. They position themselves as patrons of a system which hopefully keeps evolving in a desired direction once ‘the right initial parameters’ are set. It is very convenient to assemble deterministic or stochastic social interpretations in arbitrary proportions in order to maintain a flexible explanatory frame in political and professional terms. Social Studies are exposed to a higher risk of departure from intellectual honesty if external influences remain devoid of any critical verification. For example, at one of the scientific-political gatherings, Cœuré (2015), a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, while criticising a point raised by Friedman about floating exchange rates as shock absorbers, remained loyal to the old definition of the resilience of the global economic system as “its capacity to return to equilibrium without policy intervention”. When a central banker continues to believe that equilibrium is a real state of the economy and every kind of deviation is treated like a sub-optimal equilibrium, the mere regret of his or her ‘paradigm lost’ does not seem sincere. The public statements that proclaim the feasibility of self-sufficient global adjustment would be regarded as somewhere between flawed analysis and political sloganizing, even under academic auspices. The term ‘adjustment’ may serve as a euphemism for humanitarian crisis provided the fluid notions of common good and optimality are accepted.

It is insufficient to solely focus on the utilization of scientific vocabulary in the realm of political language games - the autonomy of Science must be considered in connection with Social Studies. The autonomy usually is regarded as a prerequisite for the objective outcome of scientific research. Probably, that is the aspiration of a perfectionist who follows Newtonian physics and, because of this, fails in the case of Social Studies. However, social processes are an indispensable object of research even though the intersection of scientific, political and social dimensions yields interesting results. Scientific and political mentalities have one deficiency in common: they are too much “into themselves”, which develops into methodological/political egocentricity. Of course, this kind of focused approach is helpful to foster a professional career as, for example, a scientist or politician, however, it is valid mainly within an institutional framework or ‘scientific field of forces’ as stated by Bourdieu (2004). Mathematical models were sup-

posed to safeguard the autonomy of scientific endeavour, because they had been expected to provide the necessary isolation from incompetent political influence (Redman, 1993: p. 156) or excessive prices of entry into the 'scientific field' for amateurs (Bourdieu, 2004: p. 48). The 21st century started with the increasing manifestation of an institutional crisis that originated from scientific and political misperceptions. Mathematics has appeared to be the overestimated guarantor of scientific clarity and certainty in the Social Sciences. Firstly, the numbers are pretty good at expressing political opinions as is every other rhetorical device on various occasions. Secondly, "the gatekeeper" has become more of a problem than solution by encouraging the entrance of many scientists from Applied Mathematics into Social Studies, as in the case of Economics (Leontief, 1982). It has resulted in distorted and inadequate sets of descriptive statistics that echo the observation of Bourdieu (2004: p. 115) that "social science will never come to the end of the efforts to impose itself as a science".

The current challenges (both of social and natural origins) do not comply with 'business as usual' and require a new way of thinking, a new kind of mentality that is better represented than by the figure of a scholar. Although this is common knowledge for learned and educated people, the conventional scientific attitude has become excessively immersed in specialism. Modernity has induced a Science composed of systematized and compartmentalized knowledge, mostly acquired through scientific methods. The aspired monopoly of expertise and technological solutions has identified a science with a capacity for engineering but dissociated from scholarship in a broader sense. Humanity is subjected to the pressures of complex issues, for example, liberal democracy under attack, insufficient global governance, climate change, economic crises, etc. This extensive interconnectedness renders abstract modelling and the idea of detachment incomplete in terms of comprehensive Social Studies or adequate policy advice. It is unaffordable 'to implement a scientific project' concerning Social Studies (or inquiry, to be more exact) into blind methodological fashion. A concise intellectual itinerary that includes critical self-reflection and public commitment should enable a scholar to become a full-fledged agent of social reforms. The provision of analytical services to govern institutions on request should be extended into active participation by a scholar in the search for viable solutions. Basically, this results in abandonment of the position *made-up for detached observation*, which leads to a network of complicated political relations. The existing monopoly of scientific and political expertise, incredibly demanding a task as it may seem, must be reconsidered. Thus, the notion of social inquiry adopts a new context for the good of all, especially if it becomes more philosophical.

2.4. The insufficiency of detachment

Social inquiry has its own methodological inconsistencies and a scholar needs to overcome the imperfections of his/her profession (or devotion, though the cutting of a grant does not necessarily imply the absence of professionalism). The aspired ideal of objectivity generally is related to the notion of detachment. It is supposed that the secured detachment of the scholar is a safeguard against bias and digression from the truth. Refusal to detach is unacceptable in conventional terms, which has exemplified a case of Natural Sciences as the successful implementation of the scientific method due to the standards of objectivity.

However, according to Dewey (1929) a detached observer is an autonomous agent but detachment from the object of study can be hazardous regarding social inquiry as well. The au-

onomy of a scholar has become interconnected with the notion of objectivity and the whole idea of 'value-free' research in conventional terms. However, it does not necessarily have to form part of the definition. This means that a breach of autonomy may presuppose both, a loss and gain of accuracy, subject to the mode of inquiry. This needs to be conducted as a deliberate decision of a scholar in any case. Social inquiry, for many allegedly 'hard' scientists, is a minefield full of ambiguities and deliberate decisions come with mammoth responsibility. It is very important to note that the topic of the treason of intellectuals has persisted since the beginning of the twentieth century. This issue is not the object of research for predominantly critical studies, rather it is of great value for the problem concerning objectivity and rationality. It has been a domain of the Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge all the while. Scholars who prefer not to rely on either of them chooses another alternative, namely Social Epistemology (Fuller, 2003). This subject will be elaborated on later once the origin of this issue has been discussed.

Universality is one of the leading principles of the scientific method. Numerous scientists love to emphasize the universal presence of physical laws that extend the limits of localised spaces, for example, 'a law discovered in the UK must be the same as in France, Germany, etc.'. It is a sharp reminder to those that claim to be social scientists who address the problem concerning the 'immaturity' of Social Sciences. The 'advanced' Natural Sciences are susceptible to shifting the meaning of universality when space and time have been significantly redefined. A perennial discussion about the 'maturity' and 'immaturity' of the Social Sciences is unproductive. "The very distinction implies that the social sciences can develop exactly as the natural" (Redman, 1993: p. 174). The same author has emphasized that not even Popper goes that far despite his inconsistencies and reservations. The social inquiry can be improved by following an alternative path with a retained high scholarship. The autonomy of a scholar can be an important universal dimension of the method in research. It supplements the notion of universality but allows the scholar to choose a point of perspective – detached or involved, objective or subjective. Here 'the objective' does not denote absolute standards as 'the subjective' does not conform to partiality. The aim of this approach is not to place the scholar between opposing perspectives and reject possible standards of inquiry. It should rather induce to face the problem of distortions in the social inquiry. The best way to handle bias is to declare it transparently and expose it to criticism. According to Myrdal this is a hopeless attempt to eradicate bias and "there is no other device for excluding biases in Social Sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and sufficiently concretized value premises" (1944: p. 1043). Redman, in the same manner, insists that objectivity does not presume "cleansed of all predilections", "rather, objectivity comes about by exposing our theories, ideas, and beliefs so that they may be criticized, corrected, and bettered" (1993: p. 133). It should consist of two major implications for the social inquiry – 1) the whole scientific endeavour can be understood as a 'systematic inquiry' without any methodological exceptions (Backhouse, 1998: p. 123) and 2) the relevance of interpretation can be acknowledged because "all sciences, including the natural ones, are interpretive" (Addleson, 1995: p. 16). However, in this case, one precaution should be seriously taken into consideration with regard to preoccupation with politics. The extended scope of the social inquiry has enabled a scholar to assume a more active position as in the case of a public intellectual who is more visible by default. In this sense, Myrdal defines Social Science as a Political Science (1944: p. 1043). Of course, this provides more opportunities for the social inquiry but also increases the risk of external political interference. It is not a coincidence that classical perceptions of the scientific method and reductionist rationality are expected to preserve "a purity" of Science. However, this kind of approach

failed to eliminate the vulnerabilities, rather it made them implicit like rubbish swept under the carpet.

The twentieth century was the age of turmoil, 'extremes' and 'the end of history'. The world changed dramatically, including in the field of Science. It does not seem that these changes were final, the end of history probably will be "actualised" on other forthcoming occasions too. To put it trivially, nothing is as permanent as constant change. Science, by searching for regularities and other fixed patterns, assists a humanity to survive and prosper in a world full of changes. In other words, nature "is tamed" through the exploitation of regularities and the control of changes. "The taming" was not preceded with uniform success due to the unequal distribution of power and resources which confirmed that knowledge has a social dimension (Hoover, 2003: p. 244). In addition, the objective of scientific research was extended to a Society that followed historical revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century (Wallerstein, 1996; Wallerstein, 2001). The projection of Social Science had implied the control and prediction of social changes. Even though social complexity is subject to human intentionality and spontaneity, predictive patterns of human behaviour have been distinguished. A social dimension of knowledge has been intertwined with a political one since the social processes can be directed (managed, manipulated, etc.). In spite of the widespread belief that Science which operates on solid ontological premises ensures a continuity and certainty with regard to the context of contingencies, moments of unpredictable bifurcations occur. A scholar is constantly impelled to re-evaluate his/her normative commitments, for example, the initial premises of a theoretical model, therefore, the issue of autonomy reoccurs too. A certain demarcation line is necessary to delineate the scholar in the context of the society and inquiry itself. Abstraction is the most common way to dissociate the object of inquiry from intermittent distortions. Furthermore, it has been methodologically assumed by mainstream thinking that abstract conceptualisation is key in scientific or metaphysical reasoning. However, when human beings are involved, appearances may be misleading.

Benda (2009 [1928]: p. 43) identified intellectuals (by using the old French word "clerks", which is also revealing) with those "whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: "My kingdom is not of this world"". This is another comment in connection with honouring 'the abstract quality of what is human' which is very important because it summarises the purpose of intellectual endeavour that considers humanitarianism as a love of the whole of humanity (Benda, 2009 [1928]: p. 81). However, this kind of approach is inclined to adhere to an elitist stance in some sense, namely that only initiated and deserving ones can take on the responsibility to enlighten humanity. Day-to-day plebeian troubles impede the understanding of universality, an intellectual must not surrender to 'the passions of laymen'. These ideas may seem old-fashioned yet Benda's book "The Treason of the Intellectuals" (2009 [1928]) groped the rising tide of modernity and its implications. He anticipated the rise of German nationalism and pointed out the threat of unchecked scientific reasoning to democracy. Industrialisation has replaced crafts and embedded routine procedures of mass production. Human experience has been compartmentalised to fit specific functions assigned by the manufacturing industry. This means that a basic set of skills is sufficient since production by employees is organised in a highly industrial manner within a factory. A newly emerging discipline of 'scientific' management, better known as Taylorism, has exemplified the dehumanising approach with regard to the organisation of modern labour. Of course, it has enabled a peasant (or any child or woman

for that matter) to be trained for a specific task next to a conveyor belt but has also led to the deprivation of universal human values. The mode of industrial mass production has had a twofold effect on the structure of society – a significant proportion of the population are involved as consumers and/or as the labour force. However, this has not brought about any greater degree of prosperity, equality or happiness. The enhanced involvement of a population does not necessarily indicate an increase in representational power, but rather growing capacities of surveillance and developing techniques of social control. Even though statistical data and calculations are supposed to provide decision-makers with a coherent and concise picture of reality, the accumulation of collected data may lead to such aggregated entities as “average consumer” or “average citizen” which are frequently regarded as fictional. In some cases, these fictional figures may be instrumentally useful but certain reservations must be taken into consideration. The averages, as presumably representational entities are exploited to serve specific interests in political discourse, later become established “political and social facts” studied by “political and social sciences”. It is a cult of fact that makes political passions take on a special form of “divinized realism” (Benda, 2009 [1928]: p. 36). This kind of “divinized realism” claims “to be founded on science, to be the result of a “precise observation of facts”” (Benda, 2009 [1928]: p. 28). Disinterested metaphysics started to play political games in the nineteenth century, therefore, losing its neutral universality and converting an intellectual into a citizen, subjected to a nation-state. The ideal of disinterested metaphysics was and still endures as an unfulfilled aspiration but the insight offered by Benda, which provides a link between ‘divinized realism’ and ‘political realism’, can help to reveal the current alienation of scientific social models from existent social processes. He was concerned not so much about ‘the treason of intellectuals’ but the assimilation of intellectual reasoning into so-called practical experience which seeks to apply knowledge. However, a sort of knowledge which is not ‘applicable’ is present, it creates unresolvable paradoxes, therefore, is quite disturbing. The scientific method tends to treat these disturbances as unwelcome distortions that must be eliminated. The problem is that Social Studies cannot be as exact as the Natural Sciences. For example, Hausman has tried “to save” Economics by admitting its inexactness yet affirming “it is only supposed to be complete at a high level of abstraction or approximation” (1992: p. 93) and “economics resembles individual theories such as Newtonian dynamics or Mendelian population genetics more closely than it resembles disciplines such as physics or biology” (1992: p. 95). Economics is supposed to be an exemplary Social Science that employs the scientific method, but its initial premises are irrelevant to actual economic and political issues (Holland, 2015). Its dependence on rationality and methodological individualism just strengthens criticism of human beings as rational agents that possess perfect information (Stiglitz, 2010). Hausman (1992) did his best to protect Economics from the criterion of falsification outlined by Popper (2008), however, its scientific status is still questioned. The claim that rational modelling represents social reality is at least dubious. A vast range of difficulties that include the accuracy of data collection, derivation of averages or aggregations, relevance of mathematical equations, etc. must be faced. Methodological individualism is a fake universality whose utility can be considered only in terms of ‘as if’ fiction (Vaihinger, 1935). This instrument may be faulty for the research as “in order to provide rigorous proofs it is frequently necessary to abstract from issues that may be important, with the result that the course of research becomes dictated by requirements imposed by the mathematics, not by the importance of the problems involved” (Backhouse, 1998: p. 158). Abstract models are expected to produce universally valid outputs given that the inputs consist of representative samples. It sustains a false impression that “everybody is included and accounted”, therefore, an outcome should be commonly accepted. Such reasoning by imitating a democratic procedure may threaten a democracy itself. This is not a controversial statement

given that modern democracy is not a perfect form of governance, a enough ways and resources are available to manipulate public opinion. Besides, this “divinized realism” promotes a fatalistic and deterministic worldview where human beings are subjected to the unilateral influence of alleged “social laws or other unavoidable regularities”. The yearning of Benda for the noble status of intellectuals may be disregarded but the rise of the new “aristocracy”, i.e. the experts, should not be neglected. They tend to occupy a monopoly of expertise not only in technical (practical) matters, an extra idea that ‘a production of knowledge’ needs to be ‘managed properly’ is introduced. Russell (1956), one of the greatest protagonists of Science, warned of the increasing threat, on an unprecedented scale, to intellectual freedom since the seventeenth century. “Thus, the practical experts who employ scientific technique, and still more the governments and large firms which employ the practical experts, acquire a quite different temper from that of the men of science, i.e. a temper full of a sense of limitless power, of arrogant certainty, and of pleasure in manipulation even of human material” (Russell, 1956: p. 245). Russell distinguished a scientist from an expert and also admitted that the latter is more likely to flourish because of scientific reasoning. Nowadays, groups of scientists and experts are so indistinguishable in terms of profession and affiliation that it is practically impossible to distinguish between them in many cases. Accordingly, the notion of scientific temper by Russell has remained an unfulfilled aspiration, the ideal to seek after or the formal standard to follow. The project of Social Science has been exposed to serious issues due to social complexity which is hardly accounted for by a universal mode of research. Irrelevant policy advice is just one of the outcomes. Knowledge about the social realm has been compartmentalised into incommensurable fields which are more easily dominated by a monopoly of expertise or certain groups of interest. Thus, social scientists are more vulnerable to alienate themselves from the notion of scientific temper and from society in general. This does not deny the use of a scientific method within Social Studies but proposes a more comprehensive methodological approach. It is evident that a truly scientific method cannot sustain the criteria of universality and objectivity in social research. The mechanics of cause and effect as well as the calculus of probabilities are only capable of partially covering the social realm. Besides, explanatory and predictive models reduce the freedom of agents in rational terms. The reduction of normativity to a finite set of initial premises is counterproductive in terms of understanding social complexity. First, the autonomy of a scholar is not predominantly an institutional value actualised in the setting of affiliation. It must be accepted as a social norm and personal imperative in relation to the method of inquiry. Secondly, it should be acknowledged that rational or mathematical modelling is not necessarily objective. It can hide a certain degree of bias or even metaphysical speculation which is unacceptable regarding social reality. Speculative reasoning associated with numbers and mathematical equations can flourish without any difficulties which is not a problem unless properly declared in the process of inquiry. More harm is done when metaphysical speculation is posed as empirical research that employs statistical data, for example, in Economics. Too much of an opportunity is provided for interpretation and possible manipulation which is particularly obvious in the media. However, metaphysical reasoning should not be neglected in the social inquiry. As Popper (2008) emphasized, the growth of knowledge is not advancing in Metaphysics, but is a useful source of ideas for scientific research. All in all, the scholar has become entangled with the network of his/her own conscious and subconscious experiences which includes the subject of social inquiry. Observation as such is the intrusion and the observers must deal with several dilemmas. These should be tackled in a transparent way without ‘rationalised’ bias or a hidden ideological agenda. This sort of methodological entanglement provides more options though more challenges play a part too. Even though disinterested meta-

physics or disinterested science would appear to be unproductive concepts for the social inquiry, it is indispensable to revisit some of the inspirational concepts of Benda. Though main issues and trends of intellectual development during the twentieth century have been identified by him, the major conclusion, namely that “today the game is over...the layman has won” (Benda, 2009 [1928]: p. 182), needs reformulation. The layman has lost but the intellectual has not won either, it is time to start a new game.

2.5. The modern preoccupation with linearity

A social transition as a process within society is an indication of deliberate or unexpected structural changes. This has occurred since time immemorial and will possibly persist into the future. In general, a succession of stages is involved in leading to a preferred or undesirable outcome. It is important to reassess philosophically the ideas of evolution, progress and development which frequently are key concepts when describing and explaining social transitions over time. These are relatively new worldviews that have only been consolidated over the previous two to three hundred years, “the idea of progress is of modern rather than ancient date” (Hertzler, 1965 [1922]: p. 101). Only since the second half of the nineteenth century has the idea of progress become “a general article of faith” (Bury, 1920). The fixation with the industrial framework had impeded alternative ways to conceptualize and understand social transition leading to the establishment of its own “natural given” in terms of modernity. Industrial development in the nineteenth century induced extreme societal changes which needed to be addressed out of necessity to preserve a political order. The success of the Physical Sciences in ‘taming a Nature’ has extended the scope of the scientific method. “Social science is a concept that was invented quite recently, only in the 19th century” (Wallerstein, 2000: p. 161). Likewise, ‘Taming a Society’ requires an elaborate set of social regularities which sometimes preferred to be termed social laws. Inescapable authority occupies a special place in the history of humanity in a moral and social sense. However, modernity (the meaning of which is somewhat ambiguous) is accompanied by a new kind of mentality that aims to manipulatively exploit regularities. Certainly, the intentions may be good, but the outcome remains unclear despite rising predictive capacities. Mechanistic reasoning mainly relies on linear perception of the reality – a transition from one stage to another in a controlled and predictable fashion based on premises specified in advance. The amelioration of the human condition has been incorporated into the agenda of the scientific outlook together with the notion of progress. The combination of cause-effect reasoning and the urgent necessity to establish safeguards against social tensions has produced modern forms of social engineering which had tremendous implications during the twentieth century.

Unlike Benda (2009 [1928]), Wolfe had suggested completely to rule out “metaphysics and figures of speech” for the same idea of introducing “objective standard” (1923: pp. 252-253). Both, Benda and Wolfe, reflected on the consequences of WWI and intellectual developments at that time in the context of social transformations. While Benda denounced political ideologies as ‘divinized realisms’ and preferred metaphysical permanence beyond a succession of ‘historical’ states, Wolfe insisted on looking “nowhere else than to science to dispel the mystical, metaphysical, nationalistic, class, and narrow-egotistical illusions that still stand in the way of our sensing a rational direction in which collectively to guide human evolution” (1923: p. 306). These two approaches still are present in many intricate ways among scholars trying to secure their intellectual autonomy. Benda had rejected ‘political realisms’, which were abusing lan-

guage of science and establishing the 'cult of fact'. He endorsed disinterested universal theoretical framework, isolated from political contingencies and secured from nationalistic ambitions. Benda's intellectual was supposed to follow the principle – "My kingdom is not of this world" (2009 [1928]: p. 43). Wolfe had expected that applicability of the scientific method in social realm would enhance scientific attitude as 'generalized behaviour-pattern'. According to him, the scientific method is the best possible way to rationalize political interests' conflict. "The scientific attitude rests upon one, and only one, fundamental article of faith – faith in the universality of cause and effect" (Wolfe, 1923: pp. 215-216). The idea of deterministic science includes prediction and control through a cause-and-effect analysis, what is supposed to be helpful for orderly social transitions from one state to another. It comes as no surprise, that scientific attitude in this sense enters close association with liberalism, both being positioned between reactionism (as longing for the past state of society which is non-existent *already*) and radicalism (as seeking the possible state of society which is unachievable *yet*). This distinction may look as rude simplification (and probably it is) because our times demand more sophisticated typologies. However, it's hard to escape a feeling that both, science and liberal democracy, have entered a mode of crisis (or probably they never left it) exclusively due to external reasons or because this is just a pure coincidence in time. The ruptures of linearity and unexpected bifurcations pose a pressure to the scholars in the process of social inquiry. The scientific method being applied between *already* and *yet* does not necessary yield reliable results concerning social complexity. Social engineering under diverse disguises and reinventions did not manage to repeat a 'success story' of physical sciences through all the 20th century.

Wolfe was not so naïve to rely completely on deterministic science and mechanistic psychology. What makes his approach still relevant for today's discussion, is the notion of sympathy as "an indispensable aid to scientific observation, where human beings and their motives are involved" (Wolfe, 1923: p. 312). 'Sympathetic insight' and ethical dimension still have not been accommodated properly within scientific framework. Though, there's another side of coin or topic what Wolfe had indicated as very important, but no breakthrough was achieved despite many profound discussions and policies suggested. It regards the educational system in general and its role in sustaining democracy through responsible citizenship. The identification of scientific attitude as one among other social attitudes (including reactionism, conservatism, liberalism, radicalism, etc.) implies the obligation to secure and disseminate it for the sake of sustainable society. Widespread network of educational institutions is indispensable to the scientific rationality proposed as social mode of being. Wolfe's imagined society of rational agents could be a universal template for introducing social wellbeing and predictability – a perfect match of social reality and scientific modelling. However, critical thinking and sciences have a complicated correlation which may be identical to the problem of education and indoctrination. Ortega y Gasset (1950 [1930]) had warned that modern science regarding increased specialization allowed the 'average man' to enter this field with success. As he had implied, the same mechanisation divided scientific activity into separate technical functions, which could be performed with 'commonplace' intellectual merits. In this sense, specialization reproduces self-satisfied mentality within certain limitations what cannot support further progress. "The specialist "knows" very well his own, tiny corner of the universe; he is radically ignorant of all the rest" (Ortega y Gasset 1950 [1930]: p. 81). Benda, Wolfe, and Ortega y Gasset express a shared concern but distinct suggestions for intellectual encountering 'layman passions', 'popular mind', or the 'average man'. In general, their critical sensitivity is still valid today despite obvious inclination to elitist detachment in terms of securing a safe harbour for "higher" values. The

other option would be to reconsider a participatory social inquiry thus revisiting the notion of rationality and latest developments in natural sciences.

2.6. *New scope of participant*

Once very popular guide for “young academic politicians” (Cornford, 1908) supplied many career advices for prospective fellows in witty fashion. As they say, advices are never in short supply under academic auspices. Besides identifying a major method for building fellow’s reputation as ‘sit tight and drink port wine’, this guide introduced (among several others) the ‘Principle of Unripe Time’ like rule of inactivity which denounced the present as right moment for action. Every “decent” academic fellow must obey certain rules of inactivity and keep obstructing alternative proposals. In this context Cornford (1908) had inserted a sardonic and very revealing remark – “time...has a trick of going rotten before it is ripe”. It may be related in some sense to a discussion around the issue of presumed “immaturity” of the social sciences or the application of scientific method within social realm. The success of natural sciences has specified a set of standards and procedures for scientific excellence. For example, there used to be utilized a distinction between “hard” and “soft” sciences. However, Rueff (1929) had deconstructed the “hardness” of natural sciences by referring to the history of measurement units which appeared to be a result of social conventions and political battles. The measurement units and referential system for Space-Time are indispensable instruments for the sciences and engineering technologies “to cut” reality into pieces out of which material is produced for following research or processing. The standards do not exist somewhere in the Platonic world of ideas though they serve as useful idealisations; they are not perfect and need to be constantly redefined and upgraded within scientific community. Nevertheless, Rueff proposed to include social sciences into “softened” universal scientific framework by rejecting the ‘Science’ in favour of ‘sciences’. His notion of reasoning machine, as set of initial premises and chain of syllogisms, was just another intellectual device treating physical and social realities in comprehensive mechanistic way without human intervention. Not surprisingly, Rueff had built his reputation as severe free market proponent and extreme anti-Keynesian what later evolved into a typical template for controversy regarding methodological (and political) issues within sciences.

Modern science has inherited a troublesome problematic of origin which hinders its ambitious claim to universality. Barrow (2007: p. 15) has pointed out that it was Judaeo – Christian perspective inducing the way of cutting reality into pieces and studying the wholeness through its constituent parts. That enables linear approach focused on transitional processes from one state to another involving predictive and manipulative powers. This is not to imply that modern science and Christianity were directly inter-related, though many prominent precursors like Boyle, Newton, and Maxwell had been deeply religious persons. According to Barrow (2007), other religious sentiments have also participated in building scientific framework, although not on equal basis. In this sense, Eastern wholistic perspective and its contribution to the understanding of non-linear processes has been appreciated only recently due to developed computational capacities. Barrow (2007) has attempted to balance Western and Eastern ‘approaches’ by making the studies of linear and non-linear processes complementary, reliant on each other’s achievements. But there is some space for qualification, which can be specified by surviving legacy of Hegelianism as esoteric Christianity (Stace, 1955).

It's a common misperception that all scientists are supposed to make new discoveries or to gain unique insights. The biggest amount of scientific endeavour is focused on reducing previous discoveries to simplicities or 'trivialities', what enhances the technological applicability for various aspects of reality (Barrow, 2007: p. 136). Of course, there are cases of mastering 'extreme complexities' out of 'pure trivialities' but 'true' scientists usually persist in 'normal' science as indicated by Kuhn (1996). This way rationality is upheld by setting up a clarity with the help of logical forms, and it's exactly a responsibility of intellectual to keep the idea within reasonable boundaries. Like every human quality, rationality is not immune to extreme "revelations" – "it is as if science were driven by Divine Providence, and only one decision must be made – to walk with the saints or the sinners" (Fuller, 2003: p.162).

The reduction as scientific procedure has been used to construct a unified Theory of Everything by reducing physics to basic set of constants like Russell's method reducing mathematics to basic logical propositions (Barrow, 2007: p. 115). The promise of Theory of Everything has included the refinement and simplification of existing knowledge. But the symmetry of physical laws and the beauty of mathematical equations do not convene a complex reality which is simply 'messy', though they are at heart of the efforts to reconcile the knowledge. As indicated by Barrow (2007: p. 138), we do not observe laws of Nature - we just observe their outcomes. Likewise, we do not observe mathematical equations as representations of Nature and its laws – we only can have the use of their solutions. It implies that laws and mathematical solutions do not necessary manifest a symmetry, e. g. in quantum mechanics: "outcomes are much more complicated than laws; solutions much more subtle than equations" (Barrow, 2007: p. 138). This is not a coincidence that reductionism is a key procedure in two extreme poles of the scientific inquiry: in physics of elementary particles and astronomy. These disciplines still have been trying to preserve a status of 'fundamental' ones as retained promise of 'unified theory'. But there exists intermezzo (or meso) world of complexity occupied by 'messy' human beings, a case full of symmetry breaking. Social complexity cannot be reduced to definite parts and viewed as a total sum of them while searching for ultimate explanations at the lower level. Non-reducible social systems with emergent properties have induced new arrangements in terms of causality and determinism (Byrne, 1998; Ormerod, 2009).

Quantum mechanics has revolutionized physics since the beginning of the 20th century. Contrary to popular beliefs, it didn't completely abolish Newtonian framework neither finally settle down the issue of indeterminacy. Quantum systems evolve according to deterministic Schrodinger equation if no interference of measurements is attempted. The interference of measurement has remodelled scientifically 'fixated' position of detached observer in favour of participant's one. It has been addressed with possible implications for social sciences since the emergence of quantum mechanics as scientific discipline (Dewey, 1929). The non-locality of quantum systems has redefined causality relations through the notion of entanglement. As emphasized by Weinert (2005: p. 258), the causation has become "a cluster concept: if at least a majority of its features are satisfied, then we are entitled to speak of a causal situation". Philosophical reflection on the developments of quantum mechanics has introduced a new concept of causation without classical determination, what is relevant for social inquiry as well. Social scientists have been always used to work with sets of most likely factors as the causes of events (Weinert, 2005: p. 249). Every kind of inquiry explores regularities, dependencies, and patterns; it's a common way to understand physical and social realities. And for this purpose, a certain model of causation has always been in demand. The overwhelming mathematization of sciences "strongly encouraged the identification of the notion of causation with that of predictive

determinism” (Weinert, 2005: p. 259). The positivist ideal of value-free science did not manage to tame bias; the interests could be safely harboured by using language of mathematics too. The participatory inquiry has reintroduced human agency into the process of research otherwise restrained by hyper-rationality. The proposal to redefine scholarship and social inquiry does not possess any ‘anti-scientific’ sentiment. Causation made compatible with chance delivers the conditional model of causation as plausible alternative to classic mechanics. This model implies that some of the causal conditions may be necessary/dependent and others sufficient/independent. In other words, Weinert (2005) following quantum mechanics has philosophically reinterpreted the conditional view of causation as incomplete but with the advantage of adaptability. Now, it’s up to entangled scholar, with assumed role of responsible intellectual, to introduce duly contextualized and viable causal stories.

3. Conclusion

The phrase 'we live in interesting times' means nothing specific despite our sentimentality praising this instant. 'Interesting times' used to be and will continue to be; a detached omniscient observer (if such exists) would be relieved of boredom across timeline. The human ambition to identify itself with that omniscience could be detected in anticipated forms of societal 'perfections' at the 'end of history'. Directional and progressive development is supposed to ameliorate human condition according to entrenched idealizations projected into the future. The existing hyper-rational idealized models are aimed at sustaining the notion of general agreement on the level of metaphysical certainty like logical forms and mathematical equations do. These intellectual devices allegedly are helpful in distinguishing the imperfections of reality and providing with possible solutions. But austere scientific mentalities are prone to constructing automated chains out of initial premises and syllogisms, leaving human agency aside. In this case, ethical dimension has been treated as temporary indication of present imperfections, but not as necessary part of a model. However, social realm has proved itself unsuitable for setting up and running 'rationalistic machines', which are capable of producing distortions no less evident than deterministic explanations out of reductions. There is a growing imperative for social inquiry with participatory aspect, i.e. involving human agency. It should be pursued by scholars who fully realize the subtlety of entanglement with studied social processes, both as challenge and opportunity in leaving observational position of omniscient spectators.

References

- Addleson, M. (1995). *Equilibrium Versus Understanding: Towards the restoration of economics as social theory*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Backhouse, R. E. (1998). *Explorations in Economic Methodology: From Lakatos to empirical philosophy of science*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Barrow, J. D. (2007). *New Theories of Everything: The quest for ultimate explanation*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Benda, J. (2009 [1928]). *The Treason of the Intellectuals*. New Brunswick (USA), London (UK): Transaction Publishers.
- Bourdieu, P. (2004). *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bury, J. B. (1920). *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its origin and growth*. London: MacMillan and Co.
- Byrne, D. (1998). *Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Cœuré, B. (2015). *Paradigm Lost: Rethinking international adjustments*. [Online] Available from: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp151121.en.html> [Accessed 12 November 2018].
- Cornford, F. M. (1908). *Microcosmographia Academica: Being a guide for the young academic politician*. Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes Publishers Ltd.
- Dewey, J. (1929). *The Quest for Certainty: A study of the relation of knowledge and action*. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
- Dyson, F. (2006). Is God in the Lab? In *The Scientist as Rebel*. New York: New York Review Books, pp. 305 – 314.
- Fuller, S. (2003). *Kuhn vs Popper: The struggle for the soul of science*. Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd.
- Hausman, D. M. (1992). *The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hertzler, J. O. (1965 [1922]). *The History of Utopian Thought*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1997). *The Passions and Interests: Political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Holland, S. (2015). *Europe in Question – and what to do about it*. Nottingham: Spokesman.
- Hoover, K. R. (2003). *Economics as Ideology: Keynes, Laski, Hayek, and the creation of contemporary politics*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1996). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.

- Lakatos, I. (1999). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91 – 196.
- Leontief, W. (1982). Academic Economics. *Science*, 217, pp. 104 – 107.
- Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American Dilemma: The Negro problem and modern democracy*. New York, London: Harper & Brothers Publishers.
- Ormerod, P. (2009). Keynes, Hayek and Complexity. In *Coping with the Complexity of Economics*. Milano: Springer-Verlag.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. (1950 [1930]). *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: The New American Library.
- Popper, K. (2008). *Conjectures and Refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge*. London, New York: Routledge Classics.
- Redman, D. A. (1993). *Economics and the Philosophy of Science*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rorty, R. (2016). *Philosophy as Poetry*. Charlottesville, London: University of Virginia Press.
- Rueff, J. (1929). *From the Physical to the Social Sciences: Introduction to a study of economic and ethical theory*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Russell, B. (1956). *Religion and Science*. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- Stace, W. T. (1955). *The Philosophy of Hegel: A systematic exposition*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2010). *Freefall: America, free markets and the sinking of the world economy*. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Vaihinger, H. (1935). *The Philosophy of 'As if': A system of the theoretical, practical and religious fictions of mankind*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
- Wagner, P. (2001). *A History and Theory of the Social Sciences*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications.
- Wallerstein, I. (1996). *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the restructuring of the social sciences*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Wallerstein, I. (2000). Time and Duration: The Unexcluded Middle, or reflections on Braudel and Prigogine. In *The Essential Wallerstein*. New York: The New Press, pp. 160 – 169.
- Wallerstein, I. (2001). *Unthinking Social Science: The limits of nineteenth – century paradigms*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Weinert, F. (2005). *The Scientist as Philosopher: Philosophical consequences of great scientific discoveries*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
- Wolfe, A. B. (1923). *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method: An essay on social attitudes*. New York: The MacMillan Company.

Juozas Kasputis

**THE NECESSITY FOR PEACE AND PAX IMPERII:
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	33
1. Introduction	35
2.1. The Spectre of Empire	35
2.2. A Metaphor of an Empire as a Cognitive Tool	37
2.3. The European Peace Project in the Context of the ‘Migrant Crisis’	38
2.4. An Empire and the Broken Linearity	40
2.5. ‘Network Power’	41
2.6. The Nobel Peace Prize	42
2.7. The EU as an Empire (or UPO)	43
3. Conclusion	46
<i>References</i>	47

Abstract

This paper explores the possible introduction of the notion of an empire as a new analytical tool in the context of European integration. An extensive amount of scientific literature and research papers is focused on the EU, but it is quite difficult to distinguish between original thought amidst this mainstream of abundant writing which is proliferated in proportion to official funding from the EU. The EU has experienced a serious identity crisis since the previous enlargement. This crisis does not concern the proper definition of a “European project” (which stands for the EU in broader terms including continental peace) – numerous discussions have failed to deliver the expected results. It is an interesting paradox that the EU has been proposed globally as a model of peacebuilding in the context of the Nobel Peace Prize 2012. However, no clearly defined model of internal EU integration exists with the exception of some basic premises. The Monnet method has become formalised within the official framework of the EU, therefore, justifying top-down institutional engineering which is contrary to the concept by Jean Monnet. Peace is a keyword in the foundational mythology of the European project. The recent failure to provide a consolidated response to the ‘migrant crisis’ is a symptom of additional fundamental structural problems in the EU. Pax Europaea is a concept that is excessively internally oriented with a huge ambition to become a European ‘soft power’ but with a limited will to be implemented outside the EU. It seems that usual forms of governance do not strive for the benefit of the European project, a danger is emerging that Pax Europaea will one day collapse in a similar manner to the Pax Romana. However, the notion of an empire can provide a productive insight with regards to current issues that concern the EU. This does not necessarily have to be a critical one, though some reservations are firmly founded. The Neo-medieval Paradigm could be a good alternative source of novel ideas and thus resist rigid formalisms and hierarchies which have deeply permeated into European institutions.

1. Introduction

It is quite common to start a paper by stating that certain spectres are haunting Europe. As Philippe C. Schmitter (2006) bluntly put it, “to paraphrase Karl Marx (for the Nth time), a (new) spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of post-liberal democracy” (p. 9). The whole project of the European Union has sought to preserve peace and democracy within Europe. What is more, peace outside the European Union is supposed to be promoted by an exemplary model of European integration combined with economic ‘soft power’ or a conditionality package for potential (without any obligation to be accepted as actual) new member states. However, the recent migrant crisis has revealed certain discrepancies between how peace is maintained by institutions of the EU both inside and outside Europe. It is quite noticeable that since the EU is trying to maintain peace inside Europe, it is spectacularly failing to do likewise outside Europe. This once more reinforces the present fundamental problems that the EU is facing as an institution. Is it reasonable to suppose that the necessity for peace, that helped to unite post-WWII Europe, could one day destroy the EU? The answer to this question is deeply interconnected to ongoing discussions about the definition of the EU as such and its possible future. Initially, the EU was always a top-down project instigated by the constant danger of the Cold War turning into WWII. The problem is that institutional engineering (as is true of any form of engineering) requires a formal model to be followed and a clearly defined hierarchy to implement the model of choice. Accurate modelling is indispensable to the understanding and shaping of social and political realities, but the danger of a model replacing reality is ever-present. No model is ideal, just parameters within models. Rational expectations driven by formal models do not necessarily coincide with irrationalities and subjectivities driven by real agents. As far as people comply with prevailing ideas or ideologies, the relevance of models may be reaffirmed even though a situation may have always been fragile. Two major claims of models, namely the representation of reality and the allegiance to objectivity, have frequently been contested. Political and social realities tend to be volatile in the absence of any predictive outcomes despite endeavours to impose fixed structures on society or exploit a tradition and religion in a manipulative way. On top of that, a democracy itself is subject to numerous transformations throughout various phases and is in constant need of adjustment in the light of re-emerging challenges by employing available creativity, critical thinking and social analysis. In case of a lack of dissatisfaction with the current situation, another major driving force – a crisis – can come to one’s aid. Furthermore, the EU has had to face crises, one may even notice that it was born, even though still in labour, out of a crisis.

2.1. The Spectre of Empire

It is quite easy to get lost among various debates with regard to the form of governance in the EU. Many take the idea of a European federation/confederation for granted and focus merely on studying existing obstacles which prevent their dreams from being fulfilled. However, a federation/confederation is not the only option available in terms of future development. Intergovernmentalism is considered to be an explicit alternative to supranational integration of the EU. It seems quite tempting to blend different approaches and celebrate a consensus almost in terms of a ‘European’ fashion, like:

The EU is the first new type of supranational and intergovernmental economic and monetary union in the World based on European law. It works successfully against authoritarian states, anarchical international relations, nationalism, neo-colonialism and wars. It is an

important tool to preserve peace among states in Europe. From this point of view the EU can be regarded as a successful peace project that is appreciated world-wide.

(Éva Bóka, 2010, p. 57)

At the end of debates, whatever is left to define may be referred to as the unspecified 'uniqueness' of the EU. The European peace project is justified by the post-WWII mythology of 'never war again', as if history had started afresh in 1945. Not surprisingly, newly emerged "prophets" have come up with the idea of final achievement, e.g. 'the end of history'. All good deeds must be finalised otherwise political creeds are doomed. That is why mainstream European thinking is disturbed and confused – the form of governance in the EU is still far from ideal. 'The ideal' in this case denotes the best performance possible. The EU is mainly treated as a predecessor as well as innovator of peace-making and a new form of governance. However, this kind of 'uniqueness' may be quite misleading in the context of an institutional crisis, because it distorts the analysis itself and eliminates available solutions. To paraphrase Philippe C. Schmitter and Karl Marx (for the Nth+1 time), an (old) spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of empire. It has not disappeared or withered away, so to speak, as the medieval period is over. The empire has changed its form by merging with and re-emerging out of other forms of governance, almost in the same way as democracy. Democracy has been reinvented constantly since antiquity. Especially during a time of crisis, the process of reinvention should be fostered in order to search for a viable solution. Furthermore, this is not simply a historical generalisation, it has to be induced as an ongoing contemporary practice:

...democracy as we know it needs to be reinvented. Democracy as praxis, as set of institutions, regulations and legal guarantees defined and confined by the sovereign nation state faces fundamental challenges and is already on the way to deep transformation. At the same time, democracy as an idea has a more profound appeal than the global economic system with its fragmented political units known as 'democracies': it entails the eternal desire of the individual and groups of individuals for freedom and dignity and a greater recognition of the necessity of human cooperation and mutual support and interdependence on a global scale.

(Ferenc Mészlivetz & Jody Jensen, 2013, p. 42)

It is unsurprising 'to discover' a democracy in a continuous phase of transformation. This is the biggest illusion of modernity and progress – the illusion of fixed Final Outcome or Final Method. The idea of Final Method precludes a critical assessment of current political and administrative practices, especially ones embedded in formal hierarchies. A bureaucracy mainly refers to the authority of experts and clarity of formal procedures that presume political detachment or unbiased objectivity. On the other hand, language, despite being formalised, possesses an ambiguous property – it can serve in different ways both as a mode of communication and a barrier to entry against 'outsiders'. It is not ironic but simply a way in which formal language functions. Administrative formalisms were supposed to help institutions run smoothly. However, their alleged sensitivity to external influences and biases has sustained this exclusive group of "initiated ones", i.e. unelected officials that hold to mainstream ideology and seek to suppress (or isolate) opposing views. This ideology resembles a system of beliefs in progress and development which can be driven by almost mechanical rules once suitable initial conditions are set. It presupposes linear cause-effect relations and developmental growth throughout specified stages. This kind of evolutionary model fosters predictive calculations and formal analysis in terms of so-called objectivity. Sadly, this can end in a self-sustaining vicious circle which converts

objective rationality into a pseudo-theological endeavour. In this case, all efforts of critical thinking and revision are treated as no more than friction within a framework of “objective forces”. A mechanical approach considers society as a social and political mechanism which can be managed and maintained according to technical manuals written in the head office. Unfortunately, for a significant period of time, the EU has been captivated by institutional engineering and progressive creed in terms of European peace/prosperity. The concept of the EU was positioned as ‘a higher’ stage of political and economic evolution that would steer Europe towards eternal peace. However, in spite of the numerous achievements of the EU, the historical legacy of ‘lower’ precursors should not be neglected. A discrepancy between declarative content and formal practices has pushed the initial idea of the EU into a more abstract realm with less possibilities of practical implementation. ‘Progressive arrogance’ can induce a dreadful and analytically misleading method. The search for new forms of governance should not simply be a goal that justifies the current state of affairs. Excessive preoccupation with ‘political realities’ and formal procedures open the floodgates for a novel institutional crisis. Social reality is not submissive to a certain mechanism driven by a political impetus from a single point of influence, be it Brussels or Berlin. This is not just a recent trend of retro mania, the neo-medieval paradigm is being discussed with an ever-increasing degree of seriousness. While the EU struggles to become more than just an ideal notion, one spectre from the past may be actualised – the spectre of empire. This neo-medieval paradigm can provide useful implications for social and political analysis, but it is necessary to know how to transform a spectre into a viable model. Yet, Europe has always been renowned as a land of spectres and provocative ideas.

2.2.A Metaphor of an Empire as a Cognitive Tool

The notion of an empire does not have to be consolidated according to empirical evidence in order to enhance political and social analysis. The power of a metaphor can induce a productive insight of good analytical value. A metaphor is not only a figure of speech entertained for rhetorical effect in literature or language. Umberto Eco (1986) introduced a metaphor as a valuable cognitive tool. The complexity of metaphors is both a source of clarity and vagueness. This interplay between clarity and vagueness is subject to interpretation, a nightmare for admirers of truth functions. Such interpretability is not related to a neutral description of independent data, where a sign denotes something that has been specified exactly. The representation of the EU in strictly formal and legal terms not only reveals the engineering nature of this institution but also misleads decision-makers. Engineering as such does not form a monopoly that shapes a reality despite sound claims. Umberto Eco (1986) made a relevant distinction between practical and engineering powers which implies the presence of a major difference between Philosophy and Science as follows:

Signs are not empirical objects. Empirical objects become signs (or they are looked at as signs) only from the point of view of a philosophical decision...Outside their philosophical framework, the empirical data that a philosophy organizes lose every possible unity and cohesion...A philosophy cannot, however, be true in the sense in which a scientific description (even though depending on previous philosophical assumptions) is said to be true. A philosophy is true insofar as it satisfies a need to provide a coherent form to the world, so as to allow its followers to deal coherently with it.

(ibid., pp. 10-11)

A practical power has been attributed to Philosophy because 'it contributes' to real changes. Engineering power is based on the predictability (rather than the belief in predictions) of the world described in formal language. But "such an engineering power is the result of a free decision, not an automatic side effect of the scientific research" (ibid., p. 6). Therefore, a deliberate or undeliberate choice has to be made in both cases. A metaphor is not just an ornament of a language, it is an instrument of knowledge (ibid., p. 89). Interpretations provoked by metaphors move the observer beyond the mere perception of the similarities between things. As emphasized by Umberto Eco (1986), a metaphor that describes what is already known is insufficiently cognitive (p. 121). The metaphor of an empire breaks down the current institutional logic of the EU. The engineering mind is deeply related to the ideology of developmental progress. The idea of development presupposes a certain continuity in time, in other words, a 'properly' described present is set as a reference point for predictions. The metaphor of an empire has no visible connection with the present-day EU which interrupts such a continuity. According to mainstream thinking, empirical and imperial are mutually exclusive in this case. The proposal to investigate a practice of governance in the EU in the context of the neo-medieval paradigm may be labelled as utopian. Actually, this is not the worst possible label, on the contrary, it can be considered as 'an honorific' title. This utopian projection is free from the present ballast of necessity 'to improve' the current situation and can be regarded as a "rebellion against these crystallized and perverted institutions and social practices" (Joyce Oramel Hertzler, 1965, p. 259). It is somewhat of a privilege and advantage to not be framed by the concept of continuous development hereby extending and deepening the pool of potential ideas. Of course, numerous utopias with irrelevant and idealistic contents exist but it is flawed to expect that the present world is the optimum and rely on probability calculus. Lewis Mumford (1928) distinguished between the utopias of escape and reconstruction (p. 15). His observation is still considered to be very profound and modern, "an idea is a solid fact, a theory is a solid fact, a superstition is a solid fact as long as people continue to regulate their actions in terms of the idea, theory, or superstition; and it is none the less solid because it is conveyed as an image or a breath of sound" (ibid., p. 14). Everyone who is aware of the problems within the EU cannot be assured that the European political establishment and institutional bureaucracy have not retreated into their own Utopia of Escape.

2.3. The European Peace Project in the Context of the 'Migrant Crisis'

The image of an empire has become an immanent component within the European intellectual landscape. In particular, it can be recognized in the context of peacebuilding. The necessity for peace is a key driving force of European integration, both economically and politically. The post-WWII situation was quite threatening in terms of Franco-German relations and the escalation of the Cold War. The introduction of a solution with regard to the joint management of resources of coal and the steel industry led to the establishment of the European peacebuilding model for the future. It was expected to prevent a war, as well as increase social and economic wellbeing by learning from past mistakes. The Paris Peace Conference in (1918) ended as a prelude to the following world war. As Keynes (1920) witnessed, "Paris was a nightmare, and everyone there was morbid" (p. 5). Hopefully, Europeans have learned to deal with the economic consequences of peace. It was coined the term "Pax Europaea" due to the success of internal peacebuilding over the last 50-60 years. Pax Europaea bears some resemblance to Pax Romana despite originating from vastly different periods of history (but not geographical

locations). In both cases, peace over vast territories is preserved because of the expansion and predominance of certain 'regulatory authorities'. This kind of internal appeasement can be referred to as Pax Imperii and has important implications for the EU. Too strong an emphasis on internal peace highlights existing discrepancies between efforts to secure peace inside and outside the EU. Regarding the external environment, the Pax Imperii is mainly oriented to its neighbourhood. The EU does not actively participate in peace processes on a global scale. European integration started with the institutionalisation of existing economic interdependencies. A substantial economic dimension is still preserved in the EU as a peace project. According to Eurostat (2016), the EU accounted for a 23.8% share of global GDP in 2014. This was the largest share of global GDP despite a recent decreasing trend. This figure may be regarded as a major achievement but may also include certain dangers. The disposition of economic power entangled with peacebuilding policy normally transforms into the concept of 'soft power' in the realm of external relations. The EU is noted for its constant reliance on 'soft power' when defending its own external interests. It is effective in imposing membership criteria on potential neighbouring candidate states. However, as a result, this can lead to the reverse of implications, for instance, increased susceptibility to external threats which are not necessarily military ones. For example, the EU has been quite seriously challenged by the migrant crisis, which is not the right term that should be used to name a problem, rather the incapacity of the EU to take responsibility and make decisions in a consolidated way. The words 'migrants', 'smuggling', 'flood', etc. misleadingly refer to external sources of trouble. Presumably, this crisis was triggered and exploited by some stakeholders outside the EU but echoed fundamental institutional discrepancies inside the EU. The entire founding mythology of the EU is focused on establishing permanent peace in Europe. On the other hand, a war is never over unless it is suppressed and disguised as a tamed menace. This is a binary logic of institutional formalism which treats peace as the absence of war. However, Keynes (1920) by referring to the book "War and Peace" by Tolstoy warned that historical events can march "on to their fated conclusion uninfluenced and unaffected by the cerebations of Statesmen in Council" if "the word was not flesh" and "dissociated from events" (p. 6). The solid appearance of achieved internal peace cracked as soon as the number of asylum seekers increased dramatically in 2015. The official Immigration Policy of the EU targets legal migrants, mainly the highly qualified labour force, students, scholars, etc. Strangely enough, until 2015 "unlike other regional bodies – namely the African Union and the Organisation of American States – the EU does not have a regional convention on refugees or a fully integrated common asylum or migration policy, though European human rights law does apply to the protection of all migrants" (Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, 2015, pp. 3-4). That same year, the European Commission acknowledged that the "EU needs a permanent system for sharing the responsibility for large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers among Member States" (European Commission, 2015 (1), p. 4). 'Large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers' have put the institutional arrangements of the EU under immense pressure. However, the rhetoric of the European Commission is quite disturbing, and thus is indicative of deep institutional problems. Instead of an adequate migration policy, a new measure was proposed – a European resettlement scheme (European Commission, 2015 (2)). The relocation and resettlement scheme are less enduring than policy because of strong opposition on a national level among some member states. Despite a positive report on the relocation and resettlement of 11,000 refugees (European Commission, 2016), many reservations with regard to the EU's response to the migrant crisis are held. Heaven Crawley (2016) quite convincingly expressed them as follows:

The insistence of politicians and policymakers to ignore the growing body of evidence on the dynamics of international migration goes some way towards explaining why the policies that have been put in place in an effort to respond to the migration 'crisis' have failed to deliver what was promised or expected. But this is only part of the story...Five emergency migration summits to 'solve' Europe's crisis have done little other than to demonstrate that it is incapable of doing so, in turn creating an unprecedented political crisis that threatens to undermine the foundations of the Union itself.

(p. 17)

The problem is that Pax Europaea has become truly an "internalised" and "institutionalised" value of the EU which was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. It has enforced a certain attitude that very closely resembles arrogance, namely that an exceptional and exemplary model of peacebuilding has been created and tested here in Europe. Consequently, as in all rational modelling, it has been intertwined with idealised parameters in order to be universal and secure against the imperfections of reality. Pax Europaea was supposed to be transferred between or translated within distant parts of the globe that are subjected to distant problems. However, nowadays problems are impatient to wait for a model to be drawn up, immigrants are arriving in Europe in search of a solution and asylum. The "intruders" have destroyed the EU's image of being 'united in diversity'. The migration 'crisis' is not about migrants, rather it has revealed fundamental problems with the EU, i.e. the premises and founding mythology of the European project is in need of serious reconsideration. Post-WWII Europe was reconstructed by taking into consideration the critical input of displaced people from different countries. Nowadays, Pax Europaea may suffer the same fate as Pax Romana did. The metaphor of empire can provide cognitive assistance in analysing sources of problems and searching for possible solutions. Pax Imperii will not necessarily become the next model but is a useful point of departure in terms of discussion and research.

2.4. An Empire and the Broken Linearity

The structural deficiencies of the EU are better highlighted in a comparison with other forms of governance including historical ones. Defining an empire is far from straightforward because it depends on various historical and political contexts. An empire mainly refers to a multinational entity greater than a kingdom and is ruled by an emperor or empress. Usually, it connotes a dominant core of power that exploits the periphery and is opposed to the notion of federation as a voluntary union of autonomous nations. A federation, from a 'progressive' point of view, is a more democratic and suitable form of governance. To regard a federation as a more advanced evolutionary form of governance requires a linear approach. However, such linearity breaks down when the complexity of the historical process is taken into consideration. Many serious doubts have been raised regarding the categorisation of the US as a dominant empire and the Russian Federation as a unitary authoritarian state. In the light of these discussions, the position of the EU seems to be no less controversial. At the time of writing, the EU is faced with a so-called 'crisis of identity' since it is unable to transform itself into a federation or another form of a super-state. It would appear that the pressure to carry out the final phase of this transformation has turned into an engineering obsession that overarches the institutional mechanism of the EU. Should a goal not be achieved directly, it is pursued in devious ways through numerous amendments of the Treaty and other procedures. As a result, the Eu-

European project tends to diverge into its own abstract realm separated from real political and economic processes - actions in response to emerging challenges are obstructed by this discrepancy. The implementation of the European project has stalled over the last decade. Now it is crucial to determine the limits of centralisation in the EU. Obviously, even though top-down engineering is better confined within a deeply centralised hierarchical system, this proposal seems to lack promise according to immense social and political difficulties. Many examples of societies and states which contain entangled structures that are not centralised, most commonly referred to as networks, can be found in the history of humankind. A particular feature of networks is the ability to simultaneously evade and penetrate hierarchies. A network is a fundamental social bond that upholds social reality. It is impossible for hierarchies to replace networks or at least constrain them for top-down steering away from the exclusive core of governance. As is remarkably pointed out in a book written by Hinsley (1963), since the Congress of Vienna, major European powers failed to maintain peace according to mutual agreements and guarantees during the 19th century. It was a misleading concept that formal agreements and concentrated power could establish permanent peace, as if peace could be an outcome of properly determined relations of power. However, in this case, it is nothing but hidden warfare. The arrogance of dominant powers raises a blind assumption that they control the continuation of peace. Unfortunately, the same path of ignorance tends to be followed by the EU which resulted in WWI and WWII. The interdependency between the necessity for peace and existence of states (their alliances) is more subtle than an engineering approach can encompass. The Monnet method presumes peace to be an inevitable necessity which is beyond state control and transcends the limits of traditional rationality. The metaphor of an empire is a useful addition to an analytical tool kit, it can be exploited in both a deconstructively critical and supportive way with regard to the EU.

2.5. 'Network Power'

A critical approach is vividly represented by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2015). For them the notion of an empire is rather a reality than a metaphor, but this is not contradictory since the ideas which move people are more important. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2015) stressed the emergence of a new form of sovereignty, 'network power', which possesses imperial features. In terms of 'network power', a war becomes "a permanent social relation" (ibid., p. 12) in the absence of a clearly defined enemy which "is no longer concrete and localizable but has now become something fleeting and ungraspable, like a snake in the imperial paradise" (ibid., p. 30). Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2015) warn against dangerous and undemocratic trends that emerge from a 'network power' when an enemy is uncertain, but its presence is constantly emphasized. A war that adopts an 'ontological' state usually initiates ideological mobilisation which "requires strict hierarchy and obedience and thus the partial or total suspension of democratic participation and exchange" (ibid., p. 17). Again, this is very similar to the generation of many kinds of 'crises', including the one concerning migrants. It makes no sense to discuss a 'migrant crisis' in terms of cause and effect, it is mainly a symptom of the dysfunctional nature of the EU. The European project, which was initiated in the name of peace, is struggling against some deficiencies which can be better understood in the context of current affairs interpreted by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2015):

One might say that the world has not really been at peace since early in the twentieth century. The First World War (1914 – 1918), which was centered in Europe, led directly, after

a tumultuous quasi-peace, to the Second (1939 - 45). And immediately upon completion of the Second World War we entered into the Cold War, a new kind of global war, in some sense a Third World War, which in turn gave way with its collapse (1989 – 91) to our present state of imperial state war. Our age might thus be conceived as the Fourth World War.

(p. 37)

It may sound like a strong over-statement, but this quote conveys a truly precautionary message. To put it simply, the EU is networked which presumes both overlapping and nonlinear interdependencies. Neither peace nor war can be conceptually localized in physical terms, only by ideological/institutional ‘monopolisation’. Peace is not a geographical, institutional nor ideological achievement, it is human. Accordingly, a war is no longer a territorially bounded disaster, its influence extends beyond localities. Of course, the institutional input into peacebuilding can be crucial and more productive when a legal framework is required. However, if the union of states as a whole is defined as a formal (arithmetic) sum of parts, then a sufficient number of inconsistencies in state governance are inherited. Formal bureaucracy is notorious for distorting reality: global problems are “reduced” (or neglected) by employing procedural formalities which just defend isolation and other forms of ‘non-involvement’. Vice versa, many banalities are amplified and transformed into serious problems like regulations of the shape of cucumbers. This is revealing or symptomatic given that such an institution as the EU received The Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

2.6. The Nobel Peace Prize

The Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 bears a certain resemblance to the same prize in 2009 which was awarded to Barack Obama. The Nobel Peace Prizes in 2009 and 2012 were deeply institutional because at that time Barack Obama was the President of the US. However, these awards presented to political institutions seem to bear forms of ‘advance payments’ which do not necessarily end in expected ‘purchases’. Political projects that combine institutional resources and relevant visions have had a substantial amount of potential which in all likelihood exceeds that of individuals. President Barack Obama (2009) during his Nobel Lecture applied the idea of former President Kennedy “on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions”. An aspiration to adhere to commonly accepted standards which could globally govern the use of force was expressed. The EU is also believed to provide a universal model of peacebuilding and a method of implementation. According to Herman Van Rompuy (2012), President of the European Council:

But symbolic gestures alone cannot cement peace. This is where the European Union’s “secret weapon” comes into play: an unrivalled way of binding our interests so tightly that war becomes materially impossible.

José Manuel Durão Barroso (2012), President of the European Commission, made a strong statement in the same spirit: “My message today is: you can count on our efforts to fight for lasting peace, freedom and justice in Europe and in the world”. However, volatility and uncertainty produced by social processes demonstrate the fragility and deficiency of political institutions, especially formal ones. This goes hand in hand with the incorrect distribution of institutional resources or conflicting misinterpretation of leading political visions. In other words, a gradual evolution of institutions is under threat, as Willy Brandt (1971) put it once, in

“impotence disguised by verbalism: taking a stand on legal positions which cannot become a reality and planning countermeasures for contingencies that always differ from the one at hand”. This is an unwelcome scenario when institutions turn into rather a problem than a solution. The EU faces the same challenge which is elucidated in the context of peacebuilding. Instead of mystifying European Founders, what can be deduced from the Nobel Lecture by Herman Van Rompuy (2012), the EU should constantly adhere to an imperative by Willy Brandt (1971): “We need peace not only in the sense of the absence of violence; we need it as the basis for that redeeming cooperation I have spoken about”. The efficiency of the EU’s “secret power” outside Europe is less than expected from such an economic power. Without any considerations about causes and effects, it is noteworthy that this indicates internal structural problems which, at least since 1985, have yet to be overcome.

2.7. The EU as an Empire (or UPO)

Jan Zielonka (2010) identified a revealing trajectory of the possible evolution of the EU. His reference to the opening speech by Jacques Delors at the Intergovernmental Conference on September 9, 1985 is still very much relevant to current European issues. Jacques Delors (1985) warned about the EU remaining as an UPO – unidentified political object – for the following 30 or 40 years unless certain measures were taken:

For we must face the fact that in 30 or 40 years Europe will constitute a UPO - a sort of unidentified political object - unless we weld it into an entity enabling each of our countries to benefit from the European dimension and to prosper internally as well as hold its own externally.

(p. 8)

2017 is an ideal threshold of time to evaluate achievements over the previous 40 years. Of course, plenty could be assessed, especially quantifiable ones – the number of treaties and agreements signed, regulations issued, new member states accepted, etc. However, a fundamental problem regarding the form of governance of the EU (or the definition of an entity) has yet to be resolved. Alternatively, is it a problem which needs to be resolved for the sake of European integration? It is quite possible that formal institutions with rigid hierarchies face a more serious issue which is disguised as the EU’s problem. Although formal language and mentality are mainly preoccupied with clearly defined notions, clarity is just a pretentious facade of institutional bureaucracy that seeks to regulate social and political realities. Hierarchical top-down engineering is failing due to its inability to grasp anything other than mechanical/physical reality. The current issues of the EU were included in the institutional priorities listed in the opening speech by Jacques Delors (1985). An emphasis was placed on a strong economic dimension as if it had been a major consolidator of Europe through the Common Market. Jacques Delors (1985) described four essential prerequisites for the EU in the future as ‘a coherent and interdependent whole’: 1) large internal market; 2) a technology-serving productive capacity and social life; 3) economic and social cohesion; and 4) monetary capacity. Without a doubt, many declarative points with regard to the environment, culture and science have been made but a major goal was to create an efficient economic entity throughout Europe. The efficient market mechanism, as simply the ideal parameter of rational modelling, is insufficient to maintain the European project and guarantee “the European dimension and to prosper internally as well as hold its own externally”. A moral dimension, with a fully pledged commitment, is

also an essential prerequisite for the EU. In the absence of any moral responsibilities, the EU may be considered as an unstable entity prone to collapse. Jan Zielonka (2010) proposed the neo-medieval paradigm as a more balanced approach in comparison to the model of a centralised super-state referred to by him as a Westphalian one (see Figure 1). The Westphalian state represents the positivist paradigm of rigid statism: absolute sovereignty over territory, borders are fixed and hard, socio-economic system is relatively homogeneous, one single (national) culture predominates, and a clear hierarchical governmental structure with one centre of authority (ibid., p. 10). This kind of positivism has influenced the architecture of the EU.

Figure 1. Two contrasting models of the EU system in the future, Jan Zielonka (2010)

Neo-Westphalian model (Super-state)	Neo-medieval model (Empire)
A clear hierarchical structure with one centre of authority	Interpenetration of various types of political units and loyalties
A pan-European cultural identity prevails	Multiple cultural identities coexist
A distinction between EU members and non-members is sharp and important	A distinction between the European centre and periphery is crucial but unclear
One single type of citizenship	Diversified types of citizenship with different sets of rights and duties
Parliamentary representation is dominant, but constrained by constitutional provisions	Non-majoritarian institutions dominate over a weak parliament(s)
Easily identified demos based on ethnic and civic ties, and operating within a rich and compact public space	The multiplicity of distinct demos operating in a segmented public space; pan-European identity is unclear and weak

As a result, a repetitive inconsistency of a positivist paradigm is perceived as a certain “uniqueness” of the European project. However, it is exactly this way of distorting a reality that does not conform to the model. Jan Zielonka (2010) introduced the notion of an empire in order to improve the analytical tool kit:

To start with, mysterious terms, such as ‘unidentified political object’ or ‘postmodern polity’ do not allow us to compare the Union to any other types of polities we know from history. I use the term ‘neo-medieval empire’ exactly to emphasize that the EU’s ways of organizing governance and projecting power abroad are not unique, but have been tried in previous stages of European history, even though in an entirely different socio-political context. Of course, simple historical analogies never work, and I do not attempt to apply them. That said, utilizing historical comparisons can be helpful in identifying basic analytical benchmarks. They also represent a rich source of inspiration.

(p. 17)

Existing heterogeneity makes the implementation of uniform general rules almost impossible, similarly it is inappropriate to construct strict algorithms of complex reality. Jan Zielonka (2010) implied that imperial features are already present within the EU, despite efforts to centralise in hierarchical terms. These features include: hybrid arrangements with few hierarchies or overlapping hierarchies, a multi-level polity that is constantly 'pooling' and 'mixing' with sovereignty, cascading socio-economic discrepancies, multiple cultural identities, polycentric systems of governance, etc. (ibid.). This is a picture which terrifies every federalist or other adherents of statism. Unsurprisingly, the notion of an empire is unacceptable to anybody claiming to be a progressive modernist. However, the concept of progress needs some critical elaboration - 'progressive arrogance' is capable of paving a way to its own "Dark Ages". Positivist value-free premises can hide the most dangerous sources of regressive bias. The EU has something to learn from the medieval actors in justifying policies according to values and norms (ibid., p. 150). All in all, it can be a valuable analytical tool that is capable of handling various implications concerning the future development of the EU.

Conclusion

The importance of the neo-medieval paradigm has been reaffirmed in the context of latest discussions regarding 'Multi-speed Europe'. The 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome provided an interesting background for proposing future scenarios. The political establishment of the EU attempts to demonstrate a kind of awareness of popular dissatisfaction with formal institutional policies. According to old diplomatic traditions, a time for celebration provides a good opportunity to test certain outcomes of ongoing celebrations. The old idea of Multi-speed Europe resurfaced once more (Maïa de La Baume (2017), Wolfgang Münchau (2017), Eszter Zalan (2017)). It was the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who publicly delivered five possible future scenarios for the EU and opened an official debate. 'Multi-speed Europe' was one of the scenarios mentioned but was definitely coordinated with and highlighted by major member states. After just one week, the leaders of Germany, France, Italy and Spain (the four largest economies in the EU) also publicly welcomed this proposal. 'Multi-speed Europe' is positioned as a third solution, a sort of compromise that appeases the debate between proponents of Federal Europe and decentralised Europe. However, the problem with the third solution is its symptomatic tendency to reach a compromise when necessary because of an implicit appeal to be compromised itself. The notion of a third solution usually covers an absolutist pretension to a final solution which is delusional. 'Multi-speed Europe', as 'a structure with an integrated core and a looser outer layer', is a path to disintegration. It is possible that this idea is a political warning signal to less integrated (or obedient) member states but will not end the debate about centralised/decentralised Europe. The concept of a neo-medieval empire suggests the competing cores of power. The emergence of a single dominant core is the beginning of the end for every union which embraces a diversity.

References

- Barroso, J. M. D. (2012). Nobel Lecture – From War to Peace: A European Tale. Retrieved from: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/en-lecture_en.html.
- Bóka, É. (2010). *Europe in Search of Unity in Diversity: Can personalist federalism and multi-levelism manage diversity?* Szombathely – Kőszeg: Institute for Social and European Studies (ISES).
- Brandt, W. (1971). Nobel Lecture – Peace Policy in Our Time. Retrieved from: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-lecture.html.
- Crawley, H. (2016). Managing the Unmanageable? Understanding Europe’s Response to the Migration ‘Crisis’. *Human Geography, Volume 9, No. 2, pp. 13 – 23*.
- de La Baume, M. (2017, March). Multispeed Europe: the EU’s ‘Loch Ness monster’. *Politico*. Retrieved from: <http://www.politico.eu/article/multispeed-europe-the-eus-loch-ness-monster-future/>.
- Delors, J. (1985). Opening of the Intergovernmental Conference. *Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 9, Volume 18, pp. 7 – 13*.
- Eco, U. (1986). *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- European Commission (2015 (1)). A European Agenda on Migration. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Brussels: European Commission.
- European Commission (2015 (2)). Commission Recommendation (EU) 2015/914 of 8 June 2015 on a European resettlement scheme. *Official Journal of the European Union, L148/33, 13.6.2015*.
- European Commission (2016). Relocation and Resettlement: Positive trend continues, but more efforts needed. Brussels: European Commission – Press release, 13 July 2016.
- Eurostat (2016). The EU in the World: 2016 edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
- Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2015). *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. London: Penguin Books.
- Hertzler, J. O. (1965). *The History of Utopian Thought*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers.
- Hinsley, F. H. (1963). *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keynes, J. M. (1920). *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe.
- Metcalfe–Hough, V. (2015). The Migration Crisis? Facts, Challenges and Possible Solutions. *ODI (Overseas Development Institute) Briefing, October*. London: ODI.

- Miszlivetz, F. and Jensen, J. (2013). Global Crises and Democratic Challenges for Europe and the World. In J. Jensen and F. Miszlivetz (Eds.), *Global Challenges – European and Local Answers: The Rise of Glocality in Europe*. Szombathely: Savaria University Press, pp. 35 – 52.
- Mumford, L. (1928). *The Story of Utopias*. New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers.
- Münchau, W. (2017, March). A multi-speed formula will shape Europe's future. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/f01f1266-058e-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9>.
- Obama, B. H. (2009). Nobel Lecture – A Just and Lasting Peace. Retrieved from: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html.
- Schmitter, P. C. (2006). A Sketch of What a 'Post-Liberal' Democracy Might Look Like. *Central European Political Science Review, Volume 7, No. 23 – 24, Spring – Summer, pp. 9 – 19*.
- Van Rompuy, H. (2012). Nobel Lecture – From War to Peace: A European Tale. Retrieved from: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/en-lecture_en.html.
- Zalan, E. (2017, March). EU's big four back 'multi-speed' Europe. *EUobserver*. Retrieved from: <https://euobserver.com/news/137134>.
- Zielonka, J. (2010). *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.